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51.Introduction
“The termination of the Cold War and the altered picture of poten-
tial crises pose new questions for the defence of Finland. With the 
decline in the threat of a major war, its place has been taken 
by the existence of regional crises that are susceptible to esca-
lation. With crises becoming more obviously internal matters 
for individual states or otherwise spatially restricted events, we 
are obliged to adjust the structure and deployment plans of our 
armed forces accordingly. All in all, the image of future warfare 
has substantially altered.”
Statement issued by the Parliamentary Defence Committee to 
the Foreign Affairs Committee, 1997
The international security environment has indeed greatly altered 
since the end of the Cold War, and Western capabilities to repel a 
large-scale offensive on the part of armoured and mechanized divi-
sions of Warsaw Pact troops under Soviet command have given way 
to smaller military operations carried out progressively further from 
home. It has now been recognized in both the United States and 
Europe that the threat of a large-scale conventional attack is a thing 
of the past.
“Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial 
capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of 
individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores 
for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. … America is 
now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing 
ones.”1
“… we no longer face the old threat of massive attack.”2
“Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now im-
This study was written when the author was serving as lecturer of strategy at 
the Finnish National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence 
Studies. Major (GS), Dr.Pol.Sc. Jyri Raitasalo is currently serving in Defence 
Command Finland.
1 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), pp. i, 1. 
2 NATO (1991).
6probable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more di-
verse, less visible and less predictable.”3
“It was relatively simple during the Cold War to predict develop-
ments in armed forces, the forms that a war might take and the 
modes of warfare that might be employed. These were mainly 
dependent on the opposition between the major power blocs 
and the existence of similar development work in both the East 
and West. Recent turns in events have made such predictions 
more difficult, however, and the general nature of crises has 
become more complicated. With the cessation of the confronta-
tion between the major military alliances, the danger of a full-
scale war suddenly breaking out in Europe has diminished, and 
it has been replaced with regional crises that frequently involve 
the interests of the major powers and are highly susceptible to 
escalation.”4
“….the threat of a conventional war has receded, particularly 
in Europe.”5
The purpose of this research is to examine the challenges in-
volved in the post-Cold War development of the Finnish defence 
system within the framework of the Western military viewpoint, 
given the changes that have taken place in the international security 
environment.6 These changes have been of such a magnitude that 
they have inevitably altered the concepts harboured by the princi-
pal actors engaged in generating military power (still predominant-
ly states) regarding the nature of a potential future war. As these 
concepts alter, pressures will build up for changes in the principles 
governing the use of armed forces, the nature of their missions and 
the equipment and forms of organization required. As the “reality” of 
war changes, armed forces will be required to be prepared to cope 
with new modes of warfare. The aim here is therefore to examine 
3 A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy (2003), p. 3.
4 Security trends in Europe and the defence of Finland, Government report to 
parliament 1/1997, 17.3.1997 (1997), p. 49 (in Finnish). All citations from works 
published in Finnish have been translated specifically for the purposes of 
this paper.
5 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), p. 16. 
6 This study covers the years between the end of the Cold War in 1990/1991 and 
2007.
7the effects of the altered international security environment of the 
post-Cold War era on the principles governing the development of 
the Finnish defence system. 
War and preparations for the event of war will be examined 
here from the strategic perspective, the emphasis being on the po-
litico-military implications of changes in warfare and the image of 
war. This means that the operational, tactical and technical aspects 
that are frequently to the fore in military research will be excluded 
from the scope of the discussion proper and will be mentioned only 
in cases where they are of political and strategic significance for the 
definition of war. One example of this might be the concept prevail-
ing in the United States of a Revolution in Military Affairs brought 
about by advances in technology, leading to a possible change in the 
nature of warfare.7 This paper does not, therefore, aim to present a 
new prediction of the potential military threats to Finland that might 
arise from the new image of war, nor to provide recommendations 
for the future development of the Finnish defence system or for the 
acquisition of particular weapons systems, for instance. Instead, the 
strategic perspective to be adopted with regard to the changing in-
ternational security environment, and particularly with regard to 
new interpretations of the use of military force – the changing image 
of war – will imply here a division of the research task into three 
stages:
I) Analysis of the changing international security environment 
from the perspective of the use of armed forces. This implies an 
analysis of the Western image of war in the post-Cold War era, 
for use as a frame of reference for discussing the corresponding 
image harboured in Finland.
II) Analysis of the effects of trends in the international security en-
vironment on the Finnish image of war during the post-Cold 
War era.
III) Analysis of the changes in the Finnish defence system brought 
about by the altered image of war during the post-Cold War 
era.
7  See, for example, Raitasalo (2005a); Raitasalo (2005b).
8Perspective on war
This paper will adopt a constructivist approach to war, through the 
medium of its image. The image of war can be regarded as an ana-
lytical tool for identifying shared understandings of war within the 
international system. In the context of the present work the image of 
war refers to a relatively uniform set of shared understandings connected 
with the deployment of armed forces that are grounded in an interpretation 
of the nature of the international security system that is based on a com-
mon world view.8 This image of war is constantly being reconstructed 
through international interplay between the main actors responsible 
for developing, maintaining and deploying armed forces.
During the 1990s the Western image of war ‘outgrew’ the par-
adigm that had governed it during the Cold War era.9 As the old 
military threat receded, this image went through a process of re-
definition that is in effect still taking place in the form of a constant 
interaction between practical measures (actual wars and military op-
erations) and discourses (interpretations of the practical measures). 
Thus the image of war inherited from the post-Cold War era has 
been shaped by the way in which military force has been employed 
– or the way in which demands have been expressed for it to be 
employed – in the post-Cold War world. Examined from a construc-
tivist perspective, no change in the nature or image of war can be 
discerned if one is to view the use of armed forces from a value-free 
– i.e. objective – viewpoint, for this is a question of interpreting the 
events. The interpretation of a military operation as an invasion or 
a humanitarian intervention, for instance, will significantly affect its 
normative ‘nature’. Thus interpretations of the use of armed forces 
are a potential resource for the actors engaged in their use,10 and 
their behaviour in accordance with all the regulations governing the 
use of armed forces can reduce international objections to their use. 
The war that began in Iraq in 2003 provides one example in this 
sense, since the United States and its allies attempted to disseminate 
the interpretation of a war aimed at eliminating terrorism and the 
threat posed by a combination of weapons of mass destruction with 
8 This definition of the image of war parallels that of a scientific paradigm, cf. 
Kuhn (1994). On the paradigm of war, see Raitasalo (2002); Raitasalo & Sipilä 
(2004a); Raitasalo & Sipilä (2004b); Raitasalo (2005a).
9 Raitasalo & Sipilä (2004a).
10 The use of armed forces is understood here in a broad sense to include their 
development, maintenance and actual deployment in military operations.
9a rogue state in the grip of a powerful dictator in order to justify the 
deployment of their armed forces and ensure the widest possible 
political, military and economic support from the international com-
munity. Actors may thus be assumed to attempt to bring about com-
mon interpretations (common understandings of a war or deploy-
ment of forces) based on their own points of departure. On the other 
hand, common interpretations that emerge gradually in the course 
of continuous, extensive interaction are not merely the outcomes of 
the conscious intentions of certain actors. Interpretations of practical 
actions that arise through daily interaction over a matter of years or 
decades emerge of their own accord, as if taken for granted, to form 
common interpretations that take on a ‘natural’ or ‘suprahistorical’ 
status.
In this sense international politics can be looked on as a struggle 
between competing interpretations of practical actions,11 although this 
does not mean that a conflict situation need exist between the ac-
tors concerned; it is simply that interpretations of concrete actions 
are seldom, if ever, entirely incontestable. It should also be noted 
that even those concepts that have become established features of 
international politics can vary in meaning as parts of this struggle 
that is waged in words as well as deeds. There are few perfectly clear 
rules or regulations governing the use of armed forces that apply in 
all situations.12 Interpretations of practical actions (the use of armed 
forces) can also be constructed out of conflicting evidence and fre-
quently from different points of view which may prove impossible 
to reconcile entirely. Questions of the legitimacy of armed interven-
tions, for instance, can become embroiled nowadays in conflicts 
between the sovereignty of states (which condemns such interven-
tions) and the pursuance of human rights (which may render them 
acceptable in certain circumstances), and both factors have to be 
taken into account when actors and the international community 
define their stance towards individual concrete instances of the use 
of armed force.
It will be assumed here that interpretations of the use of armed 
forces – images of war – can be understood as being constructed in a 
‘space’ delimited by the discourses of war, where these discourses are 
11 Cf. Harle & Moisio (2003), pp. 11-12.
12 One fairly unambiguous rule of this kind is the right to defend oneself in the 
event of an armed attack, although even this has been subject to re-interpreta-
tion in the light of the 9/11 events. 
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continually emerging narratives of factors connected with the use 
of armed forces – e.g. military threats or arguments legitimizing the 
use of force. In the words of Kari Laitinen, discourses “can also be 
understood as strategies that shape and construct reality, confirm 
prevailing truths or equally well deconstruct what already exists.”13
The termination of the Cold War can be regarded as forming 
a recent conceptual watershed14 or creative moment15 in international 
politics, at which established meanings and interpretations were apt 
to be questioned and re-evaluated. It thus served to challenge the 
Western image of war, which had become ossified over a period of 
several decades, as the military threats of the Cold War era began 
to be dispelled in the course of the 1990s, together with the prin-
ciples and methods governing the use of armed forces, at least in 
the advanced industrialized countries. Instead of full-scale warfare, 
these Western principles came to be characterized by the prospects 
of small-scale, multifocal interventions and crisis management op-
erations conducted outside the country’s own area and that of its 
allies. This also meant changes in the meanings of concepts that had 
existed in Cold War times (e.g. a radical change in the concept of 
crisis management in the course of the decade) and the adoption of 
new concepts in connection with military activities. Where war and 
peacekeeping operations were the principal concepts used in con-
nection with the deployment of forces in the Cold War era, the accent 
now shifted to humanitarian interventions, crisis management op-
erations, peace operations, small-scale military operations, military 
operations other than war (MOOTW) and ‘campaigns’ as the new 
vocabulary for interpreting the use of armed forces. When discuss-
ing the concepts and the changes that took place in their meanings 
it should be noted that concepts are always bound to discourses that 
arise from and are modified by practical actions and utterances – i.e. 
broader linguistic and pragmatic structures – which in turn make it 
possible to perceive the world in a conceptual manner. 
13 Laitinen (2005), p. 72 (in Finnish); see also Hast (2006), p. 13 (in Finnish): “Dis-
courses differ from one another in the picture that they paint of reality.”
14 See Moisio (2003b), p. 105. It is typical of conceptual watersheds that controver-
sies arise over the meanings of political concepts. 
15 See Lehti (2003), p. 117 (in Finnish). [According to Erik Ringmar,] a creative 
moment can be viewed as ”a time when the concept of what is an appropriate 
manner of perceiving the world remains entirely open,… when new identities 
are establishing themselves and new social practices are being initiated.”
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One significant fact as far as our decision to resort to discourses 
for our analysis of the Western image of war is concerned is that 
there are only certain ways in which the discourses that define war 
can emerge: they are inevitably connected with the practices in-
volved in the use of armed forces – providing politico-strategic inter-
pretations of these. The ‘raw materials’ may be historical experiences 
of the deployment of armed forces and conclusions reached on the 
evidence of previous wars, and these constitute the tools for arriving 
at interpretations. In addition, the prevailing level of technology and 
the distribution of material resources in the military sense among 
the participants in the international system form the boundary con-
ditions within the framework of which it is possible to reach such in-
terpretations. The ‘possibilities’ for the discourses to define a war are 
thus strictly finite: i.e. the pre-existing shared understandings of the 
nature of war, together with material factors, will limit the linguistic 
and discursive possibilities for reconstructing the meaning of war. It 
is indeed often the case that the reproduction of an earlier image of 
war is more probable than its transformation.16 An image of war can 
therefore be assumed to be fairly ‘sticky’ or conservative in nature.
Established war discourses are a part of the social structure 
of the international system. They are “socio-cultural resources that 
people make use of in order to give significance to the world and 
to their actions.” Thus these discourses differ from political rhetoric, 
e.g. the verbal utterances of a person belonging to the political elite, 
as represented by a security policy statement by a leading politician, 
for instance. Political rhetoric needs to be anchored in the prevail-
ing discourses – at least if it is intended to be effective and cred-
ible. On the other hand, it is possible through political rhetoric and 
practical action to bring about changes in the prevailing discourses. 
Thus discourses are part of the structure of our culture – vehicles 
for potentiating thought, speech and action – although at the same 
time they can themselves be subject to change as a consequence of 
linguistic and practical activity.17 The war discourses that are most 
essential for constructing our image of war in the context of this 
work thus limit the actors’ possibilities for rhetorical argumentation 
and practical action. When George W. Bush, for example, employed 
political rhetoric to argue in favour of the unilateral preventive use 
of force on the occasion of the publication of his national security 
16 See Neumann (2002), Wendt (1999).
17 Moisio (2003b), pp. 93-103.
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strategy in 2002, he and his administration were in effect taking part 
in shaping the discourse of the ‘war on terrorism’. It is important to 
remember, however, that this discourse was not created in vacuo, but 
was influenced by the already established discourse connected with 
terrorism, which defined it as a species of crime18 and not of warfare, 
and that connected with the sovereignty of states, which prohibited 
unsolicited interventions.
It should be noted that the continuing construction of the West-
ern image of war has been a layered process, and also an ambiguous 
one, i.e. it has not been possible for individual factors or actors to 
dominate it, since an image of war is an intersubjective social fact 
rather than a subjective one. This intersubjectivity means that cer-
tain understandings of the nature, aims and methods of warfare are 
shaped in a fairly uniform manner over an extensive set of actors.19 
In research focusing om the system level in international politics and 
strategy such a set of actors may consist of states and other agents 
capable of generating armed forces – e.g. private mercenary militias 
and various sub-state armed groups led by warlords. Crucial groups 
for any examination of the intersubjective image of war at the state 
level will be the political leadership, the military leadership, the me-
dia and public opinion.20 
The intersubjective nature of the image of war implies that no 
one actor in any situation can put forward a generally and unani-
mously accepted interpretation of the use of armed forces, and that 
the image itself cannot be regarded as a clearly defined, uncontro-
versial entity. Since the image of war is determined by innumer-
able discourses connected with the use of armed forces, and since 
it arises out of common interpretations arrived at within a broad-
based community, it follows that this image will inevitably be subject 
to differences in interpretation to some extent. Indeed the degree 
of internal coherence (uncontroversiality) of the image will dictate 
how much room for manoeuvre political actors have when arriving 
18 See, for example, Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), p. 8.
19 It may be said, for instance, that an extensive body of actors generating armed 
forces possess a uniform impression of war as a reality. Thus it may be described 
as an intersubjectively perceived fact, which is capable of altering in nature over 
time. These actors – in the last resort people – create the meaning of war in their 
political actions and engage in preparations for warfare and the use of armed 
force in accordance with this intersubjectively perceived fact.
20 See Wendt (1999), p. 75: ”[i]ndividuals do not constitute social kinds, collectives 
do.”; see also Raitasalo (2005a), pp. 70-71, Searle (1995).
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at their own interpretations as to the concrete factors associated with 
the use of armed force. A low degree of internal coherence, denoting 
inconsistencies between the relevant discourses, will leave the po-
litical decision-makers with more room for interpretation, whereas 
conversely, a coherent image of the nature of a possible war will be 
formed in the presence of mutually complementary and confirma-
tory discourses, the combined effect of which will be to reduce the 
room for interpretation in matters of the use of armed force. In this 
sense the image of a possible military confrontation internalized by 
the great powers of the Cold War period can be estimated to have 
been fairly coherent relative to that entertained by the great powers 
of the present time (for a more detailed argument, see chapter 2).
Discourses can be regarded as functional structures of various 
kinds which guide the construction of an image of war and within 
the framework of which actors are able to guide its construction 
through their words and deeds,21 and can serve as ‘vessels’ for the 
dissemination of a private understanding or interpretation so as to 
become a common understanding. Thus discourses can either re-
produce interpretations of the use of armed forces that are in ac-
cordance with a previous image of war – i.e. confirm interpretations 
that prevailed earlier – or transform the image by altering one or 
more of those interpretations. The discourses themselves are either 
reproduced or altered through the agency of practical activities and 
the argumentation – political rhetoric – associated with them.
21 ‘Guiding’ means in this connection the exercising of influence on interpreta-
tions of the use of armed force, and not the possibility for determining or defin-
ing the intersubjectively constructed image of war. It should be noted, however, 
that a significant proportion of the practical actions and political rhetoric that 
will affect the discourses will not represent intentional efforts at influencing the 
generally accepted interpretations but will be simply the actors’ reactions to eve-
ryday political issues. Thus these reactions will also affect the generally accepted 
interpretations. 
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The Finnish defence system and the change in the image 
of war 
Concepts regarding the development of the Finnish defence system are 
understood in the present paper as forming one part of a broader 
conceptual entity, the image of a potential war in Finnish eyes, re-
ferred to for the sake of brevity as “the Finnish image of war”. The 
concept that one has of (a potential) war will influence to an essen-
tial degree the way in which one prepares for and equips oneself for 
such a war.22 The repelling of a large-scale offensive, the mounting 
of a peace enforcement mission and defence in the context of asym-
metrical warfare all entail different sets of principles governing the 
development of a defence system.23 
The Finnish image of war, the set of concepts prevailing in Fin-
land regarding the use to be made of the armed forces,24 has not 
arisen or been shaped through exclusively internal political process-
es within Finland itself,25 but rather a significant role has been played 
by developments in the international security environment. Factors 
such as general progress in technology, actual recent wars and the 
lessons learned from them and international military collaboration 
have been involved in shaping the Finnish image of war.
The point of departure for this work is that the Finnish image 
of war has been defined as one part of the Western image of war, 
but taking national distinctive features into account. It is essential, 
for instance, to take the geographical and historical factors associ-
ated with Russia into consideration when analysing the differences 
between the Finnish and general Western images of war. After all, 
Russia is even today a great power in a military sense and one with 
which Finland has an extensive common boundary, and in addition, 
22 Cf. Luoma-aho (2003), p. 58 (in Finnish): “How people speak about things 
directly affects what they think about them and how they act in relation to 
them.”
23 These three examples of different types of warfare are based on the official con-
cepts espoused in Finland regarding the potential tasks facing the Defence Forc-
es today and in the foreseeable future. See Finnish Security and Defence Policy 
2004 – Government report to Parliament 6/2004 (2004), pp. 102-105; Report of 
the working group for revision of the law of peacekeeping missions (2005), pp. 
8, 18-19, 25-26.
24 These include in particular concepts regarding military threats, the legitimate 
goals and methods of warfare and the elements of military force.
25 The analysis of the image of war presented here is based on the ‘war paradigm’ 
frame of reference. See Raitasalo & Sipilä (2004a), Raitasalo & Sipilä (2004b).
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the Finns still recall the events of the wars with the Soviet Union 
in 1939–1945 and the Soviet political and military pressure exerted 
on Finland during the Cold War. In fact the threat posed by Russia 
did not completely disappear with the termination of the Cold War 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, although the security situation in 
Finland has clearly changed relatively to that of the post-World War 
II decades.
“Russia is attempting to regain as much as possible of its lead-
ing role, resembling the influence that the Soviet Union had in 
Eurasia.”26
“Thus developments in Russia are a great opportunity for Fin-
land but they also involve risks and problems.”27 
“… We have to follow Russia very carefully, but … noth-
ing is happening so fast that the people need to be seriously 
worried.”28
“Russia will remain the most important military power in 
Finland’s neighbouring areas. Its military is in transition but 
a capability for traditional use of force in the region will be 
retained.”29
“Although we may not regard Russia as a threat in the political 
sense, Finland has to develop its defences to allow for all even-
tualities, include a possible change in the political situation in 
Russia.”30
“The threats to Finland are determined by the country’s geopo-
litical position… The only realistic direction from which a threat 
could arise is the east, that is from Russia.”31
26 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004 – Government report to parliament 
6/2004 (2004), p. 35.
27 Ibid., p. 67.
28 Kaskeala (2006a) (in Finnish).
29 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), 
p.70.
30 Statement by Paavo Lipponen in 2004 (in Finnish). See Nokkala (2005a).
31 Kanninen (1994), p. 107 (in Finnish).
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“… given our geographical location, the three main security 
challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia and Russia.”32
Finland’s historical experiences of the use of armed force in 
connection with Russia – a form of Finnish historical war discourse 
– are based on its position as a small state located in the sphere of 
influence of a major power and integrated into that major power for 
a substantial part of the duration of its national historical memory, 
i.e. the years 1809–1917. The struggle for independence, the Win-
ter War and Continuation War fought against the Soviet Union, the 
immediate post-war period spent under the Allied Control Com-
mission, the ‘years of danger’ under Soviet political pressure and the 
years of ‘Finlandization’ – in short, the whole period from the gain-
ing of independence up to the end of the Cold War – has provided 
Finland with a wealth of historical experience of subordination to a 
major military power. In addition, it can very well be claimed that as 
a legacy from the Second World War the Finns still cherish the idea 
that they strove unaided to survive both the horrors of that war and 
the Cold War ‘approaches’ of the Soviet empire. This view of a capac-
ity to act independently is naturally only partly correct, for Finland 
benefited from close cooperation with Germany during the Second 
World War and her fortunes as an immediate neighbour of the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War were influenced by the fluctuating po-
litical relations between the major world powers. Nevertheless the 
formation of the Finnish image of war nowadays can be estimated 
to incorporate, alongside the general Western understanding of the 
use of armed force, a certain ‘survival narrative’ that has been trans-
formed into a defence policy doctrine of ‘neutrality’ (predecessor of 
the current doctrine of ‘non-alliance’) and a belief in the country’s 
ability to act independently and credibly in defence of its own ter-
ritory.
Finland is developing its defence system and defence forces in 
accordance with the prevailing image of war and on the basis of the 
scenarios regarding a future war that can be derived from this im-
age. The Finnish image of war thus determines what defence arrange-
ments will be needed and what duties the armed forces must be capa-
ble of performing. It should be noted, however, that in terms of the 
constructivist theory of international politics the defence decisions 
taken in Finland will affect the whole Western picture of a potential 
32 Häkämies (2007).
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war, although admittedly the impact of a small country such as this 
on the process of defining war among the Western nations is bound 
to be fairly minor. Finland nevertheless does influence the Western 
image of war, albeit to a very limited extent, e.g. by developing its 
Defence Forces and taking part in international operations. One ex-
ample of its influence is its joint initiative regarding the transferring 
of the duties assigned under the Petersberg Accord to the European 
Union – despite the fact that this initiative was aimed at delimiting 
and restricting the development of the EU’s military activities and 
capabilities.
One major aim of this work is to answer the question of how 
the Finnish image of war has altered during the post-Cold War era and 
how this change has affected the principles governing the development 
of the country’s defence system. The process of seeking answers to 
these far-reaching questions will be supported by the posing of three 
more detailed subordinate questions for investigation. The overall 
aim is to achieve an analytical evaluation of the development of the 
Finnish defence system. This will be done in Chapters 2–4. The more 
detailed questions which this work will attempt to answer are the 
following:
1. How has the Western image of war changed since the end of 
the Cold War?
2. How has the Finnish image of war changed since the end of the 
Cold War?
3. How has the change in the Finnish image of war affected the 
development of the country’s defence system during the post-
Cold War era?
An answer to the first question will be sought in Chapter 2, 
where the Western image of a potential war will be analysed by 
looking into the shared understandings regarding such a war that 
prevail in US, NATO and EU circles. An answer to the second ques-
tion will then be sought in Chapter 3 by analysing the change that 
has taken place in the Finnish image of war, adopting the view that 
Finland is a part of the Western security community and shares its 
values. Finally, Chapter 4 will contain an evaluation of the influence 
of the interpretations reached regarding the changing security en-
vironment on development of the Finnish defence system. A brief 
summary of the findings will be presented in Chapter 5.
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2. Post-Cold War changes  
in the Western image of war
During the Cold War period it was the Pax Americana that deter-
mined views on global security, in that the military might and eco-
nomic buoyancy of the United States enabled the more advanced 
industrialized countries to prosper in spite of the threatening secu-
rity situation. It was thanks to the strength of the United States that 
the ominous activities of the Soviet Union in the international arena 
did not transform the Cold War into an open ‘hot’ war involving at 
least the two major military alliances. Elsewhere, of course, this was 
a period of recurrent wars, with Western powers a party to many of 
these, e.g. the Korean War, Vietnam and the Falklands (Malvinas) 
War.
From a purely military point of view, the Pax Americana was 
based on the development of nuclear weapons and the existence of 
conventional forces deployed in order to be capable of containing a 
possible offensive mounted by the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. 
As the outcome of a war conducted with nuclear weapons would 
have been catastrophic for all parties, the avoidance of war became 
the guiding principle of the day and deterrence occupied a promi-
nent role as one of the aims of security policy in both the East and 
the West, alongside victory in the event of war. Even a minor armed 
conflict between the major powers or their allies could have esca-
lated into a global nuclear war.
In spite of the focus on deterrence, a fairly consistent concept 
emerged in the West during the Cold War as to the nature of the war 
for which the allied forces should be prepared. Perhaps as a legacy 
from the Second World War, it was a large-scale attack by mecha-
nized conventional troops that formed the principal threat at that 
time, alongside a nuclear strike, that is.33 The Cold War, with its arms 
escalation and domino theory, in any case called for large armed 
forces to be kept on constant alert, and also required them to be 
deployable in regions outside the principal arena of the Cold War, 
Europe – as exemplified by the wars in Korea and Vietnam. The lat-
ter, of course, also served to demonstrate the problems attached to 
33 This is referred to in constructivist theory as the shadow of history – the way in 
which the past can provide a frame of reference for action in the present.
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warfare with conventional mechanized divisions against an enemy 
equipped for guerrilla tactics.34 In spite of this, however, the Western 
image of war in the Cold War period was dominated by the threat 
posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries as a whole 
and the prospect of the decisive battles being large-scale encounters 
between armed forces in Europe.35
It was a political and military viewpoint that emphasized the 
‘use’ of nuclear weapons and mechanized conventional forces in the 
‘war of attrition’ mould inherited from the two world wars that es-
tablished itself at the core of the Western image of war during the 
Cold War period, an image that arose out of at least the following 
discourses36:
1. The discourse of an ideological opposition and struggle between the 
democratic West and the communist East. This ideological strug-
gle was expected to flare up into an open war at any moment, 
and the discourse held that Western societies should be con-
stantly at the ready for a conventional and nuclear war against 
the countries of the Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union.
2. The discourse of nuclear weapons as a means of preventing the 
outbreak of a full-scale war and restraining any overheating of the 
Cold War. The discourse that emphasized the value of nuclear 
weapons and a nuclear strategy had been built up around the 
concept of deterrence. In fact, numerous views were put forward 
34 The Vietnam War was especially trying for the United States, as it ended in this 
superpower being defeated by the forces of an underdeveloped country. Over-
whelming technological superiority and armed forces that met up to the de-
mands of the ‘leading’ image of war at the time were unable to hold their own 
against an enemy that employed an asymmetrical strategy. The small amount of 
benefit that the United States gained from the Vietnam War was due to the fact 
that its entry into the war had demonstrated the country’s determination and 
credibility in the struggle against the spread of communism, in that it had sent 
its troops to the other side of the globe to prevent communism from engulfing 
South Vietnam. On the other hand, eventual defeat in the war undoubtedly un-
dermined the country’s overall credibility.
35 See, for example, Annual Report to the President and Congress by Secretary of 
Defense Les Aspin (1994), p. 5; Garden and Ramsbotham (2004), p. 10; Defense 
Department Special Briefing on Announcement of New Locations for the Ac-
tive Duty Army’s Modular Brigade Combat Teams (2005).
36 See van Creveld (1991); Raitasalo and Sipilä (2004a); Raitasalo (2006a). On nu-
clear weapons during the Cold War period, see Pyykönen (1998), pp. 40-42. 
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within the framework of this discourse as to the best means 
of developing a credible deterrent to influence the other side 
in a possible confrontation between the superpowers, e.g. the 
mounting of a massive counter-attack in the event of the deter-
rent being ineffective, or a flexible reaction that would allow for 
conventional warfare and a limited nuclear exchange between 
the superpowers. It should be noted that the Strategic Defence 
Initiative (SDI, also known as ‘Star Wars’) that was being de-
veloped by the USA in the 1980s in fact rendered the whole 
nuclear deterrent discourse that had been under development 
since the 1940s questionable, since the basic idea was to destroy 
the other side’s nuclear warheads in flight and thereby create a 
platform for winning the war in a situation which had earlier 
been described quite simply as ‘mutually assured destruction’ 
(MAD).
3.  The discourse of battles between extensive conventional mecha-
nized forces as the most significant expression of the nature of 
war and as a basis for developing armed forces.
In addition to these typical Cold War discourses, there were also 
some discourses regarding the nature of war which had become es-
tablished over a longer time-span but similarly influenced the image 
of war in the Cold War period37:
4. The discourse of inter-state war. One effect of this discourse was 
to marginalize non-state actors. The anti-colonialist wars and 
civil wars (often referred to as “low-intensity conflicts”) that oc-
curred during the Cold War period served partly to discredit this 
state-centred war discourse.
5. The discourse of a formal theatre of war – as opposed to a war 
fought in the midst of civil society – in which the outcome is 
decided by means of a symmetrical battle between hierarchi-
cally organized troops. It should be noted that the limitation to 
a given theatre of war had been questioned prior to the Cold 
War, e.g. in connection with the strategic bombing raids of the 
Second World War, which destroyed whole towns or cities.
37 See Franzén (2002); van Creveld (1991); Raitasalo and Sipilä (2004a); Raitasalo 
(2005a).
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Changes in the Western image of war after the end of the 
Cold War 
The end of the Cold War and the onset of globalization
The termination of the Cold War posed challenges for the Western 
image of war which had become established over a period of several 
decades (or alternatively, it can be argued that it had matured over 
a period of centuries). It was realized relatively quickly in the early 
1990s that the logic behind the workings of the international system 
was changing, although admittedly without any predictable direc-
tion, and the event did indeed constitute a conceptual watershed 
of a kind, providing the opportunity for changing the international 
rules of the game and the international security environment. This 
opportunity was connected with a change in the established inter-
pretations brought about by the practical deeds and political rhetoric 
of various actors and with the rise of new shared understandings, 
but as a widely accepted social fact, the end of the Cold War did not 
as such offer any changing interpretations of the logic behind the 
workings of the emerging international system or any new rules of 
the game. Instead, the new logic and rules had to be created out of 
the concepts and thought patterns that were already in use. Thus the 
post-Cold War era grew up out of the mentality and material reality 
of the Cold War itself, as it were. The OSCE Charter signed in Paris 
in 1990 reflected this termination of the Cold War and expressed 
the need for a broad-based re-evaluation of the relations between 
states:
“The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We 
declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect 
and co-operation. Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of 
the past. ... The changing political and military environment in 
Europe opens new possibilities for common efforts in the field 
of military security.”38 
The understanding of war simply as a series of large-scale 
mechanized encounters and the concentration on strategic nuclear 
armament no longer seemed rational once the Cold War was over, 
as the ideological confrontation between East and West had disap-
38 Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), pp. 3, 8.
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peared, and once this state of affairs had gained widespread inter-
national acceptance as a ‘fact of life’ in the early 1990s, the Cold War 
image of war was also challenged. This meant that the principles 
for the use of armed force had to be re-defined on both sides of the 
East-West dividing line as the traditional threats abated and new 
dangers emerged.
The Western image of war in the post-Cold War era neverthe-
less continued to be founded on the same concepts of war as pre-
viously – the Pax Americana understood in a broad sense. On the 
other hand, academic and political discussion concerning ‘global-
ization’ gained momentum around the same time as the Cold War 
came to an end, partly on account of the fact that the abolition of 
the political dichotomy and the progress made in technology led to 
a rapid removal of the barriers to the mobility of information flows, 
goods, capital and people that had prevailed earlier. In addition, the 
discussion that had arisen in the 1970s and 1980s concerning inter-
national interdependence merged into this broader theme of glo-
balization, within which different actors were inclined to assess the 
pros and cons of the global system from their own viewpoints.39 This 
discussion is still going on at the present time, as globalization can 
be regarded as a field in which neither the direction nor the rate of 
the process can be predicted in advance, but rather evaluations of its 
advantages and disadvantages arise through interactions between 
actors such as states, transnational companies and international or-
ganizations (IGOs, NGOs etc.) and its development and manifes-
tations are shaped by national and international political decisions 
and agreements.
As the notion of the termination of the Cold War established 
itself in the early 1990s, the stability and predictability of the inter-
national system came to occupy a prominent position in Western 
security assessments, while the discussions of globalization laid new 
emphasis on interdependence, in view of the vulnerability of the in-
ternational system and the new threats that it faced. As the prospects 
of a traditional large-scale war between the major powers rapidly re-
39 Interdependence has been looked on as both a positive and a negative factor in 
the context of globalization. One positive aspect noted as far as the use of armed 
forces is concerned is the resulting need to maintain the stability of the interna-
tional system, which can be expected to reduce the incidence of military crises, 
while a negative aspect might be the decline in the self-sufficiency of individual 
actors, for example, and their consequent increased reliance on other actors, e.g. 
under wartime conditions.
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ceded the security threats facing the globalizing world emerged as being 
more indeterminate and indirect in nature. Thus the security strategy 
for the European Union, approved in 2003, speaks in concrete terms 
of a tension between the threats posed by the globalization process 
and the military threats inherited from the Cold War period.
“In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a 
concern as those that are near at hand. … Meanwhile, global 
communication increases awareness in Europe of regional con-
flicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world. Our 
traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the 
Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new 
threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new 
threats are dynamic. … we should be ready to act before a crisis 
occurs. … In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold 
War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be 
tackled by purely military means.”40
A revolution in military affairs
The Gulf War of 1991, waged at precisely the same time as the Cold 
War was coming to an end, served in a sense as a ‘model’ for the com-
ing era, a campaign from which lessons could be drawn for future 
wars. For the United States in particular, one lesson to be learned 
was the vital importance of maintaining a technological advantage 
over the enemy, and this ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) had 
become a leading theme in US strategy by the mid-1990s. The revo-
lution was viewed as a process that was fundamentally re-shaping 
the character of war and providing the US armed forces with the vi-
sionary task of developing their capabilities in a new direction at a time 
when the traditional threats had abated and no new powerful threat or 
distinct combination of threats had emerged in their stead. Thus the 
development of information technology to the point of achieving a 
revolution in military affairs and maintaining an advantage in this 
field over all potential adversaries became the focus of US defence 
policy from the mid-1990s onwards.41 
40 A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy (2003), pp. 
6-7.
41 On the significance of the Revolution in Military Affairs discourse for the de-
velopment of the US armed forces in the post-Cold War era, see Raitasalo 
(2005a).
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In addition to the Gulf War, military experiences in Bosnia 
(1995), Iraq (Operation Desert Fox, 1998) and Kosovo (1999) lent 
support to the notion of the power of high technology for revolu-
tionizing warfare. The emphasis on aerial combat, precision strikes 
and satellite navigation, the heightened importance of command 
and control (C2) systems and the development of Network-Centric 
Warfare (NCW) were some of the manifestations of the changes in 
the nature of war brought about by this revolution – at least in the 
framework of US strategic deliberations. Other topics that were also 
at the core of this discourse were increased professionality in the 
armed forces (enhanced quality) and capabilities for expeditionary 
warfare beyond the boundaries of one’s own territory.42
The revolution in military affairs gained the status of an official 
tool for the development of the US armed forces in the latter half of 
the 1990s,43 and as a factor directing practical decisions in this field 
it became associated with the ‘transformation’ of the armed forces, 
a concept  introduced at the very end of the decade and employed 
in particular during George W. Bush’s first term of office as a cover 
term for the development of the armed forces towards meeting the 
new security challenges of the post-Cold War era. When the ‘trans-
formation’ was raised to the status of one of the key factors in US 
defence policy, the revolution in military affairs came to be regarded 
as the means for achieving such a transformation. New ‘revolution-
ary’ high-tech weaponry and command systems were thought of as 
increasing the efficiency of military operations of a new type. This 
quotation from the 1999 US National Security Strategy reflects well 
the importance attached to the transformation of the armed forces 
and the revolution in military affairs, and also the logical relation-
ship between the two:
42 The revolution in military affairs discourse gained in currency as fresh experi-
ences in action demonstrated the usefulness of advanced technology, and as the 
discourse heightened, so more resources came to be devoted to implementing 
this revolution through changes in organization, working methods, operational 
principles and available equipment (incl. command and weapons systems). The 
revolution in military affairs assumed the nature of a self-fulfilling prediction 
within US thinking and the practices adopted in the use of the country’s armed 
forces – and at the same time it served as a new strategic imperative now that 
the threat posed by the Soviet Union had been lifted.  
43 See Annual Report to the President and Congress by the Secretary of Defense 
(1995, 1999); Quadrennial Defence Review Report 1997; A National Strategy for 
a New Century (1991).
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“Transformation of our military forces is critical to meeting the 
military challenges of the next century. Exploiting the revolu-
tion in military affairs is fundamental if U.S. forces are to retain 
their dominance in an uncertain world.”44
Efforts were also made to extend the philosophy of the revolu-
tion in military affairs and the associated practical changes in the 
constitution of armed forces to Europe and elsewhere in the world, 
partly in the form of insistence by US governments on the future 
military capacity of the NATO alliance and on the ability of mem-
ber nations to conduct operations together with US forces,45 since 
the inability of many European armed forces to do so had become 
evident by the end of the decade. The lessons learned in both Bos-
nia and Kosovo were taken seriously in Europe, both within NATO 
and within the EU, which began from 1999 onwards to develop its 
own military crisis management capability in accordance with the 
tenets of the US revolution in military affairs. The aim in this re-
spect has been to form small contingents of highly professional and 
well equipped troops for expeditionary operations beyond their own 
areas in which full use can be made of high-tech command and 
weapons systems. The member states of the European Union stated 
the need for a transformation in European armed forces in order to 
achieve “more flexible mobile forces” quite explicitly in the EU secu-
rity strategy document approved in December 2003.46
Correspondingly, NATO has been attempting since the late 
1990s to develop the intervention capacity of its European mem-
ber states, again based in particular on experiences in Bosnia and 
Kosovo,47 and agreement was reached between the member states 
in 1999 on a Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) aimed at placing 
the European allies on a growth course for the development and ac-
quisition of ‘new’ resources in keeping with the revolution in military 
affairs. The vast superiority of the USA in the projection of military 
power had become apparent and there was considerable talk of a 
‘capability gap’ between it and the other NATO countries. The pur-
pose of the DCI was therefore to prevent this gap from widening to 
44 A National Strategy for a New Century (1991), p. 21 (italics by the author).
45 See, for example, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (2002), 
p. 869.
46 A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy (2003), p. 12.
47 On developments in the military capabilities of the United States, NATO and 
the European Union in the post-Cold War era, see Raitasalo (2005a).
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such an extent that it would endanger combined operations by the 
allies, and eventually to close the gap as far as possible.48
NATO began this process of transformation aimed at creating 
forces capable of taking part in modern (post-Cold War) operations 
in 2002, the spearhead of the transformation being the NATO Re-
sponse Force (NRF), which could be deployed rapidly and effectively 
out-of-area. Similarly, an undertaking for the development of military 
forces was agreed upon in Prague when it became apparent that the 
European member states were failing to fulfil the DCI    promises that 
they had made in 1999.49 In spite of everything – and in spite of the 
slow progress made by the European members of NATO in the ac-
tual acquisition of new military capabilities – the military forces avail-
able to NATO have been conceptualized, especially around the turn 
of the millennium, very largely in terms of the definitions laid down 
by the United States. In this respect the discourse of the revolution 
in military affairs may be said to have spread to the whole Western 
world, although admittedly not so much in the form of an emphasis 
on technological change as of a strong belief in networking systems cre-
ated by advanced technology that will permit reductions to be made in 
the substantial sizes of conventional defence forces. Professionalism is 
one aspect of this process, but by no means the only one. 
New wars and asymmetrical warfare
Where the ‘balance of terror’ that prevailed between East and West 
during the Cold War included the mutual understanding that nei-
ther superpower bloc could carry out military operations in the oth-
er’s sphere of influence – at least not without enlisting a proxy, the 
emergence of new wars50 has created a need for the Western powers 
to have a external intervention capacity that can be deployed outside 
their own area. Although wars were constantly being fought in Third 
World countries during the Cold War, these civil wars and ‘low-in-
tensity conflicts’51 were largely passed over in Western evaluations of 
48 See, for example, Raitasalo (2005a); Sirén, Puistola, Raitasalo, Takamaa and Ta-
vaila (2004), p. 42.
49 Raitasalo (2005a); Sirén, Puistola, Raitasalo, Takamaa and Tavaila (2004), p. 42.
50 See, for example, Kaldor (1999); Kaldor (2001). It should be noted that there 
were cases of countries carrying out military operations outside their own area 
even during the Cold War period, and at least the major military powers, includ-
ing the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain and France, developed and 
maintained a capacity for expeditionary operations. 
51 See, for example, van Creveld (1991).
27
the nature of war. The seriousness of the Soviet threat was such that 
it overshadowed all these ‘smaller incidents’ of physical violence, 
at the same time as the spheres of influence of the major powers 
placed strict limitations on the freedom of movement of both the 
American-led West and the Soviet-led East within the international 
system. Once the serious threat of a major war had receded, there 
was more room within the Western image of war for internal conflicts 
and other ‘minor’ physical skirmishes, while the development of the 
media (newspapers, television, internet etc.) into virtually real-time 
sources of news and information began to improve citizens’ aware-
ness of large-scale infringements of human rights, ethnic cleansings 
and civil wars in all corners of the world. This increased awareness 
in the West has in turn given rise to a desire to do something in a 
military sense to prevent or contain these new wars. One lesson that 
the West was able to learn from the protracted Bosnia operation in 
the early 1990s was the need for rapid intervention: these ‘new wars’ 
call for immediate action before they have time to escalate into mass 
killings or genocide.52
The partial transition in the Western image of war to incorpo-
rate non-state acts of violence is in many instances regarded as be-
longing to the frame of reference of asymmetrical warfare. The Cold 
War experiences of guerrilla warfare – such as those acquired by the 
United States in Vietnam or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan – pro-
vided an opportunity to conceptualize war in a situation where one 
or more of the parties to the conflict did not function in the manner 
of a traditional nation-state and the war itself was being conducted 
in a new arena, frequently within civil society. The ‘theory’ of asym-
metrical warfare developed gradually within the Western image of 
war in the course of the 1990s, partly through a process of extracting 
the lessons to be learned from the Vietnam War some twenty years 
afterwards, in view of the fact that the West had resolved in the im-
mediate aftermath of the war to concentrate on ‘traditional’ military 
solutions in the future.53
52 This lesson had already been learned in a preliminary form from the genocides 
perpetrated in Ruanda and Burundi in 1994–1995, and the Western inability to 
act more promptly in Central Africa later served as an example of the need for 
rapid military intervention. See, for example, A Secure Europe in a Better World 
- European Security Strategy (2003), p. 7.
53 On the state-centred image of war in the West and the lack of attention to 
guerrilla warfare, see, for example, van Creveld (1991), pp. ix-x, 25-32; Cassidy 
(2003), pp. 135-136. 
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Crisis management and humanitarian interventions
The question of stifling new wars at their inception, or at least of 
minimizing their effects, entered Western discussions of the use of 
armed forces during the 1990s. The influence of information tech-
nology on the instruments and methods of war that had come to 
be recognised under the heading of the revolution in military affairs 
had opened up possibilities for the Western powers to intervene in 
humanitarian crises without any great risk of casualties on their own 
side, and the United States in particular rapidly developed a global 
capability for such interventions by means of air power and preci-
sion weapons in the course of the decade.54 It was indeed just at 
the overlap between the discourses of the Gulf War and the war in 
Bosnia that discussions regarding international military interventions 
for crisis management and humanitarian purposes came to the fore. The 
perceived need for humanitarian interventions arose from the out-
break of a series of new wars and the increased coverage given to 
these in the media, while the possibilities for intervention arose from 
the development of new weapons systems and command and con-
trol systems – in effect the implementation of the revolution in mili-
tary affairs, especially in the United States. It was naturally partly as 
an outcome of the termination of the Cold War that these new wars 
arose and that the West was able to react in the way it did. However, 
as the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan put it, the strict interpreta-
tions of the principle of national sovereignty and the embargo on 
interventions that had prevailed in the Cold War period now started 
to be re-evaluated to correspond to the situation in the new wars 
that had broken out more recently:
“… if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable as-
sault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights 
that offend every precept of our common humanity? … Sure-
ly no legal principle – not even sovereignty – can ever shield 
crimes against humanity … Armed intervention must always 
remain the option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder, 
54 Where precision weapons accounted for about 7% of total armament during the 
Gulf War of 1991, a figure of 70% had been reached by the time of the Bosnia 
operation in 1995. See, for example, Gulf War Air Power Survey – Summary 
Report (993), p. 226; Raitasalo (2005a), pp. 208-216.
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it is an option that cannot be relinquished.”55
Gradually the idea of an increased need for a global military ca-
pability caught on in Europe as well, and some European countries 
began to invest in IT-based military technology in the late 1990s. The 
rise of international crisis management by military means – and hu-
manitarian interventions as one form of this – to a central position 
in the Western mode of warfare was made possible by the develop-
ment of precision weapons systems with long-range impact com-
bined with improved means of force protection. The unsuccessful 
humanitarian mission in Somalia in 1992–1993 demonstrated the 
importance of force protection in the context of a military operation 
mounted on humanitarian grounds that is not directly concerned 
with protecting one’s own national interests or territory. The loss of 
eighteen men led to a change in the strategic level of US policy and 
the withdrawal of troops from that country that had been ravaged 
by civil war.56
It should be noted that, although the European members of 
NATO and the EU have made considerable efforts to raise the level 
of their crisis management capabilities in military terms from the 
1990s onwards, the role of the United States has been crucial in this 
respect.57 This in turn has meant that with the re-directing of US 
security policy discussions towards the ‘war on terrorism’ since 2001 
it has become increasingly difficult to draw the line between crisis 
management operations, invasions and counter-terrorist activities, 
leading to mounting criticism of US military operations.58
The development of an EU military capability is taking place 
at the present time precisely in this sphere of crisis management, 
and partly in collaboration with NATO. Indeed, the fact that NATO 
has approved crisis management operations as part of its mandate 
in addition to defence of the territories of its member states, to-
gether with the extension of its area of operation to assume global 
proportions, has demonstrated the importance of developing crisis 
management in our post-Cold War world. As US Defence Minister 
55 See The Responsibility to Protect – About the Commission (2007).
56 On the operation in Somalia, see, for example, Weiss & Collins (2000).
57 This has especially been the case in ’demanding’ crisis management operations 
or humanitarian interventions that have required backing from military assault 
troops, and in cases where not all the parties to the conflict have given their as-
sent to a crisis management operation. 
58 See, for example, Brahimi (2006), p. 15.
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Robert Gates observed at the Munich security policy conference in 
February 2007, a considerable change has taken place in the NATO 
mandate over the last fifteen years. He laid particular stress on the 
character of NATO as a military alliance with the continuing pur-
pose of pre-empting military threats and if necessary eliminating 
them once they have materialized, and concluded that investment 
in the creation and development of a military capability for crisis 
management, together with military action to prevent terrorism, was 
in a NATO context the essence of preparedness for the warfare of 
the 21st century.59
Military Outsourcing – the privatization of warfare
Another characteristic of the developments that have taken place in 
defence administration and the armed forces in Western countries 
over the last fifteen years has been a concentration on ‘core activi-
ties’, partly in order to improve financial efficiency. This means that 
many supporting and servicing functions have been sourced out to 
private operators,60 which have come to occupy a more important 
role than ever before in the planning and execution of Western mili-
tary operations. The servicing and repairing of weapons systems and 
command systems, the construction and maintenance of military 
bases, intelligence, catering services, vehicle servicing, fuel supplies, 
billeting, security services and expert technical services in connec-
tion with Western military operations are to increasing extents being 
59 See Gates (2007).
60 As far as the U.S. is concerned, this privatization trend is summed up well in the 
Government Accountability Office report of 2007: “Since the early 1990s, DOD 
has increasingly relied on contractors to meet many of its logistical and op-
erational support needs during combat operations, peacekeeping missions, and 
humanitarian assistance missions, ranging from Operation Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm and operations in the Balkans (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo) to Afghanistan 
and Iraq.” High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-Standing Prob-
lems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed 
Forces (2007), p. 6. The increasing tendency for privatization is also reflected 
in the payments made by the US Armed Forces to private companies, which 
increased from 82.3 billion dollars in 1996 to 141.2 billion dollars in 2005. See 
Rebuilding Iraq – Reconstruction Progress Hindered by Contracting, Security, 
and capacity Challenges (2007), p. 3; see also Contractors Provide Vital Services 
to Deployed Forces but are not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans (2003), 
p. 1.
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placed in private hands.61 This process of privatization of tasks tradi-
tionally belonging to the armed forces – the ‘privatization of warfare’ 
– has become a particularly prominent feature in the years since the 
Iraq War of 2003. Even in that year it was estimated that there would 
be more than 20,000 employees of private firms in Iraq during the 
reconstruction and stabilization period, engaged in producing ser-
vices for the armed forces that have traditionally been looked after 
by the forces themselves.62 As it was, it was estimated in 2007 that 
the US ground forces alone had some 60,000 contractor employees 
working for them in military operations in South-West Asia, prin-
cipally in Iraq and Afghanistan.63 Thus where the ‘new wars’ have 
brought non-state actors into combat in the Third World, they have 
also increased the significance of non-state actors, in many cases 
multi-national companies and corporations, in military operations 
mounted by the Western nations, through this ‘privatization of war-
fare’.
The outsourcing of functions belonging to the armed forces to 
private companies is closely connected with the reform of defence 
organizations to conform to the military threats of the post-Cold War 
era. Forces have been much reduced in strength at the same time as 
the numbers of crisis management missions and other low-intensity 
military operations have been on the increase.64 Likewise, the new 
threats are looked on as calling for new modes of action from the 
armed forces, including new weapons systems and command and 
control systems. These high-tech systems in turn are unprecedent-
edly expensive, and their acquisition on a large scale is feasible only 
if substantial savings can be made in expenditure on other func-
tions of the armed forces. Efforts have indeed been made to achieve 
savings through enhanced efficiency, partly by privatizing various 
support functions that are no longer regarded as belonging to the 
core fields of expertise of the armed forces themselves – and thereby 
opening them up to competition. The constantly increasing com-
plexity of systems resulting from the application of modern technol-
61 See, for example, Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but are 
not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans (2003), p. 7.
62 Traynor (2003).
63 Rebuilding Iraq – Reconstruction Progress Hindered by Contracting, Security, 
and Capacity Challenges (2007), p. 5.
64 Cf. Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but are not Adequate-
ly Addressed in DOD Plans (2003), p. 1.
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ogy has led in turn to the commissioning of technological expertise 
from private companies. The changes in the operational methods 
pursued by armed forces, the drive for savings in expenditure and 
the emphasis placed on advanced technology are all connected with 
the post-Cold War transformation of armed forces throughout the 
Western world, and it is these circumstances that have been referred 
to as justifications for privatization.65
Another advantage to be gained from outsourcing is flexibility 
in the implementation of military operations. It is possible, if neces-
sary, to purchase from the private sector just those capacities that 
one expects to need in situations of a certain kind, e.g. situations 
in which a military organization is committed to an extensive, pro-
tracted military operation far away from home. A further motive for 
privatization has been perceived in political propriety, especially on 
the home front, in that the death or injury of an employee of a pri-
vate company does not reflect on the state or the government in the 
same way as the death or injury of a soldier in battle. Similarly, the 
employees of private companies are not usually included in calcula-
tions of the strength of the military, so that this approach offers a 
means of exceeding quotas placed on the deployment of forces or of 
obscuring the true extent of an operation.
The war on terror – Bellum Americanum
One goal of US military policy for almost a decade before the ter-
rorists struck on September 11th 2001 had been to maintain and 
even increase American military superiority, in view of the lessons 
learned in the Gulf War. The discourse of the revolution in military 
affairs determined American attitudes towards military power to a 
substantial extent and every effort was made to disseminate this 
doctrine globally. Especially in Europe, the basic tenets of this dis-
course have guided the development of armed forces over the past 
decade, although admittedly without the express aim of bringing 
about a revolution in military affairs. On the contrary, the principal 
aim has been to create an efficient body of troops that would be 
capable of taking part in multi-national operations in collaboration 
with the United States and of defending the country’s own territory 
if required, although this latter need is beginning to be regarded as 
65 See, for example, Improving the Combat Edge though Outsourcing (1996): Pri-
vate Military Companies: Options for Regulation (2002).
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highly improbable nowadays, at least in the form of a response to a 
large-scale invasion. On the other hand, an asymmetrical incursion 
into the territory of a European nation – in effect defence in the face 
of a terrorist attack, has entered the picture for armed forces in both 
Europe and the United States since September 11th 2001. It must be 
noted, however, that while the war declared on terrorism in the USA 
has been a militarized response to the terrorist threat, the armed 
forces have played a more limited role in the containing of terrorism 
in Europe, mainly one of providing support for other authorities. 
When the President of the United States declared war on ter-
rorism almost immediately after the strike of September 11th 2001, 
the goal was to destroy all the globally active terrorist organizations, 
and three days after the event Congress authorized the President 
to deploy the armed forces as necessary against all nations, orga-
nizations or persons implicated in the planning or execution of the 
raids or in providing protection for those who carried them out. This 
“Authorization for Use of Military Force” together with the declara-
tion of a war on terrorism quite explicitly extended the official US 
concept of war to include non-state actors.66 Implicitly, this transi-
tion had occurred in the 1990s, largely in connection with the ‘new 
wars’ and the question of humanitarian interventions. Nevertheless, 
the world’s only superpower declared war against an abstract threat 
named as ‘terrorism’ in September 2001, and set out in the months 
that followed to wage wars of a largely conventional nature, first 
in Afghanistan from October 2001 onwards and then in Iraq from 
March 2003, both wars that can still be regarded as being in progress 
today, although it is common to speak now of a stabilization or re-
construction phase. The security situation in both cases is very poor, 
however, and violence of a kind typical of guerrilla warfare is still a 
daily occurrence.67 
The actions of President George W. Bush in response to the 
9/11 terrorist strikes have contributed to a significant extent to the 
construction and definition of the status of terrorism as a military 
threat to the United States. Although the perception of ‘terrorism’ 
66 Cf.  Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004, Government report to 
parliament 6/2004 (2004), p. 20: “In international cooperation, terrorism 
as a concept has come to be understood as political violence used by 
individuals or groups, the targets of which are selected randomly or for 
their symbolic value.”
67 Senate Joint Resolution 23 (2001); Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments (2001), pp. 1347-1351.
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as such as a target of warfare has not spread quite so universally, all 
state actors were obliged to adjust their own military activities to the 
reality of a situation in which the world’s only military superpower 
(or hyperpower, as it is sometimes called) had initiated a number 
of military operations against the global threat posed by terrorism. 
The attempt to raise terrorism to the status of a clearly defined, seri-
ous military threat can perhaps be understood better when we real-
ize that there was a notable lack of any significant external military 
threat to the Western powers in the decade immediately following 
the Cold War. It is interesting to note, too, that a decade before the 
9/11 attack acts of terrorism had been explicitly declared criminal by 
the OSCE in its Charter of Paris – but had not been classed as mili-
tary acts.68 In addition, terrorism had been linked to strategic discus-
sions on the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the course 
of the 1990s. Evidently these factors between them formed a body 
of opinion that led at once to the assumption in the wake of 9/11 of 
a threat that was at least partially a military one, against which one 
should be prepared to deploy armed forces. 
“America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Fac-
ing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the 
smoking gun, that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”69 
It is significant that US military policy thinking and rhetoric 
links the abstract threat arising from terrorism with actors at the 
state level, through the medium of ‘rogue states’ and ‘failed states’. 
This link was forged a few months after the declaration of the ‘war 
on terrorism’, in President Bush’s famous ‘axis of evil’ speech of Janu-
ary 2002, and it has subsequently contributed to the classification of 
terrorism as a military threat, since state-level actors (rogue states or 
failed states) constitute distinct targets for military action, whereas 
terrorist organizations or individual terrorists are often more diffi-
cult to pinpoint as objects of military operations. In all events, ‘global 
terrorism’ has emerged as the principal justification for the war on 
68 Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), p. 8 “We unreservedly condemn, as 
criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism and express our determi-
nation to work for its eradication both bilaterally and through multilateral co-
operation.”
69 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (2002), p. 1718 (italics by the 
present author).
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terrorism, a connection that has arisen partly out of the fact that 
terrorist organizations bent on strikes of a catastrophic nature have 
been associated with the possession of weapons of mass destruction 
within the discourse of the war on terrorism.70
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are good examples of the con-
nection between the war on terrorism and the notion of the state, il-
lustrating that in spite of the non-state elements present in these wars, 
the discourse of the war of terrorism partially serves to reproduce the 
traditional state-centred view of war. It has not, therefore, meant a to-
tal transition to non-state adversaries in the understanding of war.
The discourse of the war on terrorism is also clearly connected 
with the discourse of the revolution in military affairs, which was 
the main determinant of military power in the 1990s, at least in 
the sense that the latter, as a post-Cold War attempt at re-defining 
warfare,71 came through the war of terrorism to be paralleled by a 
broader attempt at re-defining the operational logic of the international 
system. Thus the Pax Americana situation of the Cold War was trans-
formed through the policies of the Bush Administration into a post-
9/11 Bellum Americanum era, in which the operational logic of the 
international system came to involve the active exercise of military 
power on a unilateral basis and with pre-emptive goals if necessary, 
as defined in US military policy. The role of the revolution in military 
affairs in this broader re-definition process was largely restricted to 
one of guiding the development of military resources, since the ever 
more sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, command and control, 
and weapons systems being introduced are well suited to opera-
tions directed against terrorist organizations and states that harbour 
them.
NATO and the EU have also partially transferred terrorism to a 
military frame of reference, so that both view it as the most signifi-
cant threat to security in the current international system and have 
set about developing their military resources and missions specifi-
cally in order to combat this threat. In addition, NATO, as a military 
70 See, for example, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (2002), pp. 
2150-2151.
71 George W. Bush had stated in his presidential campaign of 1999 that the new 
arms technology would enable keeping the peace by redefining war on US 
terms, a message that he had then repeated on numerous occasions prior to 
the 9/11 attack. See, for example, Bush (1999); Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents (2001), pp. 283, 400, 1778; Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents (2004), p. 1107.
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alliance, invoked Article 5 of its charter, the commitment to mutual 
defence, as a consequence of the 9/11 attack – a clause that had ini-
tially been formulated specifically with a view to the military threat 
posed by the Soviet Union.72 
When analysing the views of the European NATO members 
and the member states of the European Union on terrorism as a 
security threat and on suitable means of suppressing it, it should 
nevertheless be underlined that US attitudes towards the use of 
armed force against terrorism have been on quite a different level 
from those of its European allies.73 The European attitude can per-
haps be characterized best as action against terrorism, whereas the 
American reaction to the threat posed by global terrorism is war. All 
the same, the war declared by the United States against terrorism 
and the threat posed by global terrorism are clearly factors that have 
to be taken into consideration by European countries when plan-
ning the development of their military resources.
Changing Western concepts of the nature of war and the 
use of armed forces
An examination of United States, NATO and EU security and de-
fence policy documents indicates that the Western image of war has 
been in a constant state of change throughout the post-Cold War 
era, and has also become somewhat diversified by comparison with 
the fairly clearly defined, unambiguous manner in which war was 
perceived during the Cold War period.74 If we look at the principal 
discourses relevant to the construction of that image in the circum-
stances of the Cold War, we can see that clear-cut changes, or at least 
72 Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting 
(2001); Presidency Conclusions – Seville European Council (2002), Appendix V, 
paragraph 6; A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy 
(2003); Declaration on Solidarity against Terrorism (2004); NATO Press Release 
(2001); NATO Press Release (2004); Operation Active Endeavour (2007).
73 On European phraseology related to terrorism and military action against it, see 
for example, NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism (2003); 
Declaration on European Military Capabilities (2004), paragraph 7.
74 There were also challenges to the Western view of war during the Cold War 
period, e.g. on account of the war in Vietnam. This challenge was for the most 
part ignored, however, and a potential war was still understood as consisting of 
a series of large-scale engagements between mechanized conventional troops 
representing the parties to the Cold War.
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alterations in emphasis, occurred in four out of the five of these in 
the course of the 1990s.
In the first place, the ideological dichotomy of the Cold War 
and the state of global ideological confrontation had ended, as the 
termination of the Cold War had meant the collapse of the whole political 
and military frame of reference that had persisted throughout that era. 
This could not fail to make itself felt in the shaping of the Western 
image of war during the 1990s, especially as far as the modelling of 
military threats was concerned, so that these models are now very 
much more complex and include more non-state actors than before. 
At the same time the military threats have become more abstract in 
character, since asymmetrical warfare is a difficult threat to concep-
tualize – at least all the time one tries to perceive a possible future 
war from the viewpoint of the armed forces of a nation-state pitched 
against a non-state actor.
Secondly, the image of a predominantly nuclear war reverted dur-
ing the 1990s to one of largely conventional warfare. Nuclear weapons 
and strategies based on them have declined in significance during 
the post-Cold War era, although they admittedly have not disap-
peared entirely. Indeed, the spread of nuclear weapons and the re-
lated technology to the ‘rogue states’ of the area of the former Soviet 
Union lay at the heart of the discussion of nuclear armament in the 
1990s. At any rate, it is evident that the new conventional military 
capabilities offered by applications of advanced information technology 
(including long-range impact and precision weapons systems, elec-
tronic deception and interference systems and technological war-
fare) have partly replaced nuclear weapons and the sheer size of conven-
tional armed forces as factors in the construction of a credible military 
force and the achievement of major power status during the post-Cold 
War era. 
Thirdly, the scale of conventional warfare in the Western image of 
war was reduced during the 1990s from the prospect of a global con-
ventional war to that of a regional conflict. Where capabilities were 
maintained during the Cold War for an encounter between millions 
of soldiers in Europe or Asia, military operations since that time have 
gradually become more limited in extent, as also have the peacetime 
and wartime strengths of the nations’ armed forces. On the other 
hand, it must be said that the removal of the deterrent to even con-
ventional war that existed in the Cold War period led to numerous 
conventional wars and smaller-scale situations in which armed forc-
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es had to be deployed in the course of that decade, e.g. the Gulf War 
of 1991, the Chechnya war in 1994 and the wars in the Balkans that 
followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Also, humanitarian missions 
have become ‘acceptable’ in the West as reasons for deploying armed 
forces, and smaller-scale contingencies have gained a more promi-
nent place among the principles governing deployment. At the con-
ceptual level, these changes in the image of war may be summarized 
as a transition towards military methods of crisis management and 
peace enforcement. The politically motivated use of armed forces – 
war – has now become legitimate in many instances as a means of 
carrying out humanitarian missions, whereas during the Cold War 
the normative embargo on territorial interventions was very much 
stronger.75
The changes that have taken place in the assessment of military 
power have thus been reflected not only in a decline in the emphasis 
on nuclear weapons but also in a change in the scale of conventional 
warfare and in new opportunities for exploiting advanced technol-
ogy. Massed forces, universal conscription and mechanized combat 
have been shifted into the background, and the traditional custom of 
‘calculating’ military strength in terms of the number of battle tanks, 
naval vessels and army divisions that can be deployed has declined 
in significance. Information technology, networked systems and in-
teroperability with the United States as the unrivalled world military 
leader imply military power of a different kind from that which pre-
vailed during the Cold War. Armed forces consisting of small, highly 
mobile units with networked sensor devices, command and control 
systems and weapons systems are typical of the nations that wield 
real military power in today’s world. The United States has had a 
virtually exclusive right to define the elements of ‘technological’ mili-
75 It should be noted, however, that not all humanitarian interventions have met 
with widespread acceptance in the post-Cold War era. One example of this is 
the intervention in Kosovo, where the US led an incursion by NATO forces into 
Serbia without a United Nations Security Council resolution.  It must also be 
pointed out that the agreements reached on the principle of sovereignty in inter-
national law have not as such been altered since the Cold War ended. It would be 
nearer the point to say that the concept of humanitarian intervention has taken 
on new interpretations in recent times on the basis of operations that have been 
carried out in practice. From the perspective of international law, it may be ‘easier’ 
for the UN Security Council to decide that a humanitarian intervention is justi-
fied nowadays than it was in the 1980s, for example, in spite of the fact that no 
new (international) agreements have been concluded on the matter.
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tary power – and has, after all, been responsible for the vast majority 
of the world’s expenditure of money and resources on the develop-
ment of military technology for many years now. Similarly, US global 
strategic interests and the superpower status that it inherited from 
the Cold War period have left that country with a distinct military 
advantage over all the other actors in the international system.
Fourthly, the state-centred perspective that had dominated the 
image of war for centuries continued to decline during the 1990s. This 
trend had already been visible during the Cold War period, in that 
a large proportion of the wars that occurred involved at least one 
party that was not the army of any state, but it was particularly in 
the 1990s that the ‘new wars’, the dissolution of states and the rise of 
humanitarian interventions led the Western nations to take all kinds 
of situations requiring the use of armed forces into account when 
constructing their image of war. The restriction of this image to wars 
conducted between states was quite simply no longer a rational 
proposition during a decade in which the diversity of situations in 
which armed forces were deployed increased markedly – or at least 
awareness of the large-scale human suffering caused by crises that 
involved the use of armed forces spread on a global scale. It was 
during this decade that large-scale acts of violence by non-state actors 
became an integral part of the Western image of war.
In spite of the trends for change during the 1990s identified 
above, it is important in this connection to emphasize the short 
time-span involved, only one decade, and the inertia associated with 
established shared understandings and interpretations of war and war-
fare. This ‘inertia’ is a matter of the ‘natural acceptance’ of intersub-
jective notions of war that have accumulated over decades and cen-
turies – a process in which social facts are gradually transformed in 
the course of time into objective facts.76 For states and other actors, 
war is a form of struggle for existence, so that any significant al-
teration in their image of war will require a broad-based change in 
the rules and operational logic governing the international system 
and a questioning of the ossified patterns of behaviour and thought 
processes associated with the use of armed forces. Thus, in spite of 
the trends towards change in the image of war that emerged during 
76 This process by which the origins of intersubjective ’social’ facts are forgotten in 
the course of human activity and they come to be understood as objective facts 
that are independent of human beings, or suprahistorical principles, is known 
as ‘reification’. 
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the first post-Cold War decade, the image that had prevailed in the 
Cold War period still largely persisted in the late 1990s, at least in the 
sphere of influence of the industrially developed Western countries. 
In particular, the view of war as a symmetrical confrontation between 
armed forces of a similar type with the aim of defeating their adver-
saries in a decisive battle continued to influence this image through-
out the decade. The state-level actors certainly became aware during 
the 1990s of the low-intensity conflicts that had made their appear-
ance before the end of the Cold War, but the development of their 
armed forces continued to be directed not only by the need to win 
the ‘new wars’ but also by a highly traditional understanding of the 
need to repel a large-scale offensive mounted by another industri-
ally developed country. So it was that throughout the decade the 
existing C2 and weapons systems developed or acquired during the 
Cold War and the related infrastructure and doctrines regarding the 
use of armed forces reproduced the Cold War image of warfare, or at 
least a ‘traditional’ understanding of the nature of war that came very 
close to this. The ‘new’ discourses of war that arose during the 1990s 
served largely as attempts at challenging the ossified Cold War image of 
war and preliminary models for a broader re-definition of war that might 
conceivably come about in the future. The discourses of change that did 
arise and gain in currency during the decade nevertheless rendered the 
traditional image of war more vulnerable to revision and opened up con-
cepts of the nature and purposes of war that were based on a fairly broad 
consensus of opinion and could become subject to re-definition.
It should be noted that only some of the discourses that de-
veloped in the 1990s were connected with determined and explicit 
efforts on the part of state actors to re-define war in relation to the 
post-Cold War security situation within the international system, 
the most obvious example being the discourse of the revolution in 
military affairs that developed in the United States and spread from 
there. At the core of this discourse lay the technology-based notion 
of warfare being carried on in a situation where the traditional logic 
of developing armed forces to meet the threat of a military offensive 
would rapidly prove inapplicable. The revolution in military affairs 
provided the United States with a moderate means of revising its 
perspective on warfare by emphasizing the opportunities for devel-
oping its capabilities through applications of information technol-
ogy, creating a military scenario, particularly for that nation, which 
could be implemented in order to develop the armed forces in a situ-
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ation in which the direct military threat had for all practical purposes 
disappeared. At the same time, however, the perspective on warfare 
remained one in which symmetrical encounters might occur on a 
fairly substantial scale between the forces of state-level actors – since 
the intellectual stimulus for the whole discourse had been the Gulf 
War of 1991. When evaluating the nature of the revolution in military 
affairs as a force for a change in the image of war, and in particular in 
those instruments of war that were regarded as efficient, it should be 
stressed that the academic and military discussion and debate that 
accompanied it – serving as a form of conceptual maturation – had 
been going on for about five years before the US defence adminis-
tration began the process of transforming the armed forces explicitly 
in accordance with this thesis.77
It should also be noted that the rise and development of the 
new discourses that altered the image of war in the post-Cold War 
years was influenced not only by states but also by many non-state 
actors. The crisis management and humanitarian intervention dis-
course, for instance, was influenced by organizations such as the 
United Nations,78 the International Red Cross and Amnesty Inter-
national.79
Thus the Western image of war had been undergoing change 
for more or less a decade by the time of the 9/11 assault, and the 
discourse of the war on terrorism that was set in motion by the 
United States was able to extract much of its momentum from ear-
lier discourses on changes in the nature of war (during the 1990s). 
Non-state actors had already become part of the Western concepts 
of war as far as the discourses associated with the ‘new wars’, asym-
metrical warfare and humanitarian interventions were concerned, 
and the new attitude towards the use of armed force had been put 
into action in the form of humanitarian interventions in the 1990s 
– with or without a UN mandate. By the time the war on terror-
ism was declared, the traditional respect for the sovereignty of states 
77 On the revolution in military affairs as a scenario for the use of the armed forc-
es in the United States and as a discourse of change in the image of war, see 
Raitasalo (2005a), especially pp. 187-313.
78 And particularly the International Commission on Intervention and State Sov-
ereignty, founded in 2000 on the initiative of the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan. 
79 Among private individuals, Mary Kaldor, for example, influenced the ‘new wars’ 
discourse and also indirectly the discussion on crisis management and humani-
tarian interventions.
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and the embargo on interventions in other nations’ territories had 
already ‘faded’ to some extent, even though the formal principles as 
laid down in international law had remained practically unchanged 
in the decade following the Cold War.80 
The technology-centred analysis of warfare lent support to the 
declaration of war on terrorism, in that it was by exploiting the core 
aspects of the revolution in military affairs discourse – the develop-
ment of capabilities for precision strikes and technological warfare 
and the adoption of modern intelligence and command systems etc. 
– that it became possible at all to declare war on terrorist organiza-
tions or even on individual terrorists. The new command and control 
systems and weapons systems that were available enabled intelli-
gence operations, surveillance missions and the use of firepower to 
be undertaken with a precision that had previously been inconceiv-
able. It may indeed be said that without the drive to develop the US 
armed forces from the mid-1990s onwards that came to be known 
as the revolution in military affairs it would have been much more 
difficult for the President of the United States to declare a war on 
terrorism with any conviction in September 2001.81 
The declaration of the war on terrorism may be understood as an 
explicit and determined attempt by the US Administration to set out 
new rules for the use of military force applying universally to the inter-
national system in the post-Cold War era. During the decade preceding 
the 9/11 offensive the Western powers had attempted to adjust their 
military capacity to the new, relatively indeterminate threats that 
were arising, but no real, clearly defined new grounds for altering 
the functioning of their armed forces had emerged.82 It can therefore 
80 See Takamaa (2005); Raitasalo & Sipilä (2005b).
81 See National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), p. 16; 
also Tucker (2006), p. 59, who presents a critical view of the ability of the US 
forces to change their understanding of warfare as their basis for action in a way 
that would be relevant on the battlefield, i.e. would correspond to the modern 
image of war: “Past and present experience suggests that the U.S. military will 
continue to innovate within its understanding of what warfare is, and that these 
innovations will doubtless aggregate into some sort of transformation of con-
ventional warfare capability, but these innovations and the transformation they 
drive will be largely irrelevant to unconventional conflict. In simple terms, the 
U.S. military will get better and better at putting projectiles into targets, whether 
bullets into foreheads or missiles into tanks, but this skill will not be decisive in 
unconventional conflict.” (italics by the present author)
82 One concept that entered strategic discussions in the West during the 1990s 
was that of “the new threats”. These replaced the threat of a large-scale war 
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be claimed that, given that the military logic of the Cold War pe-
riod had come to the end of the road, the Western powers gradually, 
through a process of ‘trial and error’, set about defining rules for the 
deployment of armed forces in the post-Cold War period. The end of 
the Cold War naturally did not directly mean that the ‘old’ intersub-
jective discursive and social structures (including shared perceptions 
of threats) disappeared, but their effects in determining the practical 
steps to be taken certainly declined as the notion of a new post-
Cold War age spread within the international system. A number of 
changes can thus be said to have taken place in the Western image 
of war over the last decade and a half. In the first place, the start-
ing point in planning and preparation for the deployment of armed 
forces is no longer exclusively the threat of an invasion by another 
state or alliance among states, since non-state actors have entered 
the picture, either as direct threats (e.g. through acts of terrorism) or 
indirectly (by upsetting the stability or security of the international 
system, e.g. when privately raised troops terrorize a state that is on 
the verge of collapse). In addition, Western thinking is moving away 
from a threat of war that might undermine the whole international 
system and towards the concept of regional conflicts.
With the change in the nature of the threat that they are facing, 
the Western armed forces turned their attention to more restricted 
operations in the course of the 1990s. Crisis management operations, 
humanitarian interventions and small-scale military operations have 
gradually ‘overtaken’ the threat of a full-scale war between alliances 
of superpowers as the potential field of activity for armed forces, and 
these operations are conceived of as occurring beyond the bounds 
of the countries’ own territories and as making use of efficient com-
mand and weapons systems in order to reduce losses – whether in 
the form of soldiers injured or killed, casualties on the opposing side, 
civilian casualties or accompanying material losses.
The transformation as far as the development of armed forces is 
concerned has emerged at the core of the Western image of war over 
the last decade. The new threats and the military modes of operation 
that had become the established norm during the Cold War.  The new threats 
include regional wars, epidemics, the drug trade, international organized crime, 
environmental hazards, etc. , and their ‘emergence’ imply the disappearance or 
dispersal of the old, clearly defined and obviously dangerous threats.  No un-
ambiguous factor or process that constitutes a threat primarily to the Western 
countries could be identified in conjunction with these ‘new threats’.
44
required to meet those threats have been looked on as calling for 
renewal of the armed forces in order to correspond better to the re-
alities of the post-Cold War era. The United States has clearly taken 
the lead in pioneering this transformation, while the main reason 
for the European countries to follow suite, apart from reducing their 
defence budgets, has been the desire to maintain interoperability 
with the US forces as the latter implement their revolution in mili-
tary affairs. Anxious comments were indeed to be heard in Europe in 
the late 1990s to the effect that, if the current trend were to continue, 
military collaboration between the United States and its allies would 
become an impossibility in the course of time on account of the lat-
ter’s huge investments in advanced military technology.
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3. Post-Cold War changes  
in the Finnish image of war
Two factors in particular should be taken into account when examin-
ing the image of war that developed and prevailed in Finland during 
the Cold War period. One of these is concerned with the tension 
that existed between the superpowers at that time and the possibil-
ity of a large-scale war breaking out between the military alliances. 
The other is connected with Finland’s security policy orientation, the 
policy of neutrality. It was the prospect of a crisis arising between 
the alliances led by the two superpowers that lay at the centre of the 
Finnish image of war during the Cold War period, for either alliance, 
NATO or the Warsaw Pact, was regarded as capable of extending its 
operations to Finnish territory if needed.83 The military threat posed 
by NATO during the Cold War according to Finnish military think-
ing was largely a product of the extraordinary situation that Finland 
was in with respect to the Soviet Union, for in order to convince the 
latter that Finland’s territory and resources could not be used as part 
of an offensive against that country, it was necessary to maintain 
credible defences against attack from any direction.84 As far as the 
military threats attached to a conflict between the superpowers in 
83 See Parliamentary Defence Committee, Komiteanmietintö 1971:A18 (1971), pp. 
21-22; Second Parliamentary Defence Committee, Komiteanmietintö 1976:37 
(1976), pp. 19-27 (in Finnish), especially p. 22: “Being close to the strategically 
important northern sea areas, the airspace and  road network of Finnish Lap-
land could provide either party to a confrontation between the military alliances 
with an opportunity to evade the defences of the other”; Third Parliamentary 
Defence Committee, Komiteanmietintö 1981:1 (1981), pp. 21-22.
84 One major goal of Finnish defence policy in 1990 was still regarded as being 
to reinforce the policy of neutrality by demonstrating a capability for repelling 
attacks from all directions (from NATO as well as the Soviet Union). See, for 
example, the evaluation of the security situation in Europe, prospects for its 
development and its implications for Finnish defence policy in the report of the 
Parliamentary Advisory Committee on Defence, 28.2.1990 (1990), pp. 22-23. On 
credibility problems affecting Finnish defence, see Kilpinen (2007) (in Finnish): 
“It can be calculated from data gathered over the years on the Finnish defence 
budget and wartime troop strengths that the sums available would not have 
been sufficient to equip an army of 500,000 with modern weapons. The belief in 
Finland’s defence rested more on the achievements of the veterans of the last 
war than on the outcome of any cool-headed analysis of the situation in the 
1970s.” 
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the Cold war world were concerned, this meant in practice that in 
addition to the possibility of a large-scale offensive on the part of 
the Soviet Union, Finland had to be capable of defending its territory 
against a NATO incursion. 
In spite of the provisions of the Agreement on Friendship, Co-
operation and Mutual Assistance, the most concrete military threat 
to Finland during the Cold War was that of a massive Soviet attack, 
and Finland did indeed experience political and military pressure of 
this kind during the decades in question, particularly in the form of 
a constant questioning of the Finnish policy of neutrality and a pro-
posal for joint military exercises on one occasion. The most extreme 
threat of all was that of a full-scale Soviet invasion with conventional 
arms, although the eventuality of a nuclear attack was also taken 
into account in national defence planning:
“Basic strategic plans [for military action in defence of the na-
tional territory] should generally be drawn up for the eventuality 
of a war in which there is a likelihood of tactical nuclear weap-
ons being used. Plans and procedures should be adjusted where 
necessary to conform to the requirements of a major atomic 
war. … Attention should be paid at every stage in the hostilities 
to the possibility of the enemy resorting to nuclear weapons in 
order to disable the country’s administration, means of produc-
tion and communications systems and undermine the resist-
ance of the population at large.”85 
The “nuclear weapons question” was a serious problem in all 
military scenarios during the Cold War period, as the possibilities 
for defence against a nuclear attack were restricted to lessening its 
effects and the scope for retaliation was extremely limited. The em-
phasis on nuclear weapons that had been present in Finnish defence 
85 Field Manual – General Section (1958), pp. 57, 101 (in Finnish; italics by the 
author); see also Field Manual – General Section (1995) (in Finnish): “Full-scale 
wars are usually waged between a number of states simultaneously. … Full-
scale warfare can be conducted with conventional arms, or it can escalate into a 
nuclear war.” The significance of the threat of a nuclear war was still in evidence 
in the training of individual soldiers in the 1990s, as protection against a nuclear 
explosion or nuclear fall-out continued to be part of the training for conscripts, 
even though the reference to nuclear weapons had been removed from the 
Field Service Manual in the 1980s. Also, provisions were made throughout the 
Cold War period to protect the civilian population from nuclear fall-out.  
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thinking since the later stages of the Second World War gradually 
began to fade during the 1960s, however, partly in response to the 
political and strategic character that these weapons had taken on 
(as deterrents)86 and partly for pragmatic reasons arising out of the 
defence system. As it was in practice impossible to repel a nuclear 
attack or to provide any protection against it, the most reasonable 
course of action was to reduce the emphasis placed on this aspect in 
evaluations of military threats, given a situation in which the useful-
ness of nuclear weapons in combat was universally doubted.87 
The general alterations in the image of war that took place 
within the international system following the Second World War 
may be attributed not only to the possibility of a nuclear war, but 
also to the heightened probability of a surprise attack. In addition to 
the use of a massive force relying on superiority in numbers, rapid 
deployment troops now came on the scene, troops that could mount 
a surprise attack and leave the defenders and the whole of the inter-
national system faced with a fait accompli.88  The territorial defence 
system and regional engagement principle introduced in Finland in 
the 1960s may be viewed as attempts to meet the challenges posed 
by this form of warfare.89 The events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia in-
creased the emphasis placed on surprise attacks in Finnish evalu-
ations of military threats,90 and again the Soviet Union came to be 
regarded as a possible source of such an attack, especially as it was 
thought to possess the capability for a rapid strike to take possession 
of the Finnish capital, Helsinki.91
86 Suspicions of the probability of a nuclear war grew as a result of the lessons 
learned in the Korean War and on account of the increased powers of destruc-
tion inherent in these weapons.
87 See Raunio (2002), pp. 170-171; Parliamentary Defence Committee, Komitean-
mietintö 1971:A18 (1971), p. 28 (in Finnish).
88 Cf. Salminen (1995).
89 See Visuri (1998), pp. 12-116; Raunio (2002), pp. 176-178; Jouko (2006). Although 
the territorial defence system was adopted in 1966, the need for such an ap-
proach and the principles governing it had already been expressed in the De-
fence Revision of 1949 and in Finnish defence policy thinking during the 1950s. 
90 See, for example, Parliamentary Defence Committee, Komiteanmietintö 
1971:A18 (1971), p. 30; Second Parliamentary Defence Committee, Komite-
anmietintö 1976:37 (1976), p. 28; Third Parliamentary Defence Committee, 
Komiteanmietintö 1981:1 (1981), p. 35; Raunio (2002), pp. 165-167; It should 
be noted that the defence revision of 1949 already made mention of an attack 
mounted by surprise as a possible military threat. See Raunio (2002), p. 57. 
91 Klenberg (2007); Raunio (2002), pp. 165-167.
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Leaving the Cold War behind – international crisis man-
agement and armed forces for the age of the information 
society 
The improvement in relations between the superpowers in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the termination of the Cold War and the 
eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union came to be reflected fairly 
rapidly in the formulation of Finnish defence policy. It was noted in 
the 1990 report of the Parliamentary Advisory Committee on De-
fence, for instance, that threats of a lower category than war were likely 
to increase in importance in the future, and that attention should be 
paid to the protection of functions that are vital to the community in 
addition to the traditional territorial notion of defence.92 
The change in the logic behind the international security sys-
tem upon the ending of the Cold War was brought out into the open 
quite directly during the early 1990s, in the sense that:
“The military situation has altered since the Cold War. The 
threat of a major war has receded, the arms race has declined 
and openness in military matters has increased. … No military 
tension of the kind experienced during the Cold War is to be 
found any longer in the immediate vicinity of Finland.”93
The 1995 government report to parliament entitled Security 
in a changing world – guidelines for Finland’s security policy notes, 
however, that while the threat of a major war had faded somewhat, 
small armed conflicts were everyday occurrences on the internation-
al scene. As the danger of wars between states subsided, internal 
conflicts within states and ethic or religious disputes had come to 
dominate the picture by the mid-1990s. The wars that ensued upon 
the dissolution of the state of Yugoslavia and the incapacity of Eu-
rope to cope with these left their mark on the Finnish understanding 
92 Estimate of the condition and capabilities of the Defence Forces and statement 
of opinion regarding developmental plans and defence budgets for the 1990s, 
in the report of the Parliamentary Advisory Committee on Defence, Komitean-
mietintö 1990:57 (1990), pp. 36, 59. Ari Raunio notes in his paper that even in 
the days of the parliamentary defence committees (1973-1981) the threat of a 
symmetrical war was almost entirely dropped from official defence thinking. 
See Raunio (2002), pp. 165-167.  
93 Security in a changing world – guidelines for Finland’s security policy. Govern-
ment report to parliament 6.6.1995 (1995), pp. 5, 30 (in Finnish).
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of the new nature of war around the middle of the decade. Thus the 
decision to join the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme 
was looked on in the 1995 government report to parliament as one 
aspect of the international change in the image of war. In addition, 
the PfP programme was viewed as an opportunity for Finland to 
take part in crisis management operations and to develop its mili-
tary capabilities – although the report admits that Finland will be 
“primarily on the input side of the PfP programme”.94 Correspond-
ingly, the large number of concepts referring to crisis management 
used in the mid-1990s report similarly testifies to the importance of 
the ‘new wars’ conducted at a lower level of intensity than had been 
traditionally assumed, as the report makes specific reference to cri-
sis management operations, humanitarian missions, peacekeeping 
missions and peace enforcement operations.95
The fact that Finland joined the European Union in 1995 also 
boosted the post-Cold War significance of the western ‘security ref-
erence group’ alongside NATO collaboration.96 Finland was naturally 
a part of the West even during the Cold War, but the lifting of the So-
viet political and military pressure and the abrogation of the Agree-
ment on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance enabled 
cooperation to take place with the West on a hitherto unseen scale 
– including military cooperation. The European Union has progres-
sively developed its security and defence dimension from the 1990s 
onwards, chiefly in response to the challenges presented by the new 
wars. It is noticeable, however, that where Finland, with a super-
power as its immediate neighbour, has continued to consider the 
possibility of a conventional war between established states in addi-
tion to these new wars, the other EU member states acknowledged 
in the course of the 1990s that the danger of a traditional military of-
94 Ibid., pp. 19-22.
95 Ibid., p. 24.
96 On the westward drift in Finland’s geopolitical standing, see Security in a 
changing world – guidelines for Finland’s security policy. Government report to 
parliament 6.6.1995 (1995), pp. 42-44 (in Finnish): “Following the termination of 
the dichotomous division of Europe, Finland is no longer located between East 
and West in terms of security policy, as it has strengthened its security by joining 
the European Union and  taking part in the joint activities to construct a secure 
environment in the neighbouring areas, in Europe as a whole and globally. … 
Membership of the European Union has clarified and strengthened Finland’s 
position by linking it to the core group of European democracies.” (italics by the 
author). 
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fensive was now more or less non-existent. In fact, the increased col-
laboration in matters of crisis management that has come with EU 
membership has led Finland as well to direct its attention towards 
more demanding international missions of that kind. The need to be 
prepared to take part in such operations had already been noted in 
the 1995 government report to parliament, with the observation that 
“a responsible security policy means that we should be prepared to 
bear our own share of the burden in more demanding missions than 
heretofore,”97 while elsewhere it was stated in an analogous context 
that Finland was still lacking the “rapid deployment troops equipped 
for international collaboration” that were quite obviously needed for 
such purposes.98 The Finnish law on the use of peacekeeping forces 
was revised towards the end of 1995 to enable the country to take 
part in “extended” peacekeeping operations, i.e. ones that included 
protection of the civilian population and the provision of humanitar-
ian aid, in addition to missions of the conventional type.99 The 1995 
revision of the law on peacekeeping operations did not yet allow for 
peace enforcement operations, however, but specifically excluded 
these from the field of activities to which it applied.100
As far as the national defence was concerned, the 1995 gov-
ernment report continued along the lines established during the 
Cold War era, so that the notions of regional defence, universal 
conscription and a defence system based on troop mobilization 
formed, as it were, a bridge between the circumstances of the Cold 
War and the new times of change and uncertainty that lay ahead. 
The long-term logic behind the development of the armed forces 
was indeed apparent in this report in the form of a rejection of 
the necessity for any adjustment in the development of the de-
fence system in spite of the changing international security situa-
tion, although it should be noted that this report was specifically 
concerned with security policy and not with security and defence 
policy, which may explain why it dealt with defence policy and the 
development of the Finnish defence system only in passing. No 
mention was made, for instance, of the perceived threats govern-
97 Ibid., p. 26 (in Finnish).
98 Ibid., p. 24 (in Finnish).
99 See, for example, Security trends in Europe and the defence of Finland, Govern-
ment report to parliament 1/1997, 17.3.1997 (1997), p. 30 (in Finnish).
100 Report of the working group for revision of the law of peacekeeping missions 
(2005), p. 6.
51
ing defence planning, although they can be found in the General 
Section of the 1995 Field Manual:  
1) rapid assumption of control over the country through disable-
ment of the political and military leadership, occupation of criti-
cal regions and the taking over of administrative functions by 
means of a surprise attack in the style of a coup d’état, 
2) appropriation of the national territory for transit purposes or as 
a base for operations against a third party, and
3) conquest of the whole country or a strategically important part 
of it by means of a large-scale military action.101
Of these three scenarios, that concerned with the use of Finn-
ish territory for operations against a third party comes closest to the 
assumption of an East-West confrontation between the Warsaw Pact 
and NATO, harking back to the days of the Cold War, in which the 
Finnish defence system was expected to possess a reliable capacity 
for repelling any attack on the Soviet Union through Finnish ter-
ritory.102
The 1995 security policy report adopted a fairly positive attitude 
towards the existence of conventional forces in the areas bordering 
on Finland and regarded the general situation in neighbouring areas 
as good. Developments in Russia were viewed in a mostly favoura-
ble light, although potential threats were still perceived in that direc-
tion, and both the normalization of relations between Finland and 
Russia103 and the “historic” reductions in conventional arms that had 
commenced in Europe by that time104 were mentioned in the report 
as promising changes in the security environment that were con-
101 Field Manual – General Section (1995), p. 24.
102 Cf. the wording used in the 1997 government report on security and defence 
policy, which states that “The most probable military threat to Finland during 
the Cold War was the use of Finnish territory by an alien power in the course of 
major hostilities”, Security trends in Europe and the defence of Finland, Gov-
ernment report to parliament 1/1997, 17.3.1997 (1997), p. 46 (in Finnish).
103 This normalization can be seen as having taken place relative to the ’state of 
subordination’ of Finland to the will of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, 
brought about, among other things, by the Agreement on Friendship, Coopera-
tion and Mutual Assistance and the almost constant political and military pres-
sure exerted by the Soviet government on the Finns.
104 Particularly through the agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE).
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nected with the post-Cold War “transition period”.105 Similarly, the 
re-phrasing in this report of the “nuclear weapons question” (of how 
the possibility of a nuclear attack should be accounted for in Finnish 
defence planning), which had been a serious defence policy problem 
for Finland in the Cold War era, was a manifestation of the change in 
the image of war that had come about by the mid-1990s:
 “Nuclear weapons have declined in importance within interna-
tional relations and are no longer the dominant source of ten-
sion between the major powers. At the same time the security 
problems associated with them have taken on new forms. … A 
new source of international anxiety is the passage of weapons-
grade nuclear material from the area of the former Soviet Union 
to crisis regions or into the hands of terrorists.”106 
The changes in the international security environment that 
took place during the first half of the decade following the end of the 
Cold War (i.e. up to the mid-1990s) were reflected in Finnish security 
policy to some extent, in that while the accent on an independent 
defence capability, the territorial defence system and universal con-
scription was retained, the notion of neutrality was replaced by that 
of non-alliance. By that time armed conflicts of the type represented 
by the “new wars” and the more demanding crisis management op-
erations required to contain these had gained greater weight in the 
Finnish image of war, and although an element of continuity existed 
in the form of the possibility of a war between nation-states, the 
probability of such an event had clearly diminished.
It was nevertheless from the first half of the 1990s onwards that a 
certain fragmentation began to enter into the Finnish image of war. On 
the one hand, there was still a risk of a serious large-scale offensive, 
although improbable, while on the other hand, the new wars that 
were cropping up elsewhere in the world meant a distinct need to 
develop a capability for conducting military operations outside the 
area of Finland itself. The latter factor was viewed in defence policy 
circles primarily within a western frame of reference, in the context of 
NATO and to an increasing extent in the EU and WEU, even though 
105 Security in a changing world – guidelines for Finland’s security policy. Govern-
ment report to parliament 6.6.1995 (1995), pp. 29-44 (in Finnish).
106 Security trends in Europe and the defence of Finland, Government report to 
parliament 1/1997, 17.3.1997 (1997), pp. 27-28 (in Finnish).
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the use of the armed forces for humanitarian purposes was regarded 
from a political and strategic viewpoint as a matter of global (UN) or 
regional (OSCE) security cooperation. It should be noted, however, 
that this fragmentation of the image of war began in a very “moder-
ate” fashion, as a stepwise process of responding to the changes in 
the international security environment in the course of the 1990s, 
and that the incremental re-evaluation of the Finnish image of war 
became possible precisely on account of the retreat of the threat of a 
large-scale conventional war into the background.107 
This meant that although the Finnish image of war by the 
mid-1990s was still dominated by the Cold War notions of inter-
state wars, factors contesting this unambiguous image had begun 
to emerge alongside these with the spread of the discourse of the 
end of the Cold War. In particular, the discourse concerned with new 
wars of a religious or ethnic nature and the predominantly western 
discourse of humanitarian interventions and more demanding mili-
tary crisis management operations had begun to “erode” the conven-
tional threat of an inter-state war.
International crisis management continued to increase in sig-
nificance as a part of the Finnish image of war in the course of the 
latter half of the decade, a development that was framed as part of 
a broader entity in the government security and defence policy re-
port to parliament in 1997. It was this report that stated explicitly 
that a change was taking place in the image of war and linked this 
change with the retreat of the threat of a major war, the increase in 
local conflicts, the increase in international crisis management op-
erations, the more demanding nature of these latter and the rapid 
developments made in military technology.108 The response to this 
change in the image of war indicated in the report was the need to 
be prepared to take part in international crisis management opera-
107 See ibid., p. 40 (in Finnish): “Finland’s security policy provides an adequate jus-
tification for participation in international joint crisis management operations 
within a framework formed by membership of the EU, observer status within 
the WEU, participation in the NATO “Partnership for Peace” programme and 
membership of the OSCE and UN.”
108 Ibid., pp. 29-30 (in Finnish). On international crisis management operations, see 
p. 29: “The changing nature of conflicts imposes growing demands on military 
crisis management in this post-Cold War situation. … It is necessary within the 
scope of crisis management to be prepared for more extensive use of force in 
order to complete the missions required by the international community.” See 
also pp. 45-46, 48, 53.
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tions to increasing extents. It is also significant that the report ana-
lysed the development of crisis management capabilities as a form of 
investment in the national defence, i.e. as implying an improved state 
of preparedness, better-trained reserves and well-equipped troops. 
In addition, active participation in international crisis management 
missions was presented as a means of improving the interoperabil-
ity of the Finnish Defence Forces and the chances of receiving external 
military assistance in the event of Finland coming under attack. An 
amendment was made to the law on the use of the Defence Forces 
for peace-keeping purposes in 2000 to allow Finland to participate 
in humanitarian operations, or to provide protection for such opera-
tions, at the request of a United Nations agency or department.109
The change in the image of war thus became evident in the 
1997 government report to parliament by virtue of two crucial fac-
tors. In the first place, the nature of crises had altered. The straightfor-
ward manner of evaluating and predicting the possibility of war that 
had applied in the Cold War period had been challenged in the post-
Cold War era, when a broad spectrum of “new threats” had appeared 
alongside the more powerful military dangers, and the report speaks 
not only of territorial infringements but also of possible crisis situ-
ations arising from attempts at military interference with the vital 
functions of societies. The creation of a crisis management capability 
was partly connected with this factor. Secondly, the change in the 
image of war is attributed to developments in military technology.110 
Following the international model, the inspiration for this analy-
sis of technological warfare in the report was the Gulf War of 1991, 
which, it was claimed, could well result in an increasing accent on 
weapons technology, air power and strategic transport capabilities 
in warfare.111 The analysis of developments in military technology 
admittedly takes place from the perspective of developments within 
society, and it is also interesting to note that the report’s evaluation 
of the relationship between warfare and technology is based on Hei-
di and Alvin Toffler’s model of three waves of warfare, which implies 
that the degree of development within society as a whole has led so 
109 Report of the working group for revision of the law of peacekeeping missions 
(2005), p. 7. 
110 See Security trends in Europe and the defence of Finland, Government report 
to parliament 1/1997, 17.3.1997 (1997), p. 51 (in Finnish): “The use of advanced 
technology for military purposes is a powerful factor in shaping the develop-
ment of armed forces and the practice of warfare.” 
111 Ibid., p. 15.
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far to three revolutionary changes in the pattern of warfare. The first 
phase of change was connected with the development of agrarian 
societies, the second with industrial societies and mass production, 
and now, “on the eve of the third wave” the development of the “in-
formation society” was leading to a further revolutionary change in 
warfare, in which knowledge would become the principal element 
rather than massed military force and large-scale destruction. Start-
ing out from the Tofflers’ three-wave model, the report maintains 
that:112  
 “The armed forces of the information society will consist of 
highly mobile, technically advanced troops with a low rate of 
personnel turnover. … although the motivation felt by the citi-
zens of the information society for maintaining conventional 
armed forces of the kind typical of an industrial or even agricul-
tural society will give rise to a credibility problem. The majority 
of the armed forces existing in Europe are armies of the indus-
trial age, and efforts will have to be made to develop these to 
the information society level. The United States has progressed 
furthest in this development work so far, but considerable 
progress is being made in the other NATO countries as well. … 
An army of the industrial age will not be able to protect its citi-
zens or social structures from the effects of weapons generated 
by the information society.”113
Examined in term of military technology, the change in the 
image of war was evident from the accent placed on the exploita-
tion of information technology for military purposes and the ex-
pected networking of intelligence, command and control systems 
and weapons systems as further developments were made in data 
transmission. Sensors and weapons systems would be function-
ing within the same networks, and with ever shorter delay times. 
Meanwhile, significant increases would be achieved in the ranges 
over which arms systems could operate and their precision would 
be substantially improved, the mobility of systems and troops would 
be enhanced, troops would be reduced in size and their combat ef-
112 Ibid.; see also Toffler & Toffler (1994).
113 Security trends in Europe and the defence of Finland, Government report to 
parliament 1/1997, 17.3.1997 (1997), p. 50 (in Finnish).
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fectiveness greatly increased.114 The 1997 report also maintained, still 
in the spirit of the Toffler model, that the defence forces had already 
developed into a “multi-layered combination of armed forces of the 
agrarian and industrial societies with functions operating on terri-
torial defence principles.” In particular, certain parts of the defence 
forces’ command, control and surveillance systems and certain naval 
and air force units were described as conforming to the requirements 
of the information society.”115
The evaluation of the technicization of warfare presented in the 
1997 report emphasizes the importance of more professional person-
nel, the value of surprise tactics based on a brief use of military force 
and a broad-based shift in doctrine from wars of attrition and the phi-
losophy behind them to manoeuvre warfare, in an attempt to produce 
an impact on the enemy by means of rapid movements, substantial 
and precisely targeted firepower and psychological manoeuvres de-
signed to undermine the enemy’s desire to continue hostilities.
 “The greater variety of missions and the development of new 
technologies will mean differentiation in the structure of armed 
forces and in their training. The performance of the smaller 
forces maintained will have to be improved by developing their 
equipment, and economic resources will have to be targeted at 
developing the best combat troops. It is the best trained and 
best equipped troops that should be kept on a high level of 
alert for demanding crisis management missions. At present 
both the development of defence equipment and trade in this 
equipment are dominated by the United States, with the Eu-
ropean countries attempting to achieve comparable technical 
standards.”116
The conclusion reached in the 1997 report regarding the spread 
of the technicization of warfare to Finland in the post-Cold War era 
was that there was a need to reduce troop size and raise the quality 
of training and armament, to invest in new military technology and 
to develop a capability for taking part in crisis management opera-
tions out-of-area. 
114 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
115 Ibid., p. 53 (in Finnish).
116  bid., pp. 28-29 (in Finnish).
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 “National defence requirements remain an important factor in 
the development of the Finnish Defence Forces, even though 
the altered security environment may mean an increase in inter-
national crisis management missions. The general global trend 
is towards a reduction in troops numbers with a corresponding im-
provement in levels of training and preparedness. Finland should be 
able to develop at least some of its troops in the same way.”117
As far as developments in Russia are concerned, the report 
notes that there are “numerous uncertainty factors” which may have 
consequences for security policy throughout Europe, including Fin-
land. Russia continues to be described from a Finnish perspective 
as a major military power which will strive to preserve its influence 
and its superpower identity by means of its armed forces – includ-
ing the nuclear weapons that it possesses.118 The reform of the Rus-
sian armed forces is discussed within the framework of the western 
image of war, and it is envisaged that Russia will set out to reduce 
the size of its armed forces, increase their level of professionalism 
and equip them with modern weapons technology and command 
and control systems that meet 21st-century requirements. In other 
words, the capability of its smaller body of troops can be expected to 
be enhanced through investments in technology and an emphasis 
on flexibility in their use. It is also estimated that the level of prepar-
edness of the Russian armed forces will improve as a result of the 
reform, as “fully equipped combat troops comprising all branches of 
the forces will be created for deployment on all the main fronts”.119 
In view of the above-mentioned global factors pointing towards a 
change in the image of war and of Russia’s military potential, the re-
port provides a partially revised list of crisis and threat models upon 
which defence planning should be based:
1. Political and military pressure backed up with limited use of 
military force or the threat of this.
2. A sudden strategic strike.
3. A full-scale offensive aimed at the capture of strategically im-
portant areas or the use of Finnish territory for an offensive 
against a third party.120
Comparison of these models with the ones quoted in the Gen-
117 Ibid., p. 53 (in Finnish; italics by the author).
118 Ibid., p. 19.
119 Ibid., p. 39 (in Finnish).
120 Ibid., p. 78.
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eral Section of the 1995 Field Manual suggests that the threat of a 
“transit” offensive (against a third party) had obviously declined in 
importance, as this was now merely one aspect of the model that 
involved a full-scale offensive, while political and military pressure 
had become established as a new type of threat that should be tak-
en into account in defence planning. Meanwhile, the “surprise at-
tack” mentioned in the 1995 General Section of the Field Manual is 
now referred to as a “strategic strike”.121 These two concepts are very 
closely related in terms of practical content, but if one is to look for 
differences between them, a “strategic strike” may be assumed to en-
tail assertive military capabilities consistent with trends in modern 
techno-warfare.
The report also mentions the need to be prepared to prevent 
crises from breaking out in neighbouring areas or to restrict the ef-
fects of any that do break out. In response to the above threat or 
crisis models derived from the nature of the security environment in 
the post-Cold War era, the 1997 report clearly regards the ability to 
prevent or repel a strategic strike as a more important target for de-
velopment, in addition to which a need is expressed for developing 
troops for use in international crisis management missions.122 
The international trends in the development of armed forces 
mentioned in the 1997 government report and the conclusions 
reached from them regarding steps to be taken in Finland may be 
seen to be clearly connected with the “grafting” of the western dis-
course of a revolution in military affairs onto Finland’s official de-
fence thinking. In addition, connections may be seen between the 
report and the possibilities for developing military crisis manage-
ment and defence of one’s own territory through modifications to 
the armed forces of the Cold War period to render them suitable for 
techno-warfare. In the latter half of the 1990s the discourses that 
had shaped the image of war in earlier times, during the Cold War, 
were combined with one of the most important western discourses 
touching upon military power to be found within Finnish security 
and defence policy thinking. The revolutionary influence of advanced 
military technology on warfare had succeeded in modifying US ideas 
on the subject from the early 1990s onwards,123 and the same revo-
121 Ibid., pp. 52, 78; Security in a changing world – guidelines for Finland’s security 
policy. Government report to parliament 6.6.1995 (1995) (in Finnish).
122 Ibid., p. 78.
123 See Raitasalo (2005a), chapter 7.
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lutionizing ideas entered Finnish discussions at the official level in 
1997.124 Examined from the viewpoint of the change in the image of war, 
the image inherited by the Finns from the Cold War era was modi-
fied towards the end of the 1990s most especially by the following:
1. The discourse of the “new wars”, a description of the conflicts 
that occurred during the transition period following the Cold 
War and of the principal security challenges facing the new, in-
ternational security environment.
2. The discourse of military crisis management and humanitarian 
interventions, as the western response to the “new wars” within 
the framework of the concept of military crisis management.
3. The discourse of a revolution in military affairs, concerning op-
portunities for the advanced industrial countries to transfer to 
a style of warfare typical of an information society by acquiring 
high-tech networked systems of the kind made possible by in-
formation technology.
It should be noted that although each of the above discours-
es regarding the change in the image of war is connected with the 
context of that image in a different way, they are all interconnected. 
The new wars are associated with the change in the international 
security environment and the new military threats emerging dur-
ing the post-Cold War era, while military crisis management and 
humanitarian interventions are responses to the need to solve the 
problems created by the new wars and serve as criteria for evaluating 
the gradually increasing western military power. At the same time, 
the revolution in military affairs enabled modernization of the ter-
ritorial defence system inherited from the Cold War period in order 
to maintain and develop Finland’s overall military capabilities in the 
changing security environment. In addition, the discourse of the rev-
olution in military affairs had the effect of reducing troop numbers 
124 Security trends in Europe and the defence of Finland, Government report to 
parliament 1/1997, 17.3.1997 (1997). See also Precautions to be taken in the 
event of social disturbances or states of emergency (1999), p. 54: “The application 
of advanced technology for military use has had a powerful effect in shaping the 
image of war and the development of armed forces and warfare. Particular objects 
of development have been methods of information warfare designed to disable 
an adversary’s data systems and, methods for achieving strategic and operative 
troop mobility, increased firepower and the ability to achieve comprehensive 
domination over a wide theatre of war” (in Finnish; italics by the author). 
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and allowing the smaller armed forces to be better equipped. The ac-
ceptance of the discourse of the revolution in military affairs as part 
of the Finnish image of war also served to promote the development 
and acquisition of a level of equipment and armaments that would 
in the long term provide opportunities for carrying out interventions 
beyond the country’s own territory and the capabilities for doing so. 
Thus the partial acceptance of the discourse of the revolution in mil-
itary affairs as part of the Finnish image of war in the late 1990s may 
also be seen as a means of providing for the future, in that by devel-
oping the Defence Forces in accordance with international trends in 
techno-warfare, or at least going along with these trends, it would 
be possible to take part in combined operations (crisis management 
for the defence of the Finnish territory or that of another country) 
with other western countries as the need arose. On the other hand, 
the revolution in military affairs was also a discourse of continu-
ity in the image of war, at least in the sense that the idea behind 
this technology-based revolution was that information society ar-
mies would have an advantage over those of industrial societies on 
the battlefield in the case of a war between nation-states. A further 
factor that implied continuity in the Finnish image of war was the 
persisting presence of Russia as a major military power in the late 
1990s and the unpredictability of its development in the medium 
or long term. Likewise, the enormous potential of Russia’s armed 
forces by comparison with the defence forces of a small nation such 
as Finland had the effect of retarding the complete passage of the 
traditional military threat into the history books.125
As the threat of a traditional full-scale military offensive con-
tinued to fade in the late 1990s, the new threats associated with the 
information society began to emerge alongside the existing military 
ones in the broadening security perspective. In terms of military de-
fence, this meant that territorial defence gradually began to diminish in 
significance as far as changes in the image of war were concerned, while 
functions vital to the society assumed a more central role as poten-
tial targets of military action. In particular, the raising of a strategic 
strike to the rank of a conceivable security threat in the 1997 govern-
ment report meant that vital functions of society occupied a more 
critical role, as the purpose of a strategic strike may be assumed to 
be to induce the defender to agree to the aggressor’s demands by 
125 Security trends in Europe and the defence of Finland, Government report to 
parliament 1/1997, 17.3.1997 (1997), pp. 19-21, 37-40.
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means of efficient surprise assaults on sites of vital importance for 
the functioning of society.126 The 1997 report similarly mentions that 
the changes in the image of war imply that vital community func-
tions are likely to become targets of military action in crisis situations 
to an increasing degree.127 It should be noted in this connection that 
the increase in the importance of international crisis management 
operations that had begun in the early 1990s did not as such im-
ply any questioning of the defence of the national territory. In fact, 
the availability of the troops trained for participation in internation-
al crisis management operations for use as part of the defence of 
the home country was emphasized in all formulations of national 
defence policy throughout the 1990s.128 The new concentration on 
technological threats that emerged towards the end of the decade, 
on the other hand, posed a challenge for the whole defence of the 
national territory, especially since the most probable military threats 
(political and military pressure or a strategic strike) would no longer 
be assumed to be aimed directly at the whole of that territory. A full-
scale offensive was admittedly still one of the threats considered at 
the end of the decade, but was by then deemed the least probable. 
The heightened importance of functions that were vital to so-
ciety as far as the national defence was concerned was also reflected 
in the National Defence Council’s memorandum Precautions to be 
taken in the event of social disturbances or states of emergency, drawn 
up in 1999. In the light of the changes in the international security 
environment and in the structure of Finnish society, this document 
stresses the importance of taking precautions for the event of a crisis. 
The increased technicality and complexity of society and the emer-
gence of new threats were taken as justification for a re-planning of 
the provisions for coping with crisis situations, especially situations 
related to the actual declaration of a state of emergency, including 
the threat of war, war itself, or the aftermath of war. In practice this 
meant turning attention to the “grey stages” rather than actual states 
of war or states of emergency as clearly laid down in law.129 The fact 
that attention was drawn to internal and external security at such 
126 See, for example, Precautions to be taken in the event of social disturbances or 
states of emergency (1999), p. 54.
127 Security trends in Europe and the defence of Finland, Government report to 
parliament 1/1997, 17.3.1997 (1997), p. 69.
128 Nokkala (2005a).
129 Precautions to be taken in the event of social disturbances or states of emer-
gency (1999), pp. 13-17 (in Finnish).
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“grey stages” reflects well the shift that had taken place in the Finn-
ish image of war during the post-Cold War period, a shift that came 
to be accepted in official security policy discussions and documents 
towards the end of the decade.
The challenges of a new millennium
By 2001 at the latest the permanence of the termination of the Cold 
War had been accepted in Finnish security policy thinking and the 
threat of a full-scale military incursion had virtually ceased to exist.
“The changes in European security put in motion after the end 
of the Cold War are both profound and lasting. The threat of a 
large-scale military conflict in Europe will remain low.”130
This statement followed on fairly naturally from the change in 
the structure of the defence forces outlined in the previous report, 
that of 1997, and also from the changeover to a capability for pre-
venting and repelling strategic strikes and an increased desire to par-
ticipate in international crisis management operations. Finland had 
come down in favour of the latter policy in 1999, when the European 
Union decided to develop its military crisis management capability, 
and the Finnish government had committed about 1500 men from 
its ground and naval troops to the European pool of forces. In addi-
tion, Finland had intensified its crisis management cooperation with 
NATO, e.g. in the framework of the extended Partnership for Peace 
programme (EAPC, PARP).
The 2001 government report regarded international crisis man-
agement as essential in view of the altered nature of international cri-
ses, and noted that the general international trend was “to develop 
defence systems in order to be able to react to international crises as 
rapidly and flexibly as possible”. At the same time Finland explicitly 
indicated its willingness to re-interpret the principle of the sover-
eignty of states: “Since blatant and massive human rights violations 
may threaten international peace and security, state sovereignty is 
no longer considered an absolute impediment to intervention.” The 
130 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001. Government report to parliament, 
13.6.2001 (2001), p. 4.
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justifications presented in the report for intervention in international 
crises were the strengthening of Finland’s own security and the sup-
port provided by this international collaboration for preparations to 
protect the vital functions of society in a state of emergency. The 
principal reference institutions mentioned in the report with respect 
to participation in military crisis management operations and the 
development of a capability for doing so were NATO and the Euro-
pean Union. As far as the country’s own national crisis management 
capabilities were concerned, it was announced that F-18 interceptor 
aircraft from the Finnish Air Force were to take part in crisis man-
agement exercises during 2001 in order to determine the feasibility 
of the air force participating in operations of that kind in the future 
and the functions that they might perform. Work had also started on 
developing the navy’s minesweeping capabilities for deployment in 
international operations.131
A further feature that was clearly visible in the 2001 report was 
a shift, already detectable four years earlier, from the threat of a mili-
tary offensive to factors threatening the functioning of society. This 
was apparent both in the emphasis placed on cooperation between 
the various authorities in the overall defence of the national territory 
and in the broader discussion entered into with regard to distur-
bances in the normal conditions of life, economic and technological 
threats, internal security and the ensuring of essential supplies.132 
The above-mentioned shift “away” from military threats should not, 
however, be taken to imply the disappearance of such threats. It was 
presumed that there would still be uncertainty factors connected 
with developments in Russia in the future as well and that Russia 
had significant bodies of troops at a high level of alert assembled in 
the areas adjacent to Finland, primarily on the Kola Peninsula and 
in the environs of St. Petersburg. Similarly, the preservation of com-
munity functions, the retention of control over the nucleus of the 
national territory and mobilization in defence of the whole territory 
if necessary continued to be laid down as the country’s military de-
fence aims, even though the focus of development in the defence 
system was on strengthening the capacity to prevent and repel stra-
tegic strikes.133
131 Ibid., sections I, III.
132 See ibid., section III.
133 Ibid, section I, ch. 1.5. 
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It was foreseen in the 2001 government report that the general 
international military development in future years – under US lead-
ership – would be towards an enhanced capability for technologi-
cal warfare, providing an increase in military capability that would 
mean that even a major reduction in numbers would not lead to any 
diminution of the threat posed. It was assumed that rapidly deploy-
able air power ad extremely accurate precision weapons would gain 
in importance in the future. It was also assumed that Russia would 
following the western technology-based pattern in the development 
of its own armed forces – although it was admitted that Russia might 
not have the economic resources to keep up with the transformation 
processes achieved in the West. It was clear, however, that given the 
country’s security environment, development of the armed forces 
would inevitably “require that Finland continues to invest in new 
technologies”.134
The post-Cold War change in perceived threats to community 
functions from a military attack was brought out into the open in 
public in a decision in principle issued by the Council of State in 
2003 regarding the ensuring of the vital functions of society under 
varying degrees of emergency conditions:
“Internationalization and the structural changes within soci-
ety will have a significant effect on society’s abilities to main-
tain its essential functions. … These functions include central 
government, external functional capacity, the national defence, 
internal security, the functioning of society and the economy, 
the people’s working ability and sources of livelihood and their 
mental ability to withstand crisis conditions. … In accordance 
with the aims of Finland’s security and defence policy, the en-
suring of these vital functions must be regarded as one element in 
the preservation of this country’s independence and the mainte-
nance of the security and conditions of life of its citizens.”135
134 Ibid., sections I and III.
135 Council of State Decision in Principle Regarding the Ensuring of the Vital Func-
tions of Society (2003), p. 6 (in Finnish; italics by the author). The threats to these 
vital functions are mentioned in the decision in the following way: “threats to 
data systems, illegal immigration and movements of population that constitute a 
security risk, threats to the health and nutrition of the population, environmental 
threats, economic threats, organized crime and terrorism, major disasters, states 
of international tension, serious violations of Finnish territorial integrity, war or 
an armed incursion, the threat of war and the aftermath of war”, ibid. pp. 7-8.
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The above decision in principle and the associated strategy for 
preserving the vital functions of society gave concrete expression 
to the gradual increase in the importance of internal security that 
had begun with the government’s security and defence policy re-
port in the late 1990s. The strategy as such meant that, adopting a 
broad concept of security, acknowledgement was given to the need 
for greater collaboration between the various security authorities, in 
practice chiefly the defence forces, the police and the border guard 
establishment.
The report of the parliamentary security policy monitoring 
group, published in 2004,136 similarly served to make it quite clear 
where the new threats lay and underlined that new security policy 
alternatives should be sought and new methods adopted in order to 
deal with these. The group proposed that Finland should increase its 
international collaboration and be prepared to bear its own share of 
the responsibility for global security – as part of the European Un-
ion and its developing military crisis management capability. As far 
as developments in the Russian armed forces were concerned, the 
group drew attention to a public statement issued by the Russian 
government regarding the possibility of preventive strikes, the use 
of armed force against cross-border crime and terrorism, the protec-
tion of Russia’s strategic transport routes and defence of the rights of 
Russian citizens living abroad.137
The 2004 government report on security and defence policy 
continued to pursue in an incremental manner the notion of the 
fading of the conventional military threat facing Finland, although 
the impact of the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001 was clear-
ly visible in this report.138 
“Although the threat of a conventional war has receded, par-
ticularly in Europe, Finland’s security is also linked through 
globalization to the wider international environment. The new 
threats targeted in recent years at comprehensive security have 
started to be reflected to an increasing degree in the external and 
136 The monitoring group, formed as part of the parliamentary phase of preparing 
the 2004 government report on security and defence, was chaired initially by 
Antti Kalliomäki, M.P., and later by Aulis Ranta-Muotio, M.P.  
137 Report of the Security Policy Monitoring Group (2004), p. 22.
138 The corresponding 2001 report had come out just prior to the attacks, and al-
though terrorism was mentioned as a new form of threat, there was practically 
no discussion on this topic. 
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internal security of European countries.”139
The definition of a threat as given above serves well to sum-
marize the trend that had taken place from the early 1990s onwards: 
military dangers should still be taken into account – at least in the 
medium term – but the threats experienced by the European nations 
were now connected far more with internal security, a new aspect 
within the framework of a more comprehensive notion of security. 
In the long term the constantly altering threat scenario would re-
quire security policy tools of a new kind in order to maintain an 
adequate response.
The threat models that governed defence planning in the 2004 
report were very much the same as those in the previous one – and 
in that of 1997, for that matter. The new element was that the 2004 
report raised for the first time the question of the methods of asym-
metric warfare being used against Finland:
“A further aim is, through joint action with other authorities, to 
prevent the use of asymmetric means of warfare against society. 
… In the future, asymmetric warfare will become a significant 
security threat and may be an element in all threat scenarios. … 
Terrorism and sabotage, the proliferation and use of weapons of 
mass destruction, and information warfare are considered the 
main asymmetric threats.”140
This formulation in the 2004 report by which the methods of 
asymmetric warfare were linked to all the threat scenarios implied 
in practice a closer dependence of the activities and tasks of the de-
fence forces on the threat posed by terrorism. Indeed, terrorism was 
now mentioned specifically as a guiding factor in defence planning. 
This association with terrorism is mostly expressed indirectly in the 
report, however, and is couched in fairly loose terms. 
“The Defence Forces can support other authorities through vari-
ous forms of executive assistance in combating terrorism. … To 
139 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), p. 
16 (italics by the author). See also, p. 75: “…stability in Finland’s neighbouring 
areas has increased. … Regional conflicts, failing states, terrorism and the threat 
of the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction are some of the 
continuing security problems.”
140 Ibid., pp. 103-104.
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this end, the requirements for efficient communications with 
the civil sector are being studied. In addition, it will be ensured 
that executive assistance arrangements are clear and function 
well, given the requirements of the situation. Executive assist-
ance obligations will also be taken into account in Defence Forces’ 
material procurement. … Development of Defence Forces’ capabili-
ties in military defence also provides the capacity for more efficient 
executive assistance, especially in combating terrorism and serious 
crime. … The ways in which the police and Defence Forces will 
cooperate in combating terrorism will be developed.”141
The report also pointed to a need for new legislation regarding 
the use of the Defence Forces’ military capabilities for anti-terrorism 
purposes in accordance with the concept of extended executive assist-
ance. By broadening the scope of the assistance provided by the De-
fence Forces to other authorities to include the use of military force 
for preventing or intercepting acts of terrorism, it would at least be 
legally possible to enlist the help of the military in the event of the 
hijacking of an aircraft, for instance. Possible assistance that could 
be offered to the police (on a case-by-case basis) as mentioned in 
the report included the deployment of air force or navy units, an-
ti-aircraft units or protective troops.142 Eventually, in July 2005, an 
amendment to the law on executive assistance provided by the Defence 
Forces to the police was introduce which allowed the assistance given 
for the prevention or interception of acts of terrorism to include military 
force if this was “essential in order to avoid a severe and immediate 
danger to the lives or health of a large number of people in  a situa-
tion that cannot be resolved by less drastic measures.” The new law 
defined this “military force” as a use of military equipment in excess 
of the discharge of a personal firearm as is permitted in pursuance 
of police duties.143
It was estimated in the 2004 government report that the “de-
mand” for military crisis management was likely to increase in the 
future, or at least remain at its existing level. It is also noticeable that 
the guidelines laid out for the development of a crisis management 
capability reflected the international terrorism perspective, in that it 
141 Ibid., pp. 127-128, 136 (italics by the author).
142 Ibid., p. 127-128.
143 Amendment to the Law on Executive Assistance Rendered to the Police by the 
Defence Forces 522/2005 (2005) (in Finnish).
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emphasized the need to intervene rapidly in crises that were likely to 
promote international terrorism and also required that the Defence 
Forces should be capable of taking the risk of terrorism attached to 
crisis management operations into account in the structure of their 
detachments and the training and equipment provided for them.144 
Any increase in the demand for crisis management operations was 
expected to call for preparations for more challenging crisis manage-
ment operations, but it was also noted that these preparations and 
the participation in such operations would be advantageous as far 
as the credibility of the national defence system was concerned and 
was likely to increase interoperability with troops from other coun-
tries. It may be claimed on the basis of the analysis of the security 
environment presented in this report that the gradual disappear-
ance of the traditional military threats that had begun in the early 
1990s had led to a situation at the beginning of the 21st century in 
which the credibility of a country’s defence – at least in the developed 
western countries – was increasingly being defined on the basis of expe-
ditionary military capabilities in crisis management operations requir-
ing multinational forces.  It is also significant that the “new” military 
capabilities required for a credible defence system were based on the 
deployment of advanced technology, high-quality personnel and 
specialized knowhow. Thus a credible military force in the context 
of the western image of war, as represented in this Finnish security 
policy analysis, was no longer based on the numbers of army divi-
sions in the field or the strength of these in terms of manpower. 
Instead, military power lay in the networking of command and control 
systems and weapons systems, the possession of precision weapons and 
the numbers and quality of the rapid deployment troops available. 
The global decline in the significance of territorial defence and 
emphasis on multinational crisis management operations was also 
reflected in Finnish security policy debates and decisions around the 
middle of the first decade of the new millennium, leading the 2005 
working group for the revision of the law on peacekeeping forces to 
justify the replacement of that law with a new crisis management 
law partly on the grounds of the change in the nature of crisis man-
agement operations. The working group based its argument on the 
decline in the significance of traditional territorial defence tasks, the in-
crease in more demanding crisis management operations and the global 
144 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), 
p.  7, p. 127.
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trend in the development of armed forces towards greater emphasis on 
the high-mobility capabilities required for international missions.145
In accordance with the constructivist theoretical framework, it 
can also be conjectured that the idea of developments in the glo-
bal security situation requiring Finland to equip its armed forces for 
more demanding international crisis management assignments, as 
laid out in the 2004 government report and the 2005 report of the 
working group for the revision of the law on peacekeeping forces 
was a manifestation of the broader changes that had taken place in 
the identities of the western nations since the end of the Cold War. 
A capacity for participating in demanding international crisis manage-
ment missions of a kind comparable to actual warfare was becoming one 
of the hallmarks of a competent western state. In terms of a security 
policy analysis grounded in traditional instrumental rationality, the 
notion of a small country taking part in challenging crisis manage-
ment operations thousands of kilometres away from its own terri-
tory is anything but a reasonable proposition. Such operations be-
come reasonable only when other – normative-expressive – identity 
factors are taken into account as well, above all the ‘obligation’ on an 
advanced, affluent western nation to acquire a military crisis man-
agement capability that had evolved in the decade and a half since 
the Cold War. ‘Being’ a western democracy entailed participation in 
military crisis management – at least as far as military activities as-
sociated with ‘Westernism’ were concerned.146
The 2004 government report had evaluated the changing se-
curity situation within the globalizing international system from the 
point of view of the armed forces of other nations in the following 
manner:
“Changes in security threats have strongly influenced the devel-
opment of strategies and military doctrines after the Cold War. 
As a result, the defence systems of major powers are undergoing 
rapid changes, a development that is supported and accelerated 
by big changes in weapons technology, particularly in the use of 
information technology. The transformation has been most evi-
dent in the Western world, but similar changes are also taking 
145 Report of the working group for the revision of the law on peacekeeping mis-
sions (2005), p. 13.
146 See The Responsibility to Protect – Research, Bibliography, Background (2001).
70
place in the Russian armed forces.”147
“Many countries are focusing on developing military forces 
suitable for crisis management instead of the earlier emphasis 
on territorial defence.”148
The changes in the defence systems of the ‘major powers’ re-
ferred to in the report – in practice the western powers as far as 
Finland was concerned – are regarded in that document as consist-
ing of a shift from territorial defence to the defence of values, inter-
ests and essential functions, implying in practical terms an exten-
sion of the area over which military activity is projected. Western 
military defence in the post-Cold War period has moved beyond the 
boundaries of these countries – although naturally without neglect-
ing the defence of their own areas.149 A crucial aspect from a Finnish 
perspective has been the progress made by the European Union in 
matters of security and defence policy, and Finland has been fully 
involved as an EU member in formulating and implementing the 
decisions and operations connected with its military dimension.
The 2004 government report on security and defence differed 
slightly from its predecessors in that it outlined the foundations of 
the country’s defence in terms of four directions of change. The first 
of these was connected with the “revised territorial defence system”, 
which in practical terms meant a reduction in the numbers of troops 
to be maintained, qualitative improvements in the equipment avail-
able to them and thus increases in their military capability.150 The 
raising of the question of a revised territorial defence system in this 
report marked a partial shift away from defence of the national ter-
ritory as such and towards the protection of society’s essential func-
tions and strategic targets.151
147 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), 
p. 38 (italics by the author).
148 Ibid., p. 77.
149 Ibid., pp. 38-39. Note the remark on p. 39: “In the future, countries will 
increasingly deploy their armed forces in international crisis manage-
ment operations and other tasks outside their own borders.”
150 Ibid., pp. 100-132.
151 Ibid., p. 101. It should be noted, however, that the report did not abandon the 
notion of traditional territorial defence. The dynamism of the change marked 
by the revised system was largely a matter of emphasis, being derived from 
an alteration in the order of importance of the various threat scenarios. The 
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The other three directions of change are mentioned in the re-
port as factors leading to the revision of the territorial defence sys-
tem. The first of these is connected with the change in the nature of 
warfare, the second with technological progress and its effects on 
warfare and the third with international collaboration. It is noted in 
the evaluation of international crisis management operations that 
preparations should be made for more complex and more demand-
ing operations in the future – i.e. from around 2010 onwards, and 
that this will require the adoption of new modes of action. Above 
all, however, participation in international crisis management op-
erations is regarded in the report as a means of enhancing Finland’s 
national defence credibility.152
The movement in the direction of high technology is reflected 
in the decision announced in the report to create for the Defence 
Forces “a common intelligence, surveillance and command and con-
trol system covering all services and fulfilling the requirements of 
network-centric warfare”. In the western strategic discourse the no-
tion of network-centric warfare was part of the implementation of the 
revolution in military affairs through the exploitation of advanced 
technology in the context of armed conflicts. In addition to this, the 
report emphasized the development of military systems from the 
perspective of military crisis management, rapid deployment capa-
bilities and international collaboration, while it also regarded the ca-
pacity of the Defence Forces to provide executive assistance for other 
authorities as an essential aspect of their development.153
It is interesting to note that alongside the requirement of net-
work-centric warfare, participation in international crisis manage-
ment is also looked on in the 2004 report as partially a function of 
technological development. The constantly more complex and more 
demanding collaboration in the field of international crisis manage-
ment was seen as being reflected in increased demands for high lev-
els of preparedness, equipment and expertise. Also the development 
and acquisition of equipment for these purposes should take place 
“according to NATO standards and norms”.154 This can be taken im-
most probable future military threats were not full-scale conventional attacks 
but rather instances of asymmetrical warfare, strategic strikes, the exertion of 
military, political or economic pressure or regional crises having repercussions 
for Finland. See also ibid., pp. 99-101.
152 Ibid., pp. 95, 100.
153 Ibid., pp. 100, 104.
154 Ibid., p. 101.
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plicitly to mean that the development of the Finnish military forces 
as far as the troops taking part in international operations were con-
cerned was to be governed to a major extent by instances outside 
Finland itself.
In the same way the troops specifically designated for national 
territorial defence duties – wartime manoeuvre and territorial troops 
– were to be developed in a manner that conformed very closely to 
the general western image of war in order to respond to the chal-
lenges of the coming decade. These forces would be smaller in size 
than previously, but more mobile and would require virtually real-
time situation assessments. This would mean the development of 
an integrated intelligence, surveillance and command and control 
system. And as with the troops taking part in international crisis 
management, the command system for the troops engaged in the 
national defence would have to be internationally compatible.155 
Thus in this respect, too, western views on the deployment of mili-
tary forces were instrumental in determining the development of the 
Finnish defence system and Defence Forces.
The new law on military crisis management to replace the ear-
lier law on peacekeeping forces was introduced in 2006. The need 
for such a law had become apparent as a consequence of develop-
ments in crisis management operations particularly during the post-
Cold War era, in that these operations had become more extensive 
and more demanding in nature and were not always backed up by 
a United Nations mandate. The space for this post-Cold War expan-
sion of military crisis management was created as a result of the 
decline in the threat of a military offensive of the traditional kind 
and the consequent lessening of the emphasis on territorial defence 
duties – at least in the majority of the developed western countries. 
One of the most controversial aspects of the law which was passed 
and came into force in 2006 was the fact that it made it possible for 
Finnish troops to take part in international military crisis manage-
ment operations that did not have a UN Security Council mandate. 
As far as the use of force was concerned, the law granted a soldier 
engaged in a crisis management operation the right to use “the de-
gree of force essential for the exercise of his task” on each particular 
occasion.156
155 Ibid., pp. 105, 109.
156 Law on Military Crisis Management 211/2006 (2006) (in Finnish).
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The Strategy for Protecting the Vital Functions of Society, also 
published in 2006, defined the aim with respect to the national mili-
tary defence as being to form a credible preventive threshold to the 
exercise of military force or the threat to do so. Russia is implicitly 
linked to this strategic document in that the credibility of the preven-
tive threshold is defined as a demonstrable level of capability relative to 
the military capacity of the security environment. The strategy defines 
the national defence in terms of the protecting of the vital functions of 
society and crucial individual targets and the maintaining of control 
over areas of critical importance for defence purposes. In the spirit of 
the 2004 government report, the focus of the national defence from 
2010 onwards should be transferred more obviously towards specific 
sites and vital functions. In addition, the document regards all the 
threat scenarios as laying more emphasis than before on collabora-
tion between the Defence Forces and other authorities.157
The strategy defines the purpose of participation in interna-
tional crisis management as being to prevent and restrict interna-
tional crises so that their repercussions will not be felt in Finland. 
Links with the United States, the European Union and NATO in this 
respect are also emphasized, and similarly links with the creation of 
new military capabilities to meet the needs of the national defence.
“The international interoperability of the Defence Forces should 
be developed in accordance with the needs, requirements and 
emphases of the EU and NATO. Particular attention should be 
paid to the development of network-assisted warfare and rapid 
deployment capabilities and areas of special expertise.”158 
Further aims of international crisis management activities de-
fined in the 2006 strategy were the ability to accept military assist-
ance and to provide host nation support. The idea of a revised territo-
rial defence system and the creation of an integrated intelligence, 
surveillance and command and control system compatible with 
network-centred warfare officially raised in the 2004 government 
report is closely associated with the purpose of international crisis 
157 Strategy for Protecting the Vital Functions of Society. Decision in Principle by 
the Council of State, 23.11.2006 (2006). See also Finnish Security and Defence 
Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004).
158 Strategy for Protecting the Vital Functions of Society. Decision in principle by 
the Council of State, 23.11.2006 (2006), p. 29 (in Finnish; italics by the author).
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management as laid down in this strategy, in that, in addition to 
improved interoperability, international crisis management activities 
were expected to lead to the development of  capabilities in the con-
text of the revised territorial defence system, especially in the form of 
the value added through network-centred defence.159 Thus network-
centred warfare and the general technicization of warfare that lay 
behind it, together with the increase in international activity, formed 
the cornerstones of the development of the Finnish Defence Forces 
as far as this strategy document was concerned:
“The Defence Forces’ organization and material acquisitions 
should be developed with a view to the change in the nature 
of warfare, advances in technology and increases in interna-
tional cooperation. … Troops strengths will be reduced, but 
at the same time their mobility, firepower and range will be 
increased.”160
It should be noted, however, that the focus of military defence 
development in the 2006 strategy was very much on cooperation 
between the various authorities, which is quite natural, since most 
of the threat scenarios considered in this strategy involved fields of 
administration that lay outside the scope of the armed forces.161 As 
a result of the changes in threat scenarios and the increasing dif-
ficulties in distinguishing between internal and external threats, 
the strategy assigned a more powerful role to the Defence Forces 
in supporting the other authorities and protecting society at large, 
proposing that their equipment and expertise should be planned 
and prepared much more with a view to use for the prevention and 
interception of threats than previously. The international dimension 
159 See ibid., pp. 29-31.
160 Ibid., p. 30 (in Finnish).
161 Where the main emphasis in the government reports on security and defence 
was on outlining and evaluating general trends in security and the develop-
ment of the Finnish defence system, the purpose of the strategies for protecting 
the vital functions of society was to define tasks and measures to be carried 
out in all branches of the administration in response to changes in the security 
environment. Only three of the nine threat scenarios mentioned in the 2006 
strategy concerned the defence administration, and correspondingly, only five 
of the 50 strategic tasks outlined in it came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of Defence. See Strategy for Protecting the Vital Functions of Society. Decision 
in principle by the Council of State, 23.11.2006 (2006).
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of the support afforded to other authorities – executive assistance 
abroad162 – was also taken into account in the document, in accord-
ance with the European Union’s solidarity obligations.
The Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025, “Security for the Fu-
ture”, published in summer 2006, outlines the principal functions of 
the defence administration in a similar manner to that adopted by 
the working group on the law governing the defence forces. These 
functions are classified into military defence of the national territory, 
increased cooperation with other authorities and intensified inter-
national crisis management activities. The strategy is again based 
on trends visible in the international system, many of which could 
have direct or indirect implications for the development of Finland’s 
defence system. Technological advances are mentioned as likely to 
affect the country’s defence arrangement to a significant extent in 
the future, even though this strategy approaches the relationship 
between military technology and the nature of warfare in a slightly 
more restrained manner than did the 1997 government report: “The 
new technologies do nothing to alter the nature of traditional war-
fare or the regularities governing it.”163
Although the strategy acknowledges the important role of 
technology in the development of armed forces, it tends to approach 
technology as a form of external pressure that is compelling Finland 
to react to certain global imperatives regarding military technology 
when developing its defence system. The appeal to technological 
progress may even be seen as a depoliticization of the wording of 
Finnish defence policy, implying, as it were, that policy decisions are 
being taken under duress from certain objective technical factors 
rather than being political valued judgements aimed at achieving 
certain desired goals:
“The development and maintenance of military technology is a 
challenging matter in view of the scarcity of resources. Modern 
defence equipment can be expected to double in price roughly 
every seven years, and maintenance costs for this new equip-
ment can be expected to rise at the same rate. The expense of 
military technology thus compels us to look for future solutions 
162 See Government Bill to be Placed Before Parliament for a Law on Military Crisis 
Management and Certain Related Laws 5/2006 (2006), p. 63.
163 Security for the Future. Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 (2006), p. 6 (in Finn-
ish).
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through innovative combinations of high-technology weapons 
systems and cost-effective commercial systems.”164    
The Ministry of Defence strategy links this compunction to fol-
low the expensive trends in military technology with the notion that 
the creation and maintenance of a credible defence capability re-
quires that a third of the defence budget should be spent on material 
acquisitions.165 Thus the development of the Finnish defence system 
in the early decades of the 21st century is viewed in the Ministry of 
Defence strategy as being to a very great extent dictated from outside 
Finland. If the focus on technology arising out of the change in the 
international image of war is combined with the emphasis on mate-
rial acquisitions required in order to guarantee external credibility, 
it is seen that the alternatives available to Finland for developing its 
defence system are little more than natural reactions to an analysis 
of the objective security environment. Following the savings and re-
ductions in defence allocations in the 1990s, the Ministry of Defence 
strategy is bringing forward high-tech systems as fairly natural jus-
tifications for substantial increases in the defence budget. At a time 
of increasingly expensive technology, it is obvious that more money 
will have to be spent to maintain even the existing level of military 
capability.166 In this age of techno-wars it is necessary to run faster 
merely in order to stay where you are. On the other hand, if more 
money is available it is possible to achieve a considerable increase 
in military capability – at least if one is to believe the discourse of 
the revolution in military affairs.   As the Minister of Defence, Seppo 
Kääriäinen, put it towards the end of 2006:
“In the name of credibility for the system and in accordance 
with the requirements of an ever-changing security environ-
ment, we are making new defence material purchases at hugely 
increasing prices. … If we do not invest sufficiently in modern 
technology there is a danger that our defence forces of the future 
will be capable of little more than ‘leisure-time excursions.”167 
164 Ibid., p. 6 (in Finnish).
165 Ibid., p. 21.
166 Cf. Security for the Future. Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 (2006), p. 21 (in 
Finnish): “The maintaining of the present level of capability to correspond to 
the new requirements would call for significant re-evaluations or a substantially 
greater financial input.”
167 Kääriäinen (2006a) (in Finnish).
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It should be noted that lying behind the general trend towards 
the technicization of warfare in connection with the development 
of armed forces, especially in the western countries, is the desire to 
be able to wage effective expeditionary warfare outside the coun-
try’s own territory with smaller bodies of troops than in earlier times. 
US troops have for decades been customarily deployed outside their 
own area – outside their own continent, in fact. Once the end of 
the Cold War and the significant decline in the need to defend Eu-
rope by means of massive concentrations of US forces had released 
the development of that country’s armed forces from the shackles 
of considering military resources in numerical terms, it was possible 
to use advanced technology to provide a new logic for this develop-
ment, especially since the military threat that constituted the reason 
for maintaining those conventional forces had virtually disappeared. 
Thanks to its leading military role in the world, the United States 
was able to set out in a determined and unprejudiced manner to 
construct visions of the nature of warfare in the future (in terms of 
the revolution in military affairs) and to develop its armed forces in 
accordance with those visions (the technology-based transforma-
tion). In Europe, too, the fading of the threat of a full-scale offensive 
with the termination of the Cold War led to an emphasis on expe-
ditionary capabilities in military development. This was particularly 
the case in Western Europe, where the threat of a military attack has 
now disappeared entirely and the aim of developing armed forces 
in accordance with technology-based visions of warfare employing 
the methods of the revolution in military affairs and the technology-
based transformation first reached Europe from the United States. 
Indeed, the most significant military powers in Europe, Great Britain 
and France, had already acquired a military culture that included ex-
peditionary capabilities during the Cold War and well before it, and 
these two major powers were able to make use of their relatively 
stable political and military position to establish a leading role for 
themselves in military developments within Europe in the changing 
security environment of the post-Cold War era. The vision of the rev-
olution in military affairs and the practical programme of develop-
ment associated with the technology-based transformation proved 
relatively easy for these two expeditionary-minded nations to adopt 
in the presence of the post-Cold War threat scenarios.
Although armed forces relying on intensive applications of ad-
vanced technology are undoubtedly very well suited for the defence 
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of their own territory, the ‘techno-war’ concept that has emerged in-
ternationally to represent the nature of warfare as far as the devel-
opment of armed forces for offensive purposes is concerned is only 
partially relevant to the situation of small nations such as Finland 
that are interested above all in protecting crucial sites, functions and 
areas within their own territory. Nevertheless, the increasing inter-
national tendency to evaluate the credibility of military activity in 
terms of the possession of capabilities of the kind associated with a 
high level of military technology and the demonstration of a readi-
ness to use such capabilities in the international arena has contrib-
uted to a ‘reification’168 of the effects of technological progress within 
Finnish defence policy thinking and to some extent to a techno-de-
terministic depoliticization of the formulation of defence policy.
The notion developed in the United States in the 1990s of a 
technology-led revolution in military affairs, with its associated 
transformation of the armed forces and implementation of network-
centred warfare is re-echoed in the Ministry of Defence strategy in 
the following way:
“Progress in information technology is making it possible to 
contemplate network-centred warfare, a concept based on 
the possession of an efficient, broad-based system for acquir-
ing, gathering and analysing information, a modular system of 
high-performance troops, international interoperability and a 
highly sophisticated command system.”169  
The fairly widespread post-Cold War western tendency for 
greater professionalism in the armed forces170 has reached Finland, 
partly along with the accent on technological development and the 
increase in progressively more demanding international crisis man-
agement operations, but by introducing the professionalism issue 
into the Finnish defence policy discussion, these more demanding 
operations and the technicization of command and control systems 
and weapons systems have in effect precipitated a need for a re-
168 ’Reification’ refers in his connection to a neglect of the socio-political nature of 
the evaluation of military strength and its transformation into something self-
evident that is regarded as an objective fact.
169 Security for the Future. Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 (2006), p. 6 (in Finn-
ish).
170 See Nokkala (2005b), p. 121.
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evaluation of one of the pillars of the Finnish defence system, uni-
versal male conscription. The Ministry of Defence strategy aims at 
an improvement in levels of expertise among Defence Forces per-
sonnel, and a more professional command of strategy among those 
taking part in international operations and the reservists grafted into 
the troops to be deployed in times of war. In as far as the credibility 
of the Finnish defence system in the post-Cold War era rests on the 
possession of well-equipped rapid deployment forces, it may never-
theless be said that the traditional model of universal conscription may 
prove to detract somewhat from the credibility of the country’s defence 
in view of the general western accent on professionalism. This may be 
true in spite of the fact that Finnish discussions regarding national 
service have laid particular emphasis on the possibilities for making 
use of the civilian skills acquired by conscripts before call-up. The 
general western discussion of military professionalism has in fact 
been steered in a Finnish context very much towards increasing the 
expertise of the regular personnel and making better use of civilian 
skills. Although no proposal for selective conscription has yet been 
put forward in Finland, there have been hints of a more rigorous at-
titude in the vetting of conscripts on admission.
“Future policy will be to train the whole sector of the age group 
that is fit for service in accordance with the Defence Forces’ 
wartime troop requirements.”171
The review of future prospects appended by the Ministry of De-
fence to its strategic plans of 2006 links new technology with the 
development of warfare from the viewpoint of the modernization 
of existing systems. Partially ignoring the question of the post-Cold 
War western troop reductions, this review notes that it is fairly com-
mon for countries to maintain extensive armed forces that have been 
modernized by the introduction of new technology.
171 Security for the Future. Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 (2006), p. 16 (in Finn-
ish). Note should be taken in this connection of the significant reduction in 
troop numbers from around 700,000 men during the Cold War period (with a 
reserve of about 700,000 men, of whom about half a million were due to be as-
signed to wartime troops as required) to the current level of 350,000. This trend 
can be expected to continue. On development of the defence forces during the 
Cold War period, see Visuri (1998).  
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“…many countries maintain large armed forces based on 
a combination of traditional and modern concepts and 
technologies.”172
The impact of the global trend towards the technicization of 
armed forces on the image of war is evaluated in the review of fu-
ture prospects from the perspectives of rapid deployment capabili-
ties, increased firepower, the military use of outer space, information 
warfare, network-assisted warfare and unmanned , all of which are 
defined as starting points for the development of the Defence Forces’ 
military capability. Russia is mentioned as one of the factors promot-
ing the modernization of armed forces by means of advanced tech-
nology, and is itself expected to follow the trend by modernizing the 
vast forces that it has inherited from the post-Cold War era as well 
as developing new military capabilities.173
“Russia will gain in affluence as a consequence of its exports of 
energy and raw materials, and this will enable investments to be 
made in the modernization of its armed forces and the devel-
opment of their capabilities. The aim will be to have a force that 
is smaller in numbers but more professional, mobile and more 
efficient equipped, while retaining a nuclear capability.”174
The threat of a military offensive against Finland is linked to the 
national territory and vital functions of society. Russia is not men-
tioned by name in this connection, but it is noted that “a significant 
and qualitatively developing military capability will continue to ex-
ist” in the neighbourhood of Finland. The military threat is regarded 
as being minimal at the time of writing, but it is admitted that the 
situation could alter even quite rapidly, e.g. in connection with an 
international conflict. In spite of Russia’s huge military potential and 
more active attitude towards the modernization of its armed forces, 
172 Ministry of Defence Review of Future Prospects (2006), p. 4 (in Finnish).
173 Ibid., pp. 7-8 (in Finnish); see also Kaskeala (2002b) (in Finnish): ”Russia is aim-
ing at a radical reform of its armed forces on the western model. They will be 
reducing them in the first phase to a wartime strength of about a million men by 
2006, and shifting the emphasis to qualitative factors in the second phase, from 
the middle of the decade onwards. The intention is to equip these reduced and 
streamlined forces with the latest military technology.” 
174 Ministry of Defence Review of Future Prospects (2006), p. 7 (in Finnish); see also 
Security for the Future. Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 (2006), p. 11.
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the security risks for Finland are perceived in the Ministry of Defence 
strategy as arising mainly from the ‘new threats’. The foundation for 
the development of Finland’s defence system is seen to lie in the 
ability to repel a fairly extensive military incursion, but at the same 
time the Defence Forces are expected to have improved capabilities 
for combating the new threats and preventing them in advance.175
“The Defence Forces should be capable of lending support to 
other authorities for the prevention and elimination of broad-
based security threats both at home and internationally.”176
A certain general global trend is seen to lie behind these ‘new 
threats’ that have emerged alongside the traditional military ones, as 
is reflected in the fact that the evaluation of future military conflicts 
and the long-term duties of the Finnish Defence Forces in prevent-
ing and eliminating these conflicts in the Ministry of Defence strat-
egy classifies terrorism and asymmetric warfare within the expanding 
category of possible types of conflict. In its estimates of the possibility 
of any of the future threats materializing, perhaps very rapidly, the 
strategy relies on a highly traditional formulation: Threat = Will x 
Potential. In other words, a major threat arises from a major military 
potential combined with the will to make use of it. Correspondingly, 
however, it is also possible for a medium-sized threat to arise out of 
a combination of a modest military potential with a strong will for 
action, or of a major potential with a minor will. Naturally, no more 
than a minor threat can arise out of a low military potential com-
bined with a minimal will to use it.177
The problem in a situation where the international security envi-
ronment and the image of war are undergoing change lies in locating 
the factors that represent military capabilities or potentials in each al-
tered situation. What are the ‘reliable’ indicators of military capabil-
ity when the nature of warfare is changing? Another problem, of 
course, is who are the actors in an altered international situation 
whose will to use their military potential needs to be assessed. Also, 
given the international trend for bringing about a transformation – 
175 Security for the Future. Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 (2006), pp. 9-10 (in 
Finnish).
176 Ibid., p. 10 (in Finnish).
177 Security for the Future. Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 (2006), p. 11; Ministry 
of Defence Review of Future Prospects (2006), p. 5. 
82
or deep-seated change – in the development of armed forces and 
the simultaneous rise of the new threats to occupy a more promi-
nent place in security policy decision-making, it is necessary to ask 
how well we are able at the present time, in the western countries 
in general and in Finland in particular, to assess the threat posed 
by terrorism, for example, by means of the formula Threat = Will x 
Potential. Whose will should we be assessing, and what military and 
civilian capabilities should we regard as relevant potentials in order 
to evaluate the threat posed by a whole variety of terrorist organiza-
tions defined on innumerable different criteria? As Stefano Guzzini 
notes when considering the problems involved in determining the 
‘balance of power’, “before diplomats can count, they must decide what 
counts”178.The Ministry of Defence strategy emphasizes the will of 
non-state actors in this connection, as they may be able to achieve 
a sufficient military capacity relatively rapidly in relation to their re-
stricted goals. A single terrorist strike, for instance, does not require 
the creation of a major military capability. Conversely, when examin-
ing threats posed by states as actors in terms of the formula Threat 
= Will x Potential, the strategy places emphasis on the inertia as-
sociated with national military capabilities – in that states maintain 
and develop large armed forces so that it can take years to alter their 
nature, extent or modes of operation, in spite of the fact that the will 
to use military force – and thereby carry out a threat – can change 
very rapidly.179
Thus the implications of the ‘new threats’ are by no means ob-
vious. As the concept of security has widened during the post-Cold 
War era, the proportional use of military means to prevent and com-
bat the many kinds of threat that have emerged can be estimated to 
have diminished. There are numerous types of environmental threat, 
social threat and threats arising from our economic interdependence 
that can only be resolved to a very minor extent by the use of arms. 
Failing states, terrorism, organized crime, the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction and regional conflicts can be regarded from 
a military viewpoint as no more than indirect threats to Finland, and 
in this sense it is logical that the Ministry of Defence strategy should 
link the growing importance of crisis management operations in 
the post-Cold War period with the broader field of western secu-
rity, defence collaboration and interoperability, the implementation 
178 Guzzini (1998), p. 231 (italics by the author).
179 Security for the Future. Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 (2006), p. 11.
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of which takes place from a Finnish point of view very clearly within 
European Union and NATO circles. Thus the new threats are viewed 
as requiring from Finland an active military contribution within a 
framework formed by these organizations – partly through partici-
pation in the EU battlegroups and cooperation with the NATO rapid 
deployment forces – all of which takes place within a world system 
based on the authority of the United Nations. It is admittedly pos-
sible, of course, that Finland may find itself in the future involved in 
international military interventions which have no UN mandate to 
legitimize them, but where a considerable amount of pressure nev-
ertheless exists for Finnish participation.180
“We may find ourselves in the future having to choose whether 
to take part in operations that do not have a clear authorization 
from the UN. … We may also have to consider in the future 
preventive military action as part of a larger group of participating 
countries.”181
The new threats are brought to the fore in the Ministry of De-
fence strategy as starting points for planning the defence system in 
the form of the increased significance of both cooperation between 
the various authorities and crisis management operations, the need 
to secure the country’s key areas and vital functions, the intention 
to develop territorial troops partly in order to provide support for 
other authorities and the implicit re-definition of the concept of total 
national defence. The strategy in fact approaches the last-mentioned 
topic from the comprehensive security perspective, and attempts to 
apply the principles of total defence as a response not only to tra-
ditional military threats but also to the new, broad-based security 
threats.182
“It will also be appropriate to use our military capacity to prevent 
and combat broad-based security threats, and for the manage-
ment and cleaning up of their repercussions both at home and, 
if necessary, beyond the boundary of our own country.”183
180 Ministry of Defence Review of Future Prospects (2006), pp. 5-9.
181 Ibid., pp. 5, 9 (in Finnish; italics by the author).
182 Security for the Future. Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 (2006), pp. 11-12, 20.
183 Ministry of Defence Review of Future Prospects (2006), p. 12 (in Finnish).
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It can be estimated that the post-Cold War alteration in the se-
curity environment – and the blurring of the distinction between 
internal and external security as part of that alteration – will have 
introduced an element of tension into the concept of total defence 
as part of the armed forces’ cooperation with other authorities. The 
role of the Ministry of Defence as a coordinator of the total defence 
system harks back to the time when the emphasis was on a distinct 
military threat. Now that the new, broad-based security threats are 
influencing Finnish security policy to an ever-increasing degree, the 
question of a gradual transfer of this coordinative role to the Min-
istry of the Interior is emerging as a more or less ‘natural’ sequel to 
this. The discussion up to now has centred partly on the role of co-
operation between the territorial troops and various authorities, and 
no open public dispute between ministries has as yet been observ-
able, but if we are to view national and international politics from 
the constructivist perspective, as a constant struggle over the accept-
ability of different interpretations, it can be expected to be no more 
than a matter of time before the responsibility for coordinating the 
total national defence becomes an issue of public debate, at the lat-
est when competition for resources between the branches of the ad-
ministration is reduced to a question of redistributing a fixed volume 
of resources among existing units with no room at all for bargaining 
in the context of a stabilization of the previously variable interpreta-
tions and responsibilities. In other words, the longer the dilution of 
the concept of military security continues, so that the broad-based 
concept becomes a ‘natural’ part of the security policy agenda, the 
higher the probability that the Ministry of Defence’s hold over the 
coordination of the total national defence will be challenged by oth-
ers.
The new threats have not replaced the old state-based scenarios 
as far as defence planning is concerned, however, for the 2006 ver-
sion of Information on the Total Defence of Finland, a textbook used in 
National Defence Courses, for example, still describes the Russian 
armed forces as an instrument for the pursuance of traditional na-
tional interests on the one hand and, in accordance with the western 
image of war, as engaged in a process of technicization and profes-
sionalization on the other:
“Russia still regards the possession of powerful armed forces as 
a matter of major geopolitical importance in view of the decline 
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in the significance of international organizations and arms con-
trol agreements and the more common use that is being made 
of ad hoc military alliances. The traditional role of armed forces as 
a means of achieving political goals has not lost its importance. … 
The doubling of the defence budget in 2000–2004 has created a 
firm foundation for the development of new weapons systems, for 
instance, although the volumes in which these have been pro-
duced have remained modest. The strength of the armed forces 
is likely to settle at around a million men, an ever-increasing pro-
portion of whom will nevertheless be contract soldiers. The raising 
of professional standards to the planned level is estimated to 
call for an increase in paid staff to 70% of the total and that of 
non-commissioned officers to 50% by 2008. The contract sol-
diers will be placed chiefly in the special troops and stand-by 
troops.”184 
The above description of the Russian armed forces reflects rath-
er aptly the discrepancies between the Finnish and western military 
threat scenarios, i.e. the perceived potential military threats or risks, 
and at the same time it shows that Russia is perceived in Finnish 
eyes as at least partially following developments in western armed 
forces by placing emphasis on high-tech systems and greater pro-
fessionality.
The change in the Finnish image of war since  
the Cold War era
The above examination of official Finnish security policy documents 
from the post-Cold War period points to the following factors as in-
dicators of changes in the international security environment:
1. The threat of another state attacking Finland with its armed 
forces has clearly diminished. Within the framework of a con-
cept of security that has broadened – or has been broadened – 
somewhat, military threats have become less numerous, at least 
by comparison with the situation during the Cold War.
2. Alongside this dilution of the military threats the more broad-
184 Pyykönen (2006) (in Finnish; italics by the author).
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based threats have become more abstract and complex. Many 
factors that are liable to threaten the functionality and secu-
rity of Finnish society are by nature such that they are difficult 
to prevent in advance or combat at the time by purely military 
means.
3. With the reduction in the threat of a full-scale offensive on 
traditional lines, defence of the functions that are vital to the 
workings of society has come to occupy a significant role in the 
duties of the Defence Forces. This is reflected in the tasks laid 
down for them both in peace time and at times of war. In peace 
time this trend is most noticeable in the form of a gradual in-
crease in the emphasis on cooperation with other authorities 
and the provision of executive assistance and in the adoption of 
the concept of ‘extended executive assistance’, while in a hostile 
operating environment it is manifested above all in a greater 
emphasis on scenarios involving a strategic strike.
4. International military crisis management operations have taken 
on a more important role among the tasks of the Defence Forces 
at the same time as the traditional threat of a full-scale military 
offensive has receded. This means that the first line of defence 
for Finland has moved beyond the bounds of the country’s own 
territory.
5. The development of a military capability consistent with the 
discharge of international crisis management duties has in-
creased its importance as a  determinant of the credibility of 
Finland’s defence.
6. The use of advanced military technology has risen to an im-
portant position in the credibility of Finland’s defence and as a 
determinant of the reforms to be made in the defence system. 
An increasing proportion of high-tech systems has become one 
of the initial assumptions for the post-Cold War development 
of the Finnish defence system, an assumption which it is dif-
ficult to question in defence policy discussions. This may be in-
terpreted as an adaptation of the goals set for Finnish defence 
policy to the technology-based transformation of the armed 
forces that has taken place in the United States and Europe 
under the aegis of the revolution in military affairs.
7. The increased emphasis on advanced military technology and 
demanding international crisis management operations in the 
development of the Defence Forces has started to generate 
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pressures for change in the system of universal male conscrip-
tion. The increased need for professional personnel and the 
gradual – and as yet still minor – shift in the emphasis of the 
national defence away from the country’s own territory as such 
and towards sites of particular importance with regard to com-
munity functions, as well as towards international crisis man-
agement operations, have gradually led people to think about 
current Finnish conscription practices. The credibility of armed 
forces nowadays rests much more on the quality of the military 
training provided than on its volume.
8. The decision has been made in Finland to offset the growing 
costs of advanced military technology by reforming the terri-
torial defence system that prevailed in the Cold War era, with 
its massive use of troops, command and control systems and 
weapons systems. In practice this has meant the disbanding of 
many units and the closure of institutions, entailing substantial 
redundancies and transfers of functions to other localities. Ef-
forts have also been made to improve economic efficiency and 
to compensate for the general loss of self-sufficiency brought 
about by globalization by centralizing many of the Defence 
Forces’ core functions and outsourcing many more peripheral 
ones. Thus the discourse of privatization in western warfare 
has been transferred to Finnish defence policy discussions and 
practices.
9. An increased need has been felt for cooperation between the 
Defence Forces and other authorities operating in the field of 
security, reflecting a more comprehensive concept of security 
and the change in military threat scenarios. The traditional 
threat posed by terrorism to internal security has gradually al-
tered since the year 2000 to apply to the nation’s external se-
curity as well, and at the same time the traditional distinction 
between internal and external security has become blurred as a 
consequence of this extension of the concept both by broaden-
ing the target whose security is referred to (from the state to 
the individual and the stability of the national and international 
system) and by broadening the content of security (from mili-
tary security to the security of the political system, society and 
the economy). Although the discourse of the war on terrorism, 
which posed a challenge to the uniformity of the western image 
of war, has only had a marginal influence on the development 
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of the activities of the Finnish Defence Forces, the more gen-
eral preparations to meet such new threats have had the effect 
of steering the construction of the Finnish image of war away 
from the notion of territorial defence and towards the defence 
of the vital functions of society and international crisis manage-
ment.
The Finnish image of war is constituted in very much the same 
manner as that prevailing in the west in general, even to the extent 
that one might conjecture that the end of the Cold War provided an 
opportunity for Finland to consolidate its identity as a western na-
tion militarily as well as in other ways. The Defence Forces’ material 
acquisitions – the most significant of which were a fleet of Hornet 
F-18 interceptor planes and a fleet of NH-90 transport helicopters – 
and both the doctrinal aspects of the general development of the de-
fence system and factors connected with international military col-
laboration have bound Finland more tightly with the West than ever. 
Universal male conscription, the territorial defence system and the 
principle of military non-alliance are nevertheless specifically Finn-
ish features that clearly cause the country to stand apart from west-
ern trends in defence policy. A potential re-appraisal of conscription 
has now been initiated in Finland, however, and similar progress has 
been made in revising the territorial defence system in accordance 
with the western tenets of a revolution in military affairs (particular-
ly network-centric warfare). Likewise, the identity factors associated 
with military non-alliance have been openly taken into account in 
the Finnish polemic over membership of NATO. One cogent argu-
ment put forward in the NATO debate has been that it would confer 
full membership of the western community of states and entitled 
Finland to a place at all the tables around which decisions regarding 
this country as well as others are taken. The gradual widening of co-
operation with NATO – including the increased attention paid to the 
need for NATO membership within Finnish internal policy discus-
sions in the course of 2007 – are indications of the importance of this 
western reference group in the constantly ongoing reconstruction of 
the Finnish image of war.
The principles governing the development of the Finnish de-
fence system tend to follow the general western trend in the de-
velopment of armed forces with a time-lag of between five and ten 
years, and the ‘depth’ of the change is in general less marked than in 
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most western countries on average. Professionalization, privatiza-
tion, the emphasis on technology, more demanding military crisis 
management operations and the integration of anti-terrorism into 
the field of activities of the Defence Forces185 are all common west-
ern trends. In certain specialized fields, e.g. the Effects-Based Ap-
proach to Operations (EBAO), it is still possible for Finland’s defence 
forces to achieve a rapid change, placing them in the forefront of 
developments. In particular, the Finnish tradition of total defence, 
the emphasis placed on disturbances in the functioning of society as 
threats and the established nature of cooperation between different 
authorities will facilitate the achievement of defence policy changes 
at the political and strategic levels as threat scenarios become more 
broad-based.
As the 1990s advanced, Finland, as part of the western commu-
nity of nations, adjusted its established Defence Forces’ peacekeeping 
tradition to the emerging pattern of international crisis management 
operations, although the emphasis in international operations and 
exercises throughout that decade was on the benefits to be gained 
for the national defence, often quite concrete ones. Since the turn 
of the millennium, however, participation in international military 
crisis management operations has emerged within Finnish defence 
policy thinking as a credible form of military activity which merits 
a place within the international system, even to the extent that the 
functions and troops required for these operations have ‘taken over’ 
part of the duties of the troops trained to defend the country’s own 
territory in a war situation, i.e. to raise the threshold for an offen-
sive and serve as a military deterrent. In addition, international op-
erations provide opportunities for troops to practice acting in crisis 
situations that come as near to wartime conditions as is possible for 
the Defence Forces to ‘arrange’. This instrumental interest in partici-
pation in crisis management is also connected with the need to act 
together with others in demanding situations which is part of the 
Finnish identity policy
Participation in international crisis management operations, 
including humanitarian operations, has made it possible to link the 
Finnish identity with the values of the western community, i.e. one 
‘should’ participate, because all the actors that tie the Finnish iden-
tity with the western countries, the United States and the nations of 
185 Admittedly, the connections between terrorism and the development of the 
armed forces have so far had very few practical implications. 
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Europe, are involved in them. By taking an active part, Finland is able 
to show the others – and itself – that it belongs to the western bloc. 
A further consideration that has formed part of the logic behind the 
increased importance of military crisis management, of course, has 
been the possibility of the solidarity of a collective western identity 
leading to concrete external assistance for Finland should it become 
embroiled in a crisis.
With the growing importance of international crisis manage-
ment operations for defining the credibility of the Finnish defence 
system, it is quite obvious that the Defence Forces will have to an 
increasing extent to develop military capabilities that they can use 
as part of a multinational force engaged in such an operation out-
side their own territory. Interoperability on the technical, logistic and 
tactical-operative levels and with respect to command systems is a 
growing requirement for the development of military troops, func-
tions and systems, at the same time as the work of building up the 
credibility of Finland’s defence continues to move beyond the coun-
try’s borders.
As far as the acquisition of defence material is concerned, a de-
cision has already been taken to observe western standards as laid 
down by NATO. In addition, the Defence Forces have been ordered 
to train and equip troops for progressively more challenging crisis 
management assignments – the latest example of which has been 
participation in two EU battlegroups. In addition, there is a desire 
to increase cooperation with NATO itself, so that the Finnish cri-
sis management troops taking part in more demanding operations 
can rehearse potential operative scenarios as thoroughly as possible 
in the company of other participant NATO troops. Finland wants 
to contribute to the exercises arranged for the NATO rapid deploy-
ment force (NRF) in the future, and the question of participating 
in operations as part of these forces has been raised nationally.186 It 
should also be noted that the European Union has adopted NATO 
standards for defining military capability and conducting exercises, 
for instance.
186 The President of Finland together with the Government Committee on Foreign 
and Security Policy announced a decision in principle to allow participation in 
NRF exercises on 2.11.2006. See Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee “On the Possibility for 
Partnership Countries to Join in the Activities of the NATO Response Force, 
13.12.2006” (2006) (in Finnish); Järvenpää (2007); Katainen (2006).
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Thus a preliminary analysis of Finnish security policy docu-
ments and political discussions and argumentation connected with 
the formulation of Finnish defence policy lends support to the idea 
that the Finnish image of war follows trends in the west with respect 
to military threat scenarios, the duties of defence forces and the 
development of their military capabilities, although with a certain 
delay. This analysis of the image of war will be pursued further in 
Chapter 4, where we will examine the relation between the develop-
ment of the Finnish defence system and the change in the security 
environment in the light of the change in the image of war.
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4. Development of the Finnish Defence Sys-
tem in the Post-Cold War era
Based on the analysis presented in chapter 3 of the changes in the 
Finnish image of war arising out of the altered international security 
situation in the post-Cold War era, we set out in this chapter to ex-
amine the challenges for the development of the Finnish defence system 
under post-Cold War conditions. The ‘defence system’ in this sense 
may be taken as referring to military activities planned and put into 
effect within the framework of Finland’s security and defence policy, 
the fundamental purposes of which are to maintain the country’s se-
curity, enhance its position with regard to security policy and pursue 
its national interests as defined within the domestic political process. 
This broad interpretation of the defence system differs somewhat 
from the definition given in the General Section of the 2007 edition 
of the Field Manual, for instance, according to which:
“The defence system is an entity that comprises the control and 
command system, the intelligence and surveillance system, 
the preparedness regulation system, the logistics system and 
the structure of the armed forces, i.e. the command levels and 
troops of the ground forces, navy and air force.”187
The broader interpretation of a defence system adopted here and 
its close affinity to the concept of defence policy may be attributed 
to the change that has taken place in the international security envi-
ronment since the Cold War, which has in turn formed the basis for 
the construction and maintenance of the Finnish defence system. Its 
adoption means that the development of this defence system is not 
restricted to preparations made for defending the national territory 
at times of war, e.g. in the framework of the concept of total defence, 
but rather the analysis presented in this chapter can be discussed from 
the perspective of Finland’s military defence in accordance with its 
declared security and defence policy. It is within the framework of this 
Finnish military activity that the Defence Forces are being developed 
– both their peacetime personnel, organization and activities and their 
wartime troops, armaments and principles of operation.
187 Field Manual – General Section (2007) (in Finnish).
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The development of Finland’s defence system will be examined 
in this chapter in terms of changes in four factors contributing to 
the Finnish image of war. These Finnish discourses constructing the 
post-Cold War image of war emerged in effect in the course of the 
examination of the Finnish image of war in chapter 3. Although in 
a sense they arise out of the general western image of war, they are 
also in part derived from Finland’s own national military culture, i.e. 
the country’s historical experiences of war and geostrategic location 
as an immediate neighbour of the Soviet Union/Russia.
The first discourse contributing to the formation of the Finnish 
image of war is connected with the national defence, and may be 
termed a war of territorial defence.188 This concept which forms the 
nucleus of the Finnish defence system has been inherited from the 
Cold War period and has continued to provide a basis, or ‘growth 
medium’, for the changes that have taken place in the system since 
that time. The second discourse that quite clearly makes a contribu-
tion to the Finnish image of war is connected with the heightened 
significance of international military cooperation for the Finnish de-
fence system, and particularly emphasis on international crisis man-
agement operations. This second discourse will therefore be referred 
to as a crisis management war.189 The third discourse that affects the 
Finnish defence system and appears in the form of a change in the 
image of war is connected with the partial transition from the de-
fence of a given territorial area to securing the functions vital to so-
ciety, i.e. that of an SFVS war.190 The fourth such discourse, which is 
again connected with the western image of war and the change that 
has taken place in this since the days of the Cold War, lays empha-
sis on the effects of advanced information technology as far as the 
development of the military activities and the creation of new ca-
pacities is concerned. This discourse, which also influences the size, 
organization and principles of operation of the armed forces, may be 
termed a techno-war. This represents a manifestation of the Ameri-
can discourse known as the ‘revolution in military affairs’ in the form 
in which it has spread to Europe and beyond. The development of 
the Finnish defence system in the post-Cold War era will thus be 
examined in this chapter from the perspective of:
188 On the term ’war of territorial defence’ and the Finnish image of war in the 
post-Cold War era, see Nokkala (2005a).
189 Cf. Nokkala (2005a).
190 SFVS is the accepted acronym for Securing Functions Vital to Society. 
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1. a war of territorial defence,
2. a crisis management war,
3. a SFVS war,
4. a techno-war.
These discourses of the Finnish image of war may be regarded 
as analytical categories that enable the influence of the alteration 
in this image on the development of the Finnish defence system to 
be observed and illustrated. In other words, they form the building 
blocks for the Finnish image of war by constraining and enabling re-
production and transformation of the image inherited from the Cold 
War period. The ‘development’ of these elements in the post-Cold 
War era is depicted in Figure 1.
 
War of 
territorial 
defence 
War of 
territorial 
defence 
Techno-war 
SFVS-war 
Crisis management war 
Cold war era Post-Cold war era 
Figure 1. Alterations in the Finnish image of war in the post-Cold 
War era.
The Finnish image of war became established as a fairly consis-
tent conceptual construct during the Cold War era, and the concept 
of a ‘war of territorial defence’ serves fairly well to reflect the situa-
tion at that time: the nation’s independence and territorial integrity 
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were threatened by the armed forces of external state actors, which 
necessitated the maintenance of a territorial defence system and 
preparations for the event of a territorial conflict. By the end of the 
Cold War the Finnish defence system was governed almost exclu-
sively by this notion of a war of territorial defence. Gradually, by the 
mid-1990s, however, the Finnish image of war began to incorporate 
a new element, connected with UN peacekeeping missions belong-
ing to demanding crisis management operations. In other words, the 
notion of out-of-area military operations became associated with 
the generally accepted Finnish concepts of war and the deployment 
of military forces. Equally gradually, from the late 1990s onwards, the 
idea of developing rapid deployment forces for use in demanding 
crisis management missions began to gain a foothold in the Finnish 
image of war as well, and close integration with the military forces of 
other western countries and the emergence of wars of a new kind in 
Europe and elsewhere became an ever more important part of that 
revised image.
The notion of an SFVS war has become part of the Finnish im-
age of war at the same time as the focus of the defence system has 
transferred from territorial defence towards securing the vital func-
tions and functioning of society. The emphasis placed on a strategic 
strike as a major threat in the 1997 government report to parliament 
“Security trends in Europe and the defence of Finland” reflects fairly 
well the emergence of the concept of an SFVS war, and the 9/11 
events, the subsequent US declaration of a war on terrorism and the 
more general western trend towards directing military attention at 
the threat posed by terrorism have increased the weight placed on 
this discourse of war within the Finnish image. The principles of ex-
ecutive assistance and international cooperation – including military 
cooperation – to minimize and/or eliminate the threat of terrorism 
are demonstrations of this.
The techno-war discourse entered the Finnish image of war in 
the late 1990s and in the very first years of the new millennium, 
a timing which corresponds fairly well with the trend in the west-
ern countries as a whole. The lead achieved by the United States 
as a developer and user of advanced information technology for 
the purposes of warfare was constantly being pointed to during the 
1990s, as the western nations of Europe had managed to develop 
high-tech instruments of war and take them into use only to a rela-
tively limited extent. Decisions had nevertheless been made in both 
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NATO and the EU to develop their future armed forces in accor-
dance with the discourse of the revolution in military affairs in order 
to be able to participate in multinational network-centric warfare. 
The European aim as far as the development of armed forces and 
the creation of capabilities for new modes of warfare are concerned 
is clearly interoperability with the United States, especially in view of 
the lead established by that country and its hegemonic position with 
regard to the development and adoption of military applications of 
advanced technology. The transformation that now has to be imple-
mented in Europe implies in practice the acquisition of network-
centric military capabilities and the conducting expeditionary mili-
tary operations. The idea of acquiring a capacity for network-centric 
warfare reached Finland around the turn of the millennium and was 
expressed in official form in the government report of 2004.
A war of territorial defence – changes in the territorial 
defence system
The Finnish image of war became fairly well established in an un-
contested, unambiguous form during the Cold War period. It was 
essential to be able to react to a large-scale conventional attack with 
delaying and attrition tactics as soon as the enemy had crossed the 
border and then to destroy the invading force in series of decisive 
battles once mobilization of the extensive reserves had become pos-
sible. Thus the term war of territorial defence describes the image 
fairly aptly. It was assumed that the invading army of a major power 
would be intent on occupying the territory of Finland, and that the 
only option for reacting to this military threat lay in the system of 
universal conscription and the extending of the defence system over 
the whole territory of Finland. Although it was estimated that the 
balance of military power in the event of a war would be to Finland’s 
disadvantage, war was nevertheless perceived primarily as a sym-
metric combat between troops fielding substantial numbers of men. 
Preparations were also made for guerrilla warfare – and for hostili-
ties of an asymmetric character on the part of the enemy, e.g. sabo-
tage – but overall the image of war during that period conformed to 
that of a territorial war that was symmetric in character.
Even at the very end of the Cold War period the development 
of the Finnish defence system was being directed unflinchingly from 
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the perspective of territorial defence conducted within the frame-
work of a war of attrition, as reflected in the concern expressed in the 
1981 report of the Third Parliamentary Defence Committee regard-
ing the projected reduction of a hundred thousand in the comple-
ment of the trained reserves, from 700,000 to 600,000, in the course 
of the 1990s. In accordance with the prevailing image of a war of ter-
ritorial defence, the committee, even as the Cold War was coming to 
an end, described the large body of trained reserves as the backbone 
of the defence system – even though a large proportion of these re-
serves were poorly equipped to resist an invasion by a massed body 
of highly mechanized troops.
“A large body of reserves can provide the required depth and 
resistance in defence and a measure of security against surprise 
developments. The equipment available to the reserves that do 
not form part of the regular protection forces can be renewed 
only to a limited extent, and they duties assigned to them will 
have to be determined with this in mind.”191
Following the termination of the Cold War, the existing Finnish 
image of war gradually changed. It is natural that as the threat of a 
large-scale invasion abated there should have been more ‘room’ for 
new – or altered – threats to grow in importance. Thus the new situ-
ation is reflected in a gradual change in the military threats quoted 
in the discourse of a territorial war, and particularly in a gradual de-
cline in the attention paid to the threat of a ‘transit attack’ by a force 
aiming to pass through Finnish territory, which was in itself a direct 
manifestation of Finland’s Cold War geopolitical role as a country 
located between East and West. One of the three threats quoted in 
the General Section of the 1995 Field Manual as keystones to Fin-
land’s military defence planning was the use of Finnish territory for 
an attack on a third party, whereas in the 1997 government report 
“Security trends in Europe and the defence of Finland” this threat is 
classified under the general threat of a large-scale invasion. In the 
same way the government security and defence policy report of 2001 
describes an attack on a third party as just one kind of large-scale 
attack that could be envisaged. Correspondingly, the concept of a 
transit attack is left out of the types of threat quoted in the General 
191 Report of the Third Parliamentary Defence Committee, Komiteanmietintö 
1981:1 (1981), p. 44 (in Finnish).
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Section of the 2007 Field Manual.192 In spite of the changes in the 
war of territorial defence discourse, it should be noted that the Finn-
ish image of war still deviates from the general western trend in that 
its nucleus consists of the notion of war as a matter of defence of the 
national territory.
Reliance on universal conscription193 and a substantial body of 
reserves, and also defence of the whole national territory, have been 
typical features of Finnish defence thinking – during the Cold War 
and later, and it is partly on account of this that the ‘Finnish de-
fence model’ may be said to have deviated in some respects from the 
view of war and the deployment of armed forces espoused in other 
countries. Universal conscription has been virtually sacrosanct in the 
context of Finnish security and defence policy debates, so that it has 
been well nigh impossible to question it. Apart from the fact that it 
has been perceived as serving an important social purpose in addi-
tion to the military training that it provides, conscription has been 
seen to be directly related to the exceptionally powerful will to defend 
the homeland that prevails among the Finnish population.194 Where 
other countries have gone over to professional armed forces instead 
of conscript armies and have turned their attention away from their 
own territory and towards out-of-area military operations, Finland 
has maintained – although admittedly in a somewhat different form 
– a massed force typical of the Cold War period in readiness for repel-
ling a large-scale offensive. It should be noted, however, that troop 
numbers have been reduced from the late 1990s onwards so that the 
192 Field Manual – General Section (1995), p. 24; Security trends in Europe and 
the defence of Finland, Government report to parliament 1/1997, 17.3.1997 
(1997), p. 78; Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001. Government report to 
parliament, 13.6.2001 (2001), section II; Finnish Security and Defence Policy 
2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), p. 102; Field Manual – General Section 
(2007), p. 26.    
193 See, for example, Security in a changing world – guidelines for Finland’s security 
policy. Government report to parliament 6.6.1995 (1995), pp. 31, 45; Security 
trends in Europe and the defence of Finland, Government report to parliament 
1/1997, 17.3.1997 (1997), pp. 5,28, 54, 63-64, 67, 77, 79, 87-88; Finnish Security 
and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), pp. 8, 86, 97, 104, 
112, 115; Security for the Future. Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 (2006), p. 1. 
16-17, 21; see also Kaskeala (2002a) “Universal conscription will always form 
the basis of our defence capability and support our security policy choices” (in 
Finnish, italics by the present author).  
194 Security trends in Europe and the defence of Finland, Government report to 
parliament 1/1997, 17.3.1997 (1997), p. 64; see also Laitinen (2005), pp. 10, 72, 
85, 103-104; Nokkala (2005b), pp. 198-201, 203.
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present-day wartime strength of the defence forces is 350,000 men, 
and that numbers are expected to drop further in the future.195
The above account of a massed army is nevertheless no more 
than partially true at best. The Finnish defence system has been de-
veloped in the direction of a form of territorial defence appropriate 
for the age of the information society, although more slowly than 
in the western countries as a whole. A traditional incursion by a 
massed force is still regarded as a possible military threat even today, 
but the motives assumed to be behind such an incursion and the 
sites to be defended have altered over the past fifteen years. It is 
evident that a possible adversary would not be interested in captur-
ing and occupying tracts of Finnish forest but would be more likely 
to concentrate on certain sites of importance for the functioning of 
society, which would mean an increased emphasis on protection of 
the capital, Helsinki, on account of its central position in the coun-
try’s administration and economy. Protection of the capital city has 
always received high priority among the duties of the defence forces, 
but recent developments have accentuated its significance and this 
effect is likely to be compounded in the future.
The area around the capital is not a site of essential importance 
in terms of defence on account of the territory involved, however, 
but rather on account of the various functions that are essential for 
the whole of Finnish society which are either located in that area 
or are dependent upon it. Thus the organizing of the defence of the 
capital region with due attention to its strategic importance does not 
necessarily imply the assignment of additional forces to this task in 
the context of wartime planning. In this sense, too, the pronounced 
development of military technology and its more intensive exploi-
tation at the expense of traditional troop structures and weapons 
systems, as practised by others under US leadership, is beginning to 
make its appearance in Finland. In fact the commencement of work 
on the construction of a capability for network-enabled defence with 
the necessary intelligence, surveillance, command and control, and 
weapons systems in accordance with the 2004 government report is 
195 “The strength of the army may be reduced to 250,000 men” (2006) (in Finnish). 
Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces, observed 
in an interview published (in Finnish) in the personnel magazine Ruotuväki 
with regard to the wartime strength of the defence forces in the 2010s that “a 
complement of 250,000 men will quite definitely be sufficient. It will be twice as 
many as that of all the other Nordic countries combined and one of the largest 
armies in Europe.”  
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one clear indication of the changing character of Finland’s territo-
rial defence system. At the same time it enables us to say that the 
emphasis on a technology-based military capability that has been 
projected from the United States to Europe with a certain delay has 
now reached Finland as well.196 
It should be noted that the General Section of the 2007 Field 
Manual describes the Finnish defence strategy in terms of a credible 
national defence capability and speaks of a national rather than a 
territorial defence system:
“Finland’s defence strategy is based on a credible national de-
fence capability formed of military units commanded to per-
form specific tasks. The extent of this capability is determined 
in accordance with government security and defence policy 
decisions. … The country’s military defence lies in a national 
defence system constructed on the principle of universal con-
scription, which makes it possible to cover the whole national 
territory.”197
The General Section of the 2007 Field Manual does not reject 
the principle of territorial defence, however, as it still states that Fin-
land’s military defence is to be implemented on the territorial    prin-
ciple, but a change in direction is to be seen by comparison with the 
1995 edition of the manual. In rhetorical terms, this is a transition 
from a territorial defence system to a defence system based on the 
territorial principle, and in this sense the more recent wording can 
be regarded as supporting the notion of a gradual decline in the sig-
nificance of the discourse of a war of territorial defence.
A further principle on which the Finnish post-Cold War dis-
course of a war of territorial defence has relied, in addition to univer-
196 In the United States emphasis has been placed throughout the post-Cold War 
era on the opportunities offered by information technology in present-day and 
future war arenas, whereas this viewpoint began to spread in a more concrete 
fashion in Europe only in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the new mil-
lennium. As far as Finland is concerned, an emphasis on technology could be 
detected at the level of official defence policy in the 2004 government report, 
although references to the western ‘techno-war’ trend can be seen in some doc-
uments outlining official defence policy about a decade earlier. On the technol-
ogy-based western image of war, see Raitasalo (2005a).
197 Field Manual – General Section (2007), p. 28 (in Finnish; italics by the present 
author).
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sal conscription, a strong will to defend the homeland and defence of 
the whole national territory, is that of military non-alliance.198 This is 
in part connected with Finland’s efforts to break free of the country’s 
problematic Cold War geopolitical position sandwiched between 
East and West. The abandonment of the previous policy of neutrality 
in favour of one of military non-alliance – combined with increas-
ing military cooperation with the European Union, NATO etc. – has 
proved to be a relatively restrained means of altering the core of 
the Finnish defence system of the Cold War period, which remains 
linked to the notion of territorial defence even today.
One should not underestimate the influence of Russia on the 
continuity of the Finnish discourse of a war of territorial defence and 
the relatively minor changes that have taken place in this over the 
last couple of decades. Following the military ‘collapse’ of the early 
1990s, the capability of the Russian armed forces in relation to those 
of Finland is still utterly overwhelming.199 Also, Russia has set out on 
a reform of its armed forces from the late 1990s onwards with the 
intention of making this mighty military machine more flexible and 
efficient, and although it is still very much a massed army by com-
parison with the Finnish situation, a change is taking place towards 
western-style applications of advanced technology. Thus all the time 
military threats are evaluated in terms of the formula Threat = Will x 
Potential,200 Russia will retain its significant influence on the devel-
opment of the Finnish defence system. It can indeed be presumed 
that Russia’s military potential will remain high relative to that of 
Finland for the whole of the foreseeable future and beyond.
All in all, the discourse of a war of territorial defence has de-
clined in significance during the post-Cold War era as far as the 
Finnish image of war is concerned, and it has also taken on some 
new implications, particularly with the trend towards a more tech-
nological approach to the military capabilities of defence forces and 
198 See, for example, Security in a changing world – guidelines for Finland’s security 
policy. Government report to parliament 6.6.1995 (1995), pp. 31, 39, 42, 45; Se-
curity trends in Europe and the defence of Finland, Government report to par-
liament 1/1997, 17.3.1997 (1997), pp. 4-5, 42, 45, 47-48, 91; Finnish Security and 
Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), pp. 7, 87, 100; Security 
for the Future. Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 (2006), pp. 1, 21.  
199 The Russian armed forces had a total strength of about one million men as of 
2007, and also a sizeable strategic reserve that could be mobilized if necessary.
200 Cf. Security for the Future. Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 (2006), p. 11; Field 
Manual    General Section (2007), p. 27.
102
the gradual waning of the emphasis on the defence of the national 
territory. It is true that the related techno-war discourse has partly 
been entered into on boundary conditions defined by the discourse 
of a war of territorial defence, but the former has also done much 
to redirect the latter – as noted in the 2004 government report on 
security and defence when it refers to the effect of techno-warfare in 
reforming the territorial defence system. On the other hand, continu-
ity has been introduced into the representation of a war of territorial 
defence by factors connected with universal conscription, the strong 
will to defend the homeland on the part of its citizens in general, the 
principle of military non-alliance201 and the potential military threat 
posed by Russia.
201 The principle of non-alliance has characteristically involved a pronounced em-
phasis on the possession of a credible independent defence capability.
Figure 2. Diagrammatic representation of the decline in the impor-
tance of the discourse of a war of territorial defence for the development of 
the Finnish defence system in the post-Cold War era. 
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The discourse of a war of territorial defence has undoubtedly 
had a restraining influence on discussions in Finland over the ben-
efits of professional defence forces, which have not been by any 
means as heated as in other western countries, and Finnish security 
and defence policy discussions of military crisis management and 
executive assistance provided to other authorities have similarly re-
lied fairly heavily on the ‘space for discussion’ allowed by this dis-
course. Although the notion of a war of national defence has gradu-
ally declined in importance since the early 1990s, it has nevertheless 
served as a determinant of the agenda for developing the Finnish 
defence system – in the sense that it has always been necessary to 
link or relate any ‘initiatives’ regarding its development to the dis-
course of a war of territorial defence in the form in which it exists at 
that moment. The diagram in Figure 2 above attempts to illustrate 
the importance of the discourse of a war of territorial defence rela-
tive to the other, more recent discourses affecting the defence sys-
tem during the post-Cold War era.
A crisis management war
“In addition to the national defence, Finland should create 
and develop capabilities for taking part in more militarily de-
manding and complex international peacekeeping and crisis 
management missions. Crisis management capabilities should 
increasingly be regarded as an integral part of the country’s de-
fence policy, a new security policy instrument and a means of 
strengthening our defence capacity.” 
- Security in a changing world – guidelines for Fin-
land’s security policy. Government report to Parliament 
6.6.1995 
Gradually and by degrees, international military crisis manage-
ment began to progress towards the core of the Finnish image of war 
in the course of the 1990s, although this, again, was a movement of 
fairly restrained proportions. Experiences of UN peacekeeping op-
erations from the mid-1950s onwards formed a fairly ‘natural’ foun-
dation, and it is on the strength of these that military crisis manage-
ment activities have increased and become more demanding over 
the last 15 years. Practical manifestations of the discourse of a crisis 
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management war during the post-Cold War period can be identified 
in the following factors, at least:
•	 Participation	 in	 the	NATO	Partnership	 for	 Peace	 programme	
(1994) and the later Extended Partnership for Peace programme 
(1998) in addition to traditional UN peace-keeping.
•	 The	commencement	of	international	training	for	conscripts.
•	 Changes	to	the	regulations	governing	the	use	of	 force	as	 laid	
down in the law on peace-keeping operations (1995).
•	 Introduction	of	a	law	on	military	crisis	management	(2006)	to	
replace the law on peace-keeping operations.
•	 Participation	 in	European	Union	crisis	management	coopera-
tion and the contribution of troops to the EU pool of forces 
(1999) and commitment to the provision of troops for two bat-
tlegroups in the EU Rapid Response Force (2004).
•	 Listing	 of	 participation	 in	military	 crisis	management	 opera-
tions as one of the three missions of the Finnish Defence Forces 
in the new law governing these forces that came into effect in 
2008.   
The diminution in the likelihood and significance of a war of 
territorial defence has made it possible for increased emphasis to be 
placed on international military collaboration, especially since the 
‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War era and the wider public awareness 
of these202 has increased the global demand for crisis management 
operations. The decline in the probability of a large-scale military of-
fensive of a kind that could be linked with the discourse of a war of 
territorial defence has left room for the development of the Finnish 
defence system to be guided by other forms of logic. The discourse 
of international military crisis management has been closely associ-
ated both temporally and in terms of content with 1) the gradual 
decline in the significance of a war of territorial defence in Finland, 
2) new, globally recognized security threats, and 3) the fact that this 
202 It should be noted in this connection that as far as the discourse of the new 
wars is concerned it is immaterial for the purposes of the present investigation 
whether or not such wars are really ’new’ and whether or not the numbers of 
people in the international system dying in wars or as a consequence of large-
scale acts of violence have actually increased over the post-Cold War period. 
The essential point in this connection is that the discourse of the new wars has 
become fairly generally ‘accepted’ in the west – and also in Finland.
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is generally accepted as a legitimate use for armed forces. Also, 4) an 
opportunity to build up a Finnish identity as an integral part of the 
core of the western world has emerged during the post-Cold War 
era precisely because of the development of a military crisis manage-
ment capability and participation in multi-national crisis manage-
ment operations. 
The increased importance of crisis management as one part 
of the Finnish image of war can thus be explained to a significant 
extent by the redefinition of military threats following the termina-
tion of the Cold War and the development of western military co-
operation in the field of crisis management. As the threat of a direct 
military attack on Finland has abated, one of the main aims of Finn-
ish security policy has been to define the military and non-military 
threats on the basis of which it is possible to develop the country’s 
security and defence policy and defence system. The change in the 
threats lying behind Finnish defence planning between the early 
1990s and the 2004 government report on security and defence pol-
icy reflects fairly well the reconstruction of the set of military threats 
in the post-Cold War period. The threats involving a direct military 
attack were quoted in the 2004 report side by side with a regional 
crisis occurring elsewhere with implications for Finland and various 
forms of political, economic and military pressure which may or may 
not involve the threat or limited use of military force.203 Thus the 
scenarios governing defence planning and the development of the 
defence system have drifted during the last decade or so towards 
military threats that impinge less directly on Finland as such. The 
fairly powerful emergence of the discourse of a crisis management 
war in the decade following the Cold War is connected with a devel-
opment and change in the threat scenarios associated with precisely 
this formulation of the country’s security and defence policy.204
203 Field Manual – General Section (1995), p. 24; Finnish Security and Defence 
Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), p. 102. The general section of 
the 2007 Field Manual has the same list of military defence threats as in the 
2004 government report, i.e. political, economic or military pressure and the use 
of military force, which may take the form of a strategic strike executed either 
alone or preparatory to the occupation of an area of the country’s territory. See 
Field Manual – General Section (2007), p. 26.
204 ‘Threat’ and ‘threat scenario’ are used in this work as synonymous terms re-
ferring to fairly general descriptions of factors and/or actors that could pose a 
threat to the country’s security. On differences in their use in official parlance, 
see Field Manual – General Section (2007), pp. 26-27.
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In the terms of the crisis management war discourse, Finland 
can promote its own national interests and security goals as deter-
mined in its domestic political processes by helping to stabilize the 
international system in the face of the new threats to it. A more se-
cure and less violent world is likely to enjoy economic growth, sta-
bility and more predictable conditions and to allow more room for 
Finland to pursue its own medium and long-term interests. Viewed 
from this perspective, new wars constitute a threat to global peace 
and security – and thus to the stability that would otherwise pro-
mote Finland’s achievement of its security goals. In addition, the 
constantly increasing integration taking place among the western 
countries (including the EU and NATO contexts when viewed from 
a military perspective) and the increasing international interdepen-
dence (e.g. globalization, economic dependence relations and the 
maximizing of economic efficiency) will have the effect of increasing 
pressures on Finland to participate in international crisis management 
operations as part of the normal run of events.205 The need of the devel-
oped, affluent (post)industrial nations to develop and deploy their 
military capabilities in order to solve global security problems has 
now become an obligation,206 and it is certainly the case that military 
crisis management is now looked on in Finland in much the same 
light as the granting of development aid.207 Military operations of 
a humanitarian nature became a firm part of the western identity 
205 Cf. Nokkala (2005b), p. 180 (in Finnish): ”The pressure of European and Ameri-
can norms of action can be interpreted as having increased overall in matters of 
the formation of images of war and armed forces. This is particularly true of the 
transformations taking place in armed forces, and also of the sending of these 
on missions beyond the bounds of Europe in which the use of arms is highly 
probable – which is increasingly the case.”  
206 Cf. ”Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva Anxious to Strengthen the Finnish Pres-
ence in Afghanistan” (2007) (in Finnish).
207 See Iivonen (2006). The perception of military crisis management from the 
viewpoint of development aid can be interpreted in a constructivist framework 
as a discursive attempt to redefine its reality. This viewpoint naturally enhances 
the legitimacy of the men posted abroad, even in the most demanding of mis-
sions, as development aid is intended specifically as aid where international 
crisis management in a military framework can have less legitimate aspects as-
sociated with it, such as the training of personnel in order to strengthen the 
national defence capability. Also, the development aid viewpoint – should it be-
come more widely accepted in Finnish security and defence policy discussions 
-  is likely to arouse less opposition at home to the idea of sending troops to 
operations reminiscent of combat situations, especially where more demanding 
assignments are concerned.
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in the 1990s,208 so that being a part of the West presupposed par-
ticipation in western military crisis management operations – even 
though a consideration of the security viewpoint in the light of tra-
ditional political realism could scarcely reveal any strong justification 
for a Finnish contribution to a European Union battlegroup being 
sent to Africa, for instance.
Thus the gradual emergence of military crisis management 
at the core of the Finnish image of war may be traced back to the 
change in military threat scenarios following the termination of the 
Cold War and in some measure to the pressure to participate in de-
manding multinational crisis management operations as a part of the 
West which was aroused by the reconstruction of these scenarios. 
The general international – and especially western – trend for em-
phasizing the significance of crisis management operations as a de-
terminant of the image of war has thus been transmitted to Finland 
with a certain time-lag and in a somewhat attenuated form. It may 
even be claimed that at the international level the ability to take part 
in demanding military crisis management operations serves as a new 
measure of military power. The possession of a high-tech military ca-
pability that can be deployed rapidly out-of-area has become one 
indicator of a relevant level of military power in the 21st century.209
Multinational military operations – a significant proportion of 
which are military crisis management operations – have become an 
important framework for assessing military might in the post-Cold 
War era, and particularly from a western perspective, the ‘experi-
ences’ that have been gained of war210 and the lessons learned have 
frequently been connected with military crisis management opera-
tions – understood in a broad sense.211 The ability to provide techno-
logically advanced, rapidly deployable forces for multinational op-
erations has clearly become one measure of military capability and 
credibility. Inflexible troops, however massive, that are capable only 
208 See The Responsibility to Protect – Research, Bibliography, Background (2001).
209 See Raitasalo (2005a).
210 ‘Experiences of war’ should be taken here to mean in broad terms all situations 
in which one or more parties have resorted to the use of arms against one or 
more other parties in order to achieve political goals.
211 From a western perspective, the wars that ensued on the break-up of the former 
Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia in 1992-1995 and the subsequent IFOR and 
SFOR operations, in Kosovo in 1999 and the subsequent KFOR operation and 
in Macedonia, and also the wars in East Timor (1999), the Congo (2003) and 
Afghanistan (ISAF), are all examples of this.
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of taking part in national operations have in this sense lost ground 
in the military stakes during the post-Cold War period. In a way the 
crisis management discourse has been intertwined with the techno-
war discourse, since its operations require technologically advanced 
equipment and many defence forces will find themselves having to 
acquire such equipment if they wish to take part in operations, since 
the equipment already in store for ‘traditional’ home defence pur-
poses (territorial defence based on the massed forces psychology of 
the Cold War period) will prove inadequate for the demanding crisis 
management operations of the present day. It should also be noted 
that the military resources for use in both NATO and EU crisis man-
agement operations are being developed in accordance with NATO 
standards.212 
The transition from peace-keeping to crisis management in the 
course of the post-Cold War era meant more demanding military 
operations, and preparations for these are reflected among other 
things in an adjustment in Finnish military thinking to cope with the 
prospect of the loss of Finnish lives in connection with international 
crisis management operations. Also, these operations were looked 
on as requiring the availability of the best and most modern equip-
ment that the Finnish Defence Forces have at their disposal. As the 
Chief of General Staff, Lt.-Gen. Tarvainen observed at the opening 
of the National Defence Course in spring 2006:
“Situations in operational areas can develop very suddenly, and 
we have no chance of intervening rapidly from home. Thus the 
troops must be equipped in advance with the best possible material. 
It should also be remembered here in Finland that the best pos-
sible personnel have been sent to the area concerned and that 
they know what they have to do in each situation. … The danger 
that Finnish soldiers could be killed in action in such an operation 
is a very real one and must be taken into account when making 
212 See, for example, the evaluation of developments in military crisis management 
capacities presented in the 2004 government report on security and defence 
policy: “Development of interoperability and new types of forces will mean 
focusing on high technology, quality and highly specialized skills. … In addi-
tion to maintaining current capabilities, Finland will also allocate resources to 
developing niche capabilities and specialized units.  … Specialization requires 
developing the material readiness of international readiness units…”.  Finn-
ish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), pp. 95, 
101.
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decisions. We cannot be migrant workers who are present in 
an area of operation only when things are peaceful. We have to 
bear our joint responsibilities to the end, even if in the worst case 
we have to pay a high price for doing so.”213
The discourse of a crisis management war has had the opposite 
impact on the discussion regarding professionalism in the defence 
forces to that of the discourse of a war of territorial defence, for where 
the latter concept has been based up to now on universal conscrip-
tion and an extensive body of reservists, the ever more demanding 
crisis management operations are calling for increasingly high levels 
of professional skills on the part of the personnel sent on these mis-
sions.214 The most recent demonstration of this has been the high 
proportion of professional soldiers among the troops assigned to the 
EU Rapid Response Force, particularly the EU battlegroups.215 Simi-
larly, the commander of the Finnish troops attached to NATO’s ISAF 
operation, Lt.-Col. Pertti Pullinen, was of the opinion in an interview 
published in the daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat in 2006 that 
the fact that crisis management operations would become still more 
demanding in the future could well mean abandonment of the use 
of volunteer troops.216 In practice such a step would mean the as-
signment of regular soldiers (officers, NCOs, officers in the special 
forces and contract soldiers) to crisis management operations, i.e. a 
transfer from mainly volunteers recruited from the reserves to the 
use of full-time professional personnel for this purpose.
The crisis management war discourse also comes to occupy an 
important position when we examine the Finnish image of war from 
the perspective of change, although it should be noted that in this 
213 ”Finland is Moving to a New Era in Military Crisis Management” (2006) (in 
Finnish).
214 For one exception to this trend, see Kaskeala (2004) (in Finnish), where the 
Commander of the Defence Forces draws a parallel between universal conscrip-
tion, as the cornerstone of a war of territorial defence, and participation in crisis 
management operations: “Finland has for several years been making either the 
largest or the second largest contribution of any country to NATO operations 
relative to its population. Without an efficiently functioning conscription system 
we could never have achieved such a performance.”
215 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), pp. 
125-126.
216 “Afghanistan Commander: Crisis Management May no Longer be Possible with 
Volunteer Troops” (2006) (in Finnish).
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respect it has not posed any significant challenge to the discourse 
of a war of territorial defence. It is rather the case that the decline in 
the latter has allowed the crisis management war discourse to come 
to the fore. At the same time it may be said that the notion of a war 
of territorial defence has served as a framework for the formation of the 
discourse of a crisis management war, a frame of reference on which the 
legitimacy of crisis management has been dependent. This is so because 
participation in international crisis management operations and the 
development of military capabilities for this purpose have for the 
most part been considered in Finland from the viewpoint of sup-
porting and supplementing the territorial defence. It has thus been 
suggested that the acquisition of new military crisis management 
capabilities will improve territorial defence resources in the form of 
new systems, better and more realistic training (including the expe-
rience of involvement in actual operations) and the possibility of re-
ceiving external assistance in the event of Finland becoming the ob-
ject of a military offensive. The line adopted in the 2004 government 
report on security and defence policy with regard to the creation of 
a military crisis management capability for the Finnish Air Force is 
a good example of the power of the discourse of a war of territorial 
defence to delimit and direct that of a crisis management war:
“Air forces are needed for the surveillance of no-fly zones and 
other air space as part of the protection for international mili-
tary crisis management operations. From 2008 onwards, and by 
separate decision, the Finnish Air Force will have the capability 
to participate in international operations as part of a multina-
tional flying unit. This requires among other things the creation 
of an air-to-air refuelling capability. Air Force performance, en-
hanced in international operations, is an integral element in the 
overall development of national defence.”217
Correspondingly, Finland’s participation in the EU Rapid Re-
sponse Force was advocated in a Ministry of Defence memorandum 
of 2004 in part from a national defence viewpoint – on grounds dic-
tated by the discourse of a war of territorial defence:
217 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), 
p. 126 (italics by the author)
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“The capabilities offered by Finland have also been select-
ed so that they will benefit the development of the national 
defence.”218 
The emergence and strengthening of the discourse of a crisis 
management war during the post-Cold War era has thus been de-
pendent on its subordination to the discourse of territorial defence, 
in addition to which its effect on the construction of a western iden-
tity for Finland and its moral legitimation of the tasks of the armed 
forces (to serve as a ‘force for good’) have promoted its advancement 
to the core of the Finnish image of war.219 Finland’s moral need and 
duty to participate in international military crisis management in or-
der to arrest and prevent large-scale human suffering – even in the 
increasingly demanding crisis management operations – has gradu-
ally grown in emphasis as one part of the Finnish discourse of a 
crisis management war that has arisen in post-Cold War times. This 
means that alongside the strengthening of the national defence, an-
other logical argument – albeit subordinate, at least at the present 
time – has been put forward for taking part in military crisis man-
agement. This ‘naturalization’ of participation in military crisis man-
agement operations is reflected in a fairly representative manner in 
the argument put forward by Liisa Jaakonsaari, a member of the Par-
liamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, to justify the dispatching of 
additional Finnish troops to join the ISAF operation in Afghanistan 
in summer 2007 on account of the deterioration of the security situ-
ation there:
“As Afghanistan is the greatest challenge facing the inter-
national community at the present moment, it seems logi-
218 Memorandum from the Defence Policy Department of the Ministry of Defence 
8.12.2004 “Finnish Participation in European Union Battlegroups” (2004) (in 
Finnish). 
219 One indication of a change of attitude towards use of armed force during the 
post-Cold War years has been the positive line adopted by the Green Party with 
respect to the European Union’s Rapid Response Force. According to a survey 
conducted by Taloustutkimus in 2004, only 36% of the Greens’ supporters were 
opposed to this force – a degree of acceptance exceeded only among the sup-
porters of the conservative Coalition Party. The reasons for this positive attitude 
undoubtedly include the change in the function of the armed forces that this 
represents and the increased accent on legitimate humanitarian duties. See “No 
Dispute over Battlegroups” (2004).
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cal to me that Finland should accept its own part of the 
responsibility.”220
Note should also be taken when assessing the influence exerted 
by the discourse of a crisis management war of the shift in emphasis 
in the evaluation of the use of military force within the international 
system towards the deployment of flexible and rapidly mobilized 
expeditionary capabilities. It is principally within the framework of 
military crisis management that Finland is able to construct such 
capabilities for itself, as it would seem apparent, given the current 
Finnish social and military climate, that no more active or aggressive 
use of  military force out-of-area221 is likely to arise, at least in the 
near future.
Participation in the EU battlegroup in particular is the kind of 
demonstration of a ‘new’ military capability created for the purposes 
of crisis management operations that can additionally be regarded as 
being of significance for a credible222 national defence. Similarly, the 
Finnish government’s announcement to NATO in summer 2007 that 
it was ready to consider participating in the NATO Response Force 
(NRF) can be interpreted as an indication of the increase in the cred-
ibility of the national defence capability to be achieved in this way in 
addition to a desire for involvement in military crisis management.223 
In effect, the ability to train, equip and exercise NATO-certified NRF 
troops and maintain these in a state of readiness would constitute a 
far greater military power than that implied by the ‘official’ capabili-
ties of these troops, for these Finnish contributions to NATO’s expe-
ditionary operations would possess a considerable symbolic value in 
a constructivist sense given the post-Cold War international political 
220 “Korkeaoja: We are Aware of the Dangers in Afghanistan” (2007) (in Finnish).
221 Cf. the participation of Danish and Estonian troops in operations forming part 
of the US war against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
222 A credible defence capability is socially constructed, and credible military activ-
ity in the post-Cold War era is based on partly different criteria from those that 
prevailed in the Cold War age of massed armies.
223 “Häkämies: Finland to Decide in Autumn on Participation in NRF Troops” 
(2007). Note how quickly the Finnish security policy elite came down on the 
side of potential NRF participation. It was only in the previous December that 
the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, Tarja Halonen, 
expressed a more reserved view of Finnish involvement in these forces. See, 
for example, “Sweden More Open-minded than Finland Regarding the NATO 
Response Force” (2006). 
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situation in which we are living in the latter years of the first decade 
of the new millennium. In the context of the Finnish public defence 
policy discussion of the benefits of participation in the NRF troops 
and the disadvantages of not participating, the national newspa-
per Helsingin Sanomat, a known advocate of NATO membership, 
phrased its argument regarding the coincidence of crisis manage-
ment and territorial defence considerations in a editorial in July 2007 
precisely from the viewpoint of creating a militarily credible perfor-
mance capability:
“Opposition to NATO is nevertheless a poor reason for object-
ing to Finland’s participation in [NRF] activities, as these can be 
expected to develop our own defence capabilities to a significant 
extent and will fit in well with the scale of Finnish crisis man-
agement. The alternative would be a reactionary trend in military 
matters.”224  
When considering the additional symbolic value accruing to 
the credibility of the Finnish defence system as a consequence of the 
NRF troops and their activities,225 it is naturally necessary to take into 
account the small size of the detachment that would be sent from 
Finland. It is also clear that the national defence, which relies on the 
discourse of a war of territorial defence, cannot be built up exclusive-
ly on the symbolic value of the credibility granted by participation in 
the EU battlegroups and the NRF troops, in spite of the fact that the 
Finnish discourse of a war of territorial defence has altered since the 
Cold War and can be expected in the future to continue to shake off 
the shackles of that period.
224 ”A Place for Finland in the NATO Response Force” (2006) (in Finnish; italics by 
the present author).
225 It should be remembered that in the constructivist context ‘symbolic’ is not syn-
onymous with ‘minor’ or ‘marginal’. The word ‘symbolic’ denotes the importance 
of credibility – a denominator of defence capacity that cannot be measured – in 
the construction of Finland’s post-Cold War defence system. Credibility is built 
upon the possession and availability for use of military capabilities of a kind that 
at the given point in time are symbolic of efficient and modern military power. 
Practical evidence (e.g. in the form of actual wars conducted) plays an important 
role in defining the factors that symbolize military power at any given time, and 
practical evidence, together with the discourses of war that interpret it, makes it 
possible to evaluate the credibility of military activity on an international scale. 
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The issues of the development and maintenance of a credible 
military capability, the global technicization of armed forces and the 
strengthening of Finland’s western identity by taking part in crisis 
management all converge as parts of the general problem of de-
veloping the material level of preparedness of the Finnish Defence 
Forces. The United States in particular, as the principle developer of 
high-tech weapons systems, is inclined to view arms purchasers in 
the light of factors such as the political support which they show for 
US policies. The newest and most advanced military systems will 
only be sold to partners that have been individually adjudged to be 
reliable and progressive. One criterion, of course, is membership of 
the NATO alliance, but it is not the only one. In the context of Fin-
land’s efforts to develop its defence system and the material capa-
bilities of its defence forces, the United States has refused to supply 
some of the systems in which the Finns have shown an interest, e.g. 
long-range JASMM missiles. On the occasion of his visit to Finland 
in June 2007, the assistant director of the US Defence Security Co-
operation Agency stated explicitly that sales permits for high-tech 
military systems were partially dependent on the nature and extent 
of the support received by the United States from the countries de-
sirous of purchasing them:
“The more cooperation exists between countries, the better the 
exchange of systems components will function. And this does 
not concern only weapons.”226
Active participation in military crisis management, and particu-
larly in operations which are important for the US such as the ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan, is one means of trying to facilitate the ob-
taining of sales permits for technologically more advanced military 
materials. Especially in connection with the war in Iraq (from 2003 
onwards), the United States has made a point of ‘rewarding’ those 
countries that have taken part in the war both materially and politi-
cally, e.g. in the form of reciprocal visits by heads of state. The ques-
tion of increasing the crisis management effort in Afghanistan as a 
means of expressing support for the United States was broached in 
Finland in summer 2007, when the justification for possibly sending 
additional material aid to that country and possibly increasing the 
226 “Ministry of Defence Continues Hornet Negotiations” (2007) (in Finnish).
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numbers of Finnish troops there was the development of better US 
relations.227
Where the discourse of a war of territorial defence may be 
looked on as predominantly a continuity element in the Finnish 
defence system, the clearly subordinate discourse of a crisis man-
agement war has served as one of the most important impulses for 
change when developing that defence system, i.e. for reforming the 
territorial defence, in the post-Cold War world. The discourse of a 
crisis management war is also the element in the construction of the 
Finnish image of war at which the pressure of international – and 
especially western – norms for the development of the armed forces 
and the redirection of defence policy has been targeted.
An SFVS war228
The gradual diminishing of the threat of a large-scale military offen-
sive directed against the land area of Finland has led to a shift in the 
focus of the country’s military defence from territorial defence to the 
protection and maintenance of functions and sites of vital impor-
tance to society.229 It is not only a mass mobilization of mechanized 
divisions crossing over the country’s border, backed up by substan-
tial fire power and airborne and naval support that is regarded as a 
military threat. With the acceptance from the late 1990s onwards of 
the notion of a strategic strike as a possible threat scenario and the 
recognition of the international trend towards technological warfare, 
the military threats directing Finnish defence policy and the devel-
opment of the defence forces have moved towards attacks mounted 
by smaller forces employing precision weapons. At the same time 
the tasks of the defence forces have approached the field of activity 
of the security authorities – since the smooth functioning of society 
has traditionally been in the hands of other branches of the admin-
istration rather than the Ministry of Defence.230 The discourse of an 
227 See “Lipponen and Tuomioja Disagree over Continuing the Afghanistan Opera-
tion” (2007).
228 SFVS is the accepted acronym for Securing Functions Vital to Society.
229 See, for example, Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 
6/2004 (2004), p. 101.
230 The coordinative role of the Ministry of Defence with regard to the overall na-
tional defence constituted the principal link between internal security and mili-
tary defence in earlier times.
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SFVS war has thus emerged during the post-Cold War era as another 
factor reshaping the Finnish image of war alongside crisis management. 
This change has become apparent both in the analysis of the inter-
national security environment carried out in Finland and in the de-
velopment of the country’s own defence policy and defence system.
It should be noted that the force behind the discourse of a 
SFVS war during the post-Cold War period has been derived from 
the fading probability of a war of territorial defence and changes in 
the projected nature of such a war – its scale, its implementation, 
the possible area of operation and the nature of the threat. Thus the 
discourse of a SFVS war, like that of a crisis management war, may 
be said to have grown up out of the gradually altering discourse of 
a war of territorial defence. In other words the discourse of an SFVS 
war had initially been subordinate to that of a war of territorial defence 
and in many respects supportive of the latter. The concept of an SFVS 
war has not posed any appreciable challenge to the Finnish tradi-
tion of a war of territorial defence, but rather its effect in altering the 
Finnish image of war has become visible in the form of new em-
phases within the latter. The characterization of the Finnish defence 
solution in the general section of the 2007 Field Manual reflects both 
the subordinate status of the discourse of an SFVS war with respect 
to a war of territorial defence and at the same time the increase in its 
significance that has taken place over the last decade or so:
“The principal defence objectives are to guarantee the nation’s 
independence in all situations, to ensure adequate conditions 
in which its citizens can live their lives and to allow its leader-
ship room in which to function freely. The securing of func-
tions that are vital to society and the developing of military 
crisis management capabilities are means of providing support 
for the defence of Finland. … The focus in the planning of the 
national defence should be on the prevention or interception of a 
strategic strike.”231 
231 Field Manual – General Section (2007), p. 28 (in Finnish; italics by the author) 
For almost identical definitions of a strategic strike, see also Security trends in 
Europe and the defence of Finland, Government report to parliament 1/1997, 
17.3.1997 (1997), p. 78; Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001. Government 
report to parliament, 13.6.2001 (2001), section II; Finnish Security and Defence 
Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), p. 103. 
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A strategic strike is defined in the general section of the 2007 
Field Manual as a military manoeuvre implemented with a rein-
forced detachment of troops otherwise intended for deployment 
under normal conditions which aims by virtue of an element of sur-
prise “to force the country’s leadership into taking certain desired 
measures by paralysing the activities of sites and functions that are 
vital to society and the country’s defence system.”232 This raising of 
the threat of a strategic strike to the focus of Finnish defence plan-
ning is a concrete reflection of the fairly rapid development of the 
discourse of an SFVS war to become a crucial part of the Finnish 
image of war and one of the most significant points of departure for 
the development of the country’s defence system.
The emergence and strengthening of the discourse of an SFVS 
war also reflects a cautious merging of the fields of activity of the 
defence forces and the other security authorities. This development 
in the responsibilities of the defence forces has been connected with 
the alteration in military threats and the extension – or more cor-
rectly the extending – of the concept of security.233 The Minister of 
Defence at the time, Seppo Kääriäinen, described this movement 
towards the field of activity of the security authorities in his speech 
at the opening of the 173rd National Defence Course in 2005 as fol-
lows:
“The defence administration has a great deal of knowhow and 
equipment that could be employed for many other purposes as well 
as military crisis management. The Defence Forces are nowa-
days a significant provider of assistance around the clock and 
on every day of the year. They are prepared to take on still more 
responsibilities for combating threats of new kinds in an executive 
assistance role, and it is to be hoped that the persistent dividing 
lines between branches of the government administration will 
not hamper this, and that society at large will be ready to accept 
it.”234 
232 Field Manual – General Section (2007), p. 105 (in Finnish).
233 The notion of an ”extended concept of security” serves better than a ”broad 
concept of security” to refer to the fact that the Finnish attitude towards security 
has been shaped by national foreign and defence policy decisions over the last 
15 years, i.e. it has not just been a matter of reacting to objective changes in the 
security environment. 
234 Kääriäinen (2005) (in Finnish; italics by the current author).
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The above gradual change in the field of activity of the Defence 
Forces does not yet mean, however, that they are to be assigned du-
ties of the kind that have traditionally belonged to the police. It al-
ludes rather to a need for increased cooperation between the au-
thorities at times of crisis (including war). The possibilities for the 
Defence Forces to provide extended forms of executive assistance 
have been improved by introducing the relevant legislation,235 and 
the intention is to improve their performance in SFVS duties under 
peacetime conditions, in a state of emergency and when at war dur-
ing the 2010s:
“Defence Forces personnel, troops and material will be used 
even more effectively for executive assistance in both normal 
and various exceptional situations.”236 
The idea of using provincial forces composed of reservists for in-
ternal security purposes has also been raised in recent security policy 
discussions in Finland.237 This again reflects a tendency towards the 
merging of the fields of operation of the Defence Forces and the 
other security authorities and at the same time the development of 
a capacity for implementing the extended executive assistance role 
of the Defence Forces. The adoption of this notion of extended ex-
ecutive assistance – the provision of executive assistance to the police 
235 See Government bill for a change in §4 of the law on executive assistance to be 
provided by the Defence Forces to the police, HE 187/2004 (2004) (in Finnish), 
for a detailed justification: “…the police shall be entitled to receive executive as-
sistance requiring the use of force from the Defence Forces in order to prevent 
or intercept an act of terrorism as defined in section 34a of the Criminal Law.”
236 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), p. 
104. See also p. 109: “The Army must be able to defend Finland’s entire territory, 
protect vital targets, provide executive assistance to other authorities, and prevent 
and repel military attacks supported by the other services.”
237 On the Defence Forces as an internal security reserve, see “Finland in the Fore-
front of Network Defence Development” (2006). See also Finnish Security and 
Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), pp. 124: “Voluntary de-
fence activities supporting military defence will be reorganized to facilitate collabora-
tion between authorities at all levels. For this purpose, local defence troops will be 
formed which will belong to the Defence Forces’ wartime forces. … To make vol-
untary activity more efficient, the possibility of forming a nationwide network of 
centres to serve the various branches of government will be studied. Buildings, 
facilities and training areas earmarked by Defence Forces units, emergency au-
thorities, municipalities or organizations could be used as these kinds of cen-
tres.” (italics by the current author)
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in the form of the use of force for the prevention and interception of ter-
rorist crimes and executive assistance provided abroad under the EU 
solidarity clause – and also the development of local forces and the 
‘internal security tasks’ to be entrusted to them, aroused vociferous 
opposition in Parliament during the discussion of the new law gov-
erning the Defence Forces and the law on voluntary defence train-
ing. The possibility of contractual voluntary reservists being used for 
executive assistance purposes was criticized as an attempt to rein-
troduce a Civil Defence Corps or the use of detachments of “Ram-
bos and gun fanatics” for auxiliary purposes. Correspondingly, when 
drawing up the new law governing the Defence Forces, the Parlia-
mentary Constitutional Committee insisted that their duties should 
be restricted to the use of military force against external threats di-
rected at Finland.238
The threat posed by global terrorism has also increased the em-
phasis placed on this factor traditionally assigned to the sphere of 
internal security in the Defence Forces’ agenda, not because of any 
direct danger of a terrorist strike in Finland, but rather as a response 
to the US-led “war on terrorism” – i.e. the use of military means to 
combat terrorism – the repercussions of which have been visible in 
places such as Afghanistan (from 2001 onwards) and Iraq (from 2003 
onwards).239 Although Finland has not made plans at any stage to 
send forces on operations connected with the war on terrorism, it 
has been essential for the Defence Forces to take account of possible 
repercussions of this war, as embodied in the dispatch of a Finn-
ish Detachment and Finnish soldiers to join the NATO operation 
in Afghanistan, acknowledgement of the threat of a terrorist strike 
against troops engaged in crisis management operations and the al-
teration made to the law governing executive assistance provided 
by the Defence Forces to other authorities to allow the provision of 
“extended executive assistance” in the event of the hi-jacking of an 
aircraft, for instance.
238 “Dispute in Parliament over Defence Forces’ executive assistance” (2006); “Use 
of Regional Forces for Executive Assistance Still Rankles” (2007); “Committee 
maintains that army should use force only against external threats” (2007); see 
also Statement by the Parliamentary Constitutional Committee to the Parlia-
mentary Committee on Defence 51/2006 (2006) (in Finnish).
239 On the gradual drift of anti-terrorism operations into the sphere of defence, 
partly as a consequence of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, see Lintonen and 
Pursiainen (2003), p. 290. 
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The increased significance of an SFVS war for the Finnish image 
of war became evident from the threat scenarios listed as the bases 
for defence planning in the 2004 government report to Parliament, 
where, in addition to the actual threats, i.e. political, economic and 
military pressure, a regional crisis and the deployment of military 
force, mention was made of the danger of asymmetric warfare:
“Preparedness to prevent or limit any use of asymmetric warfare 
against the society in cooperation with other authorities is also 
included in defence planning. … Terrorism and sabotage, the 
proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, and infor-
mation warfare are considered the main asymmetric threats.”240
It should be noted that the global threat posed by terrorism 
and the participation of Finnish troops in international crisis man-
agement operations have together brought about changes in the 
overall duties of the Finnish Defence Forces, although admittedly 
on a fairly limited scale so far. The European Union has introduced 
a “solidarity clause” under which the member states undertake to 
provide each other with all available assistance in the aftermath of 
a terrorist strike, for instance, including military assistance. In addi-
tion, it approved in connection with its security strategy published 
in 2003 an addition to its range of crisis management tasks (the “Pe-
tersberg Tasks”) in the form of a potential obligation to provide sup-
port for third party countries in the combating of terrorism.241 Thus 
as well as the threat scenarios and the dangers posed by asymmetric 
warfare, Finnish defence planning in the new millennium has also 
been influenced by the threats of terrorist strikes, natural disasters 
and large-scale accidents facing the other EU countries, all of which 
makes it more and more difficult to draw a line between internal and 
external security issues – not merely in Finnish security policy and 
defence policy discussions but also as part of the global trend.
“In addition, the preparedness to support other authorities as 
required by the European Union solidarity clause will be taken into 
account in defence planning. … Assistance can be given by all avail-
able means, including military resources.”242
240 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), pp. 
102, 104.
241 A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy (2003), p. 12.
242 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), p. 102.
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Factors that are closely associated with the discourse of an 
SFVS war could be detected in Finnish defence policy thinking even 
in the last days of the Cold War, as there was already some specula-
tion in 1990 that lower categories of threat than actual war would be 
likely to increase in importance in the future, and protection of the 
vital functions of society was being mentioned alongside defence 
of the national territory in the same year.243 Similarly the Cold War 
threat scenario of a surprise Soviet offensive (on the ‘Czech model’) 
gradually evolved into something more of a coup d’état aimed at pa-
ralysing the national leadership and gaining control over the ad-
ministration and crucial areas of the country. The gradual increase in 
the emphasis on the threat scenario of a strategic strike, and thereby 
on protecting functions and sites of vital importance to the nation, 
that occurred in response to the changes in the international security 
environment that took place in the 1990s formed the focal point at 
which the powerful discourse of a territorial war inherited from the 
Cold War period began to change – as part of the emergence of the 
discourse of an SFVS war. Against the background of the changes in 
the international security environment, at least the rising interest in 
techno-warfare (chiefly through the ‘star wars’ concept espoused by 
the United States), the threats posed by terrorism and the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction and the emergence of the ‘new 
wars’ served to promote the strengthening of the discourse of an 
SFVS war in Finland. This movement began as a subordinate part of 
the discourse of a territorial war, but became partly detached from 
this in the first years of the new millennium, chiefly on account of the 
threat of terrorism, and most especially in the light of the repercus-
sions for Finland of international counter-terrorist military action.244 
From the perspective of the discourse of an SFVS war, the tech-
no-war trend has been significant in shaping the Finnish military 
threat scenario. Although it is not envisaged that the West under 
US leadership would attack Finland in the foreseeable future, it is 
possible to detect the influence of the Gulf War of 1991 and the Bos-
243 See the evaluation of the current state and capabilities of the Defence Forces 
and the statement of opinion on development plans and the defence budget 
in the Report of the Parliamentary Advisory Committee on Defence, 1990:57 
(1990), pp. 36, 59.
244 The concept of ‘international anti-terrorist military action’ is used in this connec-
tion to underline the fact that the military threat arising from terrorism should 
not be interpreted exclusively from the starting point of the ‘war against terror-
ism’ instigated by the United States.
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nian War of 1995 behind the threat of a strategic strike. In addition, 
numerous experiences of the growing importance of the rapid de-
ployment of military forces (especially under the auspices of crisis 
management) and of the use of military capabilities against high-
precision targets at increasing great distances from home have been 
instrumental in shaping the threat scenario of a surprise coup into 
that of a strategic strike. At the same time the assumption that Rus-
sia intends to modernize its armed forces at least in part on the lines 
of the western techno-war trend has had the effect of emphasizing 
a strategic strike within the set of threats governing Finnish defence 
planning.
The emphasis on the threats arising from terrorism and weapons 
of mass destruction within the post-Cold War international system 
has tended to shift the focus in the duties of the armed forces further 
towards areas belonging to internal security. Terrorism in particular 
has become internationally a factor for change in the duties of armed 
forces and the principles governing their use in the first years of the 
new millennium, with the consequence that Finland, too, has had 
to place counter-terrorist military action on its security and defence 
policy agenda and on that for the development of its defence system, 
even though no significant revisions have been made to the duties of 
the Defence Forces with a view to combating terrorism. It should be 
noted, however, that the use of military force for suppressing acts of 
terrorism is possible nowadays. Furthermore, as a member state of 
the European Union, Finland has a stake in European security and 
defence policy, one dimension of which is the development of suit-
able military capabilities for anti-terrorist purposes. Finland’s obliga-
tions under the EU solidarity clause are also coming to the fore as a 
factor in defence planning, although admittedly clearly subordinate 
to the territorial defence and crisis management discourses.
The significance of Russia for the development of the Finnish 
discourse of an SFVS war can be estimated best from the perspective 
of the internal structure of that discourse and the points of emphasis 
within it. The potential threat of a military offensive is reflected in an 
emphasis on the strategic strike scenario as a part of this discourse, 
for together with the techno-warfare trend, the potential threat 
posed by Russia serves to highlight the defence of areas and func-
tions of vital importance to society. As for the risks that are of par-
ticular concern to those responsible for internal security, sabotage 
and information warfare, both connected with asymmetric warfare, 
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are the principal threats involved in the discourse of an SFVS war 
that can be associated with Russia.
One factor besides Russia that has helped to sustain the role 
of the discourse of a war of territorial defence is the tradition of total 
defence inherited from the Cold War period, and the discourse of an 
SFVS war is closely connected with this concept.
“Protection of the vital functions of society calls for broad-based 
collaboration between ministries, branches of the administra-
tion and the private sector. The concept of total defence provides 
a wide selection of means for coordinating such activities.”245
The concept of total defence that gained momentum during 
the Cold War period was indeed one of the foundations on which 
the discourse of an SFVS war was developed, but at the same time 
this discourse, as it emerged, led to a re-formulation of the idea of 
total defence, a form of evolutionary conceptual maturation in the 
post-Cold War world. At least two incipient trends can be detected 
in this development. On the one hand, the increased importance of 
an SFVS war served to emphasize the procedural model of total de-
fence as already propounded during the Cold War period, in which 
the aim was to achieve broad-based prevention or interception of 
threats through the combined action of various branches of the ad-
ministration. One central theme in the discourse of an SFVS war 
came to be a reduction of the significance of the traditional – large-
scale – military threats within Finnish security and defence policy 
thinking. Thus the discourse of an SFVS war can be also interpreted 
from the viewpoint of the concept of total defence inherited from the 
Cold War period, as a revision of this concept – and thereby as part 
of the reorganized Finnish territorial defence system. In this sense 
the idea of an SFVS war may be seen as having gradually shaped the 
concept of total territorial defence inherited from the Cold War pe-
riod and the implementation of that concept. Speaking in 2006, the 
Chief of Defence described the change in the total national defence 
in relation to that which had occurred in warfare in general in the 
age of the information society in the following terms:
245 Council of State decision in principle regarding protection of the vital functions 
of society (2003), p. 52 (in Finnish).
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“The total defence of the nation is not only a question of the ability 
of the Defence Forces to cope with information warfare, but it is 
a matter of broader collaboration between various authorities in or-
der to prevent and combat threats. The development of diversified 
forms of cooperation between the authorities and the arranging 
of joint operations with the Defence Forces are concrete ways 
of responding to the challenges of modern-day networking and 
information technology.”246
On the other hand, the development in the discourse of an 
SFVS war from large-scale military threats during the Cold War pe-
riod to new, partly non-military or semi-military threats has meant 
a gradual decline in the importance of repelling military threats as 
an element in the concept of total defence.247 This line of develop-
ment – a change in the set of threat scenarios guiding the planning 
and implementation of the country’s total defence – may well mean 
in the longer term changes in practices regarding the activities of 
the different authorities connected with the implementation of col-
laboration between various branches of the administration and the 
private sector. This will be the case at least in the event of a continu-
ation of the present trend for a gradual decline in the importance 
of a war of territorial defence and a gradual strengthening in the 
discourse of an SFVS war. It should nevertheless be remembered 
that the 2003 strategy for protecting the vital functions of society still 
gives the Ministry of Defence the responsibility for coordinating the 
country’s total defence. In addition, the 2003 SFVS document de-
fines the tasks belonging to this concept of total defence as compris-
246 Kaskeala (2006b) (in Finnish; italics by the present author)
247 It should be noted that the increase in the significance of the new threats did 
not necessary lessen the overall security role of the Defence Forces, see, for ex-
ample, Kääriäinen (2006a) (in Finnish): “The main message of the revisions in 
legislation as far as society in general is concerned is that the Defence Forces 
– their knowhow and equipment – exist for the benefit of society. It is the wide 
variety of new threats in particular that has aroused the need to devote all the 
capabilities that can be acquired with tax revenues more precisely than ever for 
safeguarding the security of our society. The new decision-makers will be faced 
with a complex jigsaw puzzle in the form of the Finnish defence system, and the 
basic questions in addition to budgetary and military alliance ones will concern 
what is the principal task of the Defence Forces. Is it the defence of this country 
or international operations? And should we in general accept the principle that 
the Defence Forces and their knowhow and equipment can be used in support 
of the security of the whole of society?”  
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ing the safeguarding of Finland’s independence and the ensuring 
of the security and living conditions of the people in the face of all 
possible threats. It is indeed required in accordance with the defini-
tion given in this document that the concept of total defence shall 
also be applicable to the suppression of internal threats where these 
are directed at the country’s independence or the security and living 
conditions of its people:
“Coordination of the total defence of the nation shall belong to 
the responsibilities of the Ministry of Defence. … Total defence 
implies all the military and civilian actions taken to ensure Fin-
land’s independence as a state and the security and living con-
ditions of its citizens against an external threat posed by another 
state or any other threat.”248
It should further be noted that the gradually changing concept 
of total defence provides Finland with an opportunity to construct 
an identity for itself as a front-line actor in the mission of combating 
new security threats, since even during the Cold War the majority 
of the branches of the government administration were harnessed 
for the purposes of defence in one way or another. Now that the 
concept of national defence is in the grip of change throughout the 
globalizing international system – along with the spread, especially 
in the western countries, of the homeland security and inter-agency 
cooperation doctrines, both of which call for extensive collaboration 
between administrative sectors – Finland’s total defence tradition 
and the minor changes that have been made to it in the years fol-
lowing the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 tragedy have created a 
foundation for demonstrating in practice the potential of collabora-
tion between authorities for eliminating the new security risks. Thus 
it is that protection against the new threats and the ‘spread’ of the 
total defence approach can assist Finland in constructing a west-
ern identity for itself by influencing the perspective adopted in the 
western countries towards military and non-military security. The 
concept of total defence can therefore be regarded as one potential sym-
bolic instrument by which Finland can develop an identity as one of the 
foremost western countries.
248 Council of State decision in principle regarding protection of the vital functions of 
society (2003), app. 1 (in Finnish; italics by the present author); see also the corre-
sponding definitions in Strategy for Protecting the Vital Functions of Society. Deci-
sion in principle by the Council of State, 23.11.2006 (2006), pp. 6, 70 (in Finnish).
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A techno-war
“The capability of our defence system comprises both the ca-
pacity for using new technology and the capacity for rapidly 
adjusting our ways of working to conform to the demands of 
the information age. Neither technology nor alterations in our 
ways of working will be sufficient on their own in this transi-
tion, but rather we need both of them in order to be credible 
abroad and in the eyes of our own citizens.”
Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, 
Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces, 2006
 
The discourse of a techno-war has affected the Finnish image 
of war, and thereby also the principles underlying the development 
of the Finnish defence system, through the medium of at least three 
trends during the post-Cold War era. In the first place, the idea of 
achieving a transformation in military forces through investments in 
information technology which developed in the international system 
during the 1990s, especially under the influence of the United States, 
has now caught on firmly in Europe. The discourse of a techno-war 
developed in Finland from the late 1990s onwards, as a description both 
of a more general change in the nature of warfare and of the improve-
ment achieved in the military capabilities of the Russian armed forces 
by modernizing the massed armies of the Cold War era through the in-
troduction of advanced military technology. It has been argued that 
the high-tech Russian armed forces could pose a potential threat to 
Finland in the future, since one cannot rely on the permanence of 
the political, economic and military changes that have taken place in 
Russia since the Cold War. 
Secondly, the discourse of a techno-war has potentiated a change 
in the discourse of a war of territorial defence, which has gradually been 
challenged during post-Cold War times, and thereby in the Finnish de-
fence system, which has also been challenged. The country’s revised 
territorial defence system has begun to be constructed around intel-
ligence, surveillance and command and control systems equipped 
with partially network-centric operational capabilities. The Chief of 
Defence , Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, described the changes in the de-
fence system in the following terms in 2006:
“It has become common to refer to the manner of conduct-
ing warfare in the age of the information society as ‘informa-
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tion warfare’, which is taken to cover all areas of impact from 
data network warfare to psychological warfare. The Defence 
Forces are reacting to these by developing a network defence 
model. … This network-enabled defence will be based on real-
time situational awareness covering the whole country, which 
will make it possible to mount joint operations involving all 
branches of the armed forces as a part of our territorial defence 
system. Our integrated intelligence, surveillance and command 
and control systems will create an entirely new dimension for 
the Defence Forces in responding to the challenges of informa-
tion warfare.”249
Likewise, the Minister of Defence, Seppo Kääriäinen, touched 
upon the significance of modern technology when describing Fin-
land’s future defence solution in 2006, demonstrating at the same time 
the relevance of the techno-war discourse to the changes taking place 
in the territorial defence system inherited from the Cold War period:
“…we are now building up an army for the whole nation that is 
equipped with modern technology. … In the name of the cred-
ibility of the system and in response to the constantly chang-
ing demands of the security environment, we are committed to 
purchasing new defence materials at prices that are soaring at 
a bewildering rate.”250
Kääriäinen mentioned three forces for change in the Finnish 
defence system in his speech. Firstly, the notion of a massed military 
force (the ‘quantitative focus’) that had prevailed during the Cold 
War and the idea of a territorial defence system which was based on 
it are losing their credibility in the present-day international security 
environment. Secondly, a high rate of exploitation of modern mili-
tary technology is emerging as the new criterion for credible military 
activity. A state engaged in generating a credible military force for 
itself must have armed forces with a capability for network-centric 
warfare (in the case of Finland, networked defence or network-en-
abled defence). The standards and lines of development for these 
techno-forces of the modern world are defined mainly in the United 
249 Kaskeala (2006b) (in Finnish).
250 Kääriäinen (2006a) (in Finnish).
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States, and as far as the renewal of the Finnish defence system is 
concerned they reach Finland though the medium of the NATO 
standards. Thirdly, attempts to follow the techno-war trend will lead 
to problems unless changes are made in the military defence goals 
upon which the defence system is based. The rapid rise in the pric-
es of defence materials mentioned by Kääriäinen, for instance, will 
force changes in the wartime organization of troops and in ways of 
operating and will necessitate implementation of the national mili-
tary defence with smaller volumes of both troops and equipment. 
In Kääriäinen’s own words, “With the current resources and given 
the recent trend in prices, we have no chance of maintaining our 
Defence Forces at the 2006 level. If we go on the way we are in all 
respects, the Defence Forces will gradually shrink until the situation 
becomes impossible.”251
The development of techno-warfare capabilities and the acqui-
sition of high-tech weapons systems and control and command sys-
tems is an expensive business compared with the creation of massed 
forces that took place in the age of the industrial society – especially 
if one intends to develop or acquire such troops and systems on the 
same scale as before. In fact the intention is precisely to exploit the 
advantages of techno-warfare in order to create improved military ca-
pabilities for the new tasks facing the Defence Forces with a smaller 
wartime complement and a smaller number of systems. The creation 
of such techno-warfare capabilities is directly connected with the 
restructuring of the Defence Forces and the fairly substantial reduc-
tions in the volume of wartime troops that began in the late 1990s, 
since the systems applicable to the information technology age, be-
ing appreciably more expensive in terms of unit prices, require the 
achievement of economies elsewhere and the above-mentioned 
concentration on the forces’ key functions. The reductions in peace-
time functions (e.g. in service depots and the network of garrisons) 
and in the numbers of troops deployable in the event of war (from 
over half a million soldiers to the present level of 350,000 and pos-
sibly further to around 250,000 in ten years’ time) and the simul-
taneous increase in partnership programmes are all measures de-
signed to achieve cost-effectiveness and to permit the acquisition of 
more expensive systems. Thus cost-effectiveness, concentration on 
key functions and management by results have become the ‘tools’ by 
251 Ibid. (in Finnish).
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which Finland intends to move from the massed army of the Cold 
War period to the armed forces of the techno-warfare age. It should 
be noted in this connection, however, that the change has been 
a fairly moderate and slow one in Finland compared with that in 
many other western countries which have explicitly announced their 
intentions to implement a transformation in their armed forces. As 
practical manifestations of the ‘tools’ referred to above, the Defence 
Forces have outsourced some of their functions, e.g. specialized 
medical services, data management services and basic pilot train-
ing for the Air Force, and have entered into partnership agreements 
in order to achieve cost-effectiveness in matters such as equipment 
maintenance and provisioning.252
It should be remembered, however, that techno-warfare sys-
tems involve other challenges as well as their expense. In particular, 
higher levels of expertise are needed on the part of the staff operat-
ing and servicing them than is the case with the conventional equip-
ment used by massed armies. This means that the Defence Forces 
must go through a process of professionalization in parallel with 
that of creating a techno-warfare capability. An increasing proportion 
of the capability of the Defence Forces will in the future be in the hands 
of regularly employed personnel.
The investments to be made in techno-warfare capabilities will 
mean that the materials budget will remain high in relative terms for 
some time to come. At the present moment about a third of the de-
fence budget is spent on equipment, which is a fairly high proportion 
by international standards253 – although the sum concerned is small 
in absolute terms. It should also be noted that the ever more expen-
sive technological systems will have to compete with the constantly 
progressing professionalization process for the same resources, i.e. 
proportions of the national defence budget. The higher the perfor-
mance of the systems, the better trained those operating them will 
have to be, so that it can be expected that pressures of rising material 
costs will be accompanied by corresponding pressures derived from 
personnel costs, at least in relation to the numbers employed. One 
of the aims in the restructuring of the Defence Forces, of course, was 
252 See “Defence Forces Seek Industrial Partners for Equipment Maintenance” 
(2006); also Kääriäinen (2006a).
253 See Kaskeala (2002b) (in Finnish): “Finland spends a third of its defence budget, 
or about half a billion euros a year, on material acquisitions, which places us in 
fourth position within the EU on a per capita basis.”
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to reduce the payroll, especially by cutting down on the number of 
garrisons and the network of military depots, but the processes of 
professionalization on the one hand and outsourcing on the other, 
which will affect both the military staff and the civilians employed in 
servicing and maintenance, will see to it in the future that the costs 
per employee will rise considerably. Thus, although the transition 
from a massed army to the armed forces of the information age will 
enable a reduction in staff, it would seem that no significant econ-
omies in personnel costs can be achieved by adopting a network-
centric approach.
The third effect that the discourse of a techno-war has had on 
the development of the Finnish defence system is connected with 
the western identity that Finland has been building up for itself 
throughout the post-Cold War era. Given that any credible and rel-
evant military state in the modern world will need to acquire armed 
forces with a capability for network-centric warfare, those wish-
ing to define themselves as ‘western’ are also required to adapt this 
capability to the demands of combined military action under US 
leadership. Thus the information age approach, with its revolution 
in military affairs and network-centric warfare, has become a part 
of the identity of an advanced western country. In the case of Fin-
land this means that the twin tasks of building up an internation-
ally widely acceptable and credible military capacity and a western 
identity have created a powerful normative pressure to reconstruct 
the defence system in accordance with the tenets of network-centric 
warfare. This trend is already discernible in the 1997 government 
report “Security trends in Europe and the defence of Finland”, while 
the discourse of a techno-war emerges especially strongly – and to 
an increasing extent – in the security and defence policy reports of 
2001 and 2004.
The concepts of the revolution in military affairs, information 
warfare and network-centric warfare together formed one of the 
dominant themes in the western strategic discourse of the 1990s and 
early 2000s, and the Finnish concepts of network-enabled defence 
and information warfare, which form part of the discourse of a tech-
no-war, have entered the agenda for the development of the military 
capabilities of the Defence Forces precisely on account of the influ-
ence of these international – and especially western – discourses. It 
must be admitted, however, that the concept of information warfare, 
which lays emphasis on the importance of data management and 
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utilization, has proved to be a somewhat fragmentary and inconsis-
tent construct, so that a wide variety of concepts have come to the 
fore in Finnish discussions on the subject.254
The development of network-enabled defence in Finland, 
which is closely connected with the theme of the revolution in mili-
tary affairs, has been approached, especially within the Defence 
Forces, in a manner which is designed to facilitate the provision of 
SFVS support for the security authorities, which means that the tar-
gets for the development of this network-enabled defence and their 
implementation have also been linked to the changing duties of the 
Defence Forces in general. Thus preparations are being made for de-
ploying techno-warfare capabilities – interpreting techno-warfare in 
a broad sense – both against an assailant military force and, where 
necessary, as part of the internal security back-up to be provided 
for the security authorities. It is already possible to provide support 
for other government authorities using the Defence Forces’ existing 
equipment and by assigning the necessary personnel.255 Admittedly, 
as noted in connection with the discourse of an SFVS war, the idea 
of the Defence Forces providing support for other authorities does 
not always meet with universal approval.256
Another major ingredient in techno-warfare alongside the con-
cept of network-enabled defence is the creation of an information 
warfare capability. Although information warfare is rather fragmen-
tary as a concept, it is clear that what lies at its core is the man-
agement and use of data alongside military force. Identified as one 
part of the development of network-enabled defence, information 
warfare can be described in essence as one aspect of information 
age crises, as in the words of the Commander of the Defence Forces, 
Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, in spring 2006:
“In the case of information warfare, limitation of the impact 
of an adversary’s actions by armed intervention alone is prob-
lematical. … The battle on the information front is fought with 
words, pictures and images, and he who wins out on this front 
is very close to winning the whole war. Information warfare can 
254 See, for example, Huhtinen (2003), pp. 52-62; Huhtinen (2005); Huhtinen and 
Rantapelkonen (2002).
255 See “Finland in the Forefront of Network Defence Development” (2006) (in 
Finnish).
256 See, for example, Kääriäinen (2006a).
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be a major challenge for the strategic leadership of both the 
state and the Defence Forces.”257
Considering the long-term influence of the discourse of a tech-
no-war on the development of the Finnish defence system, we can 
estimate that the conceptual and material factors associated with 
a techno-warfare capability will inevitably imply a re-evaluation of 
the concepts of a traditional war of territorial defence and of the mate-
rial investments made by the Defence Forces. A critical reappraisal will 
have to be made of existing ideas on the numbers and effective-
ness of weapons systems, command and control systems, potential 
combat scenarios, sites to be protected, the possible theatres of war 
and the relations between the various branches of the armed forces. 
Similarly the relations of the Defence Forces to the other security 
authorities and to society in general and the distinction between the 
concepts of information crime and information warfare will have 
to be rethought. Thus a defence policy aimed at the creation of a 
techno-warfare capacity is not restricted to the procurement of new 
peacetime and wartime equipment for the Defence Forces but also 
implies recognition of the significant change that has taken place in 
the international security environment and of the need to analyse 
how the Defence Forces are to perform the tasks assigned to them in 
the future – as part of a broader network of government authorities 
– and what are in fact the tasks to be assigned to them.
The emergence and strengthening of the discourse of a techno-
war in the late 1990s not only meant a questioning of the traditional 
discourse of a war of territorial defence but at the same time pointed 
to an opportunity to construct a new discourse of territorial defence 
for the post-Cold War era. Techno-warfare does in fact offer one pos-
sibility for maintaining credible territorial defence in the modern in-
formation age, when many countries are abandoning the defence 
of their own territory as far as the duties of their armed forces are 
concerned. By adopting the internationally widely accepted trend 
257 Kaskeala (2006b) (in Finnish); in the same speech Kaskeala had the following to 
say about the pressures exerted by the information age on development of the 
defence system: “The capability of our defence system comprises both the ca-
pacity for using new technology and the capacity for rapidly adjusting our ways 
of working to conform to the demands of the information age. Neither technol-
ogy nor alterations in our ways of working will be sufficient on their own in this 
transition, but rather we need both of them in order to be convincing abroad 
and in the eyes of our own citizens.”  
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for developing an information warfare capability for its armed forces, 
Finland is ‘buying time’ for the traditional pillar of its defence sys-
tem, territorial defence, in a situation where the corresponding Cold 
War concept is losing credibility in international terms. The ‘price’ for 
maintaining a territorial defence is nevertheless that its content has 
to be altered – the process referred to in the 2004 government re-
port on security and defence policy as a ‘revised territorial defence 
system’. This change is to be accomplished through the medium of 
network-enabled defence, which, it is believed, will be capable of 
constructing a new credible territorial defence system within the 
changing international security environment.
Apart from the construction of an effective and credible mili-
tary capability, the adoption of the techno-war trend in Finland is 
connected with the building of a western identity for the country 
through changes in organization, methods and equipment within its 
Defence Forces. The identity policy factors relevant to the develop-
ment of the Finnish defence system are naturally connected with the 
principles of material efficiency and operational credibility in a mili-
tary context. All three of the above elements in the basic logic of the 
development of military capabilities support the focus on network-
enabled defence in the Finnish defence system. Indeed, it is through 
the concept of network-enabled defence that the identity policy fac-
tors come to associate Finland with the western security policy refer-
ence group to which the country has aspired to belong throughout 
the post-Cold War era. On the other hand, as we examine the iden-
tity policy aspects of the development of the armed forces and their 
activities, we are led to ask whether network-enabled defence will 
necessarily be an effective solution for the Finnish defence system, 
given that it is modelled on network-centric warfare capabilities de-
veloped especially for out-of-area operations, often of an offensive 
nature. How well such capabilities are suited for the defence of one’s 
home territory (which could admittedly include offensive opera-
tions) is undoubtedly one of the questions that should be examined 
more closely in the future in the course of the work of developing 
the Finnish network-enabled defence system. It can nevertheless be 
established with certainty even at this very early stage in the de-
velopment work that it would not be worthwhile for Finland, as a 
small country, to develop its defence forces or defence system on the 
model of the leading military superpower, the United States.
The Finnish discourse of a techno-war, derived from the con-
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cepts of network-enabled defence and information warfare, has 
clear connections not only with the discourse of a war of territorial 
defence but also with that of an SFVS war, as can be perceived in 
the arguments for the development of a network-enabled defence 
system, which lay stress on collaboration with other authorities, 
and in the closer than ever association of this system, as a part of 
the defence system of the 2010s, with the protection of functions 
and sites that are of essential importance to the community. For its 
part, a connection between the techno-war discourse and that of a 
crisis management war is manifested most forcibly where the cre-
ation of internationally compatible (i.e. NATO-compatible) military 
capabilities, the strengthening of Finland’s western identity and the 
international criteria for the reconstruction of military forces in the 
post-Cold war era are concerned. 
Challenges for post-Cold War development of the  
Finnish defence system
The challenges facing the development of the Finnish defence sys-
tem during the post-Cold War era have arisen indirectly, out of the 
changes that have occurred in the international security system. The 
present research has identified as mediators of this extensive global 
change the altered western image of war and related changes which 
are now affecting the Finnish image of war. In addition, evaluations 
of the current situation in Russia and alternative paths for its future 
development provide further inputs into the planning of the Finnish 
defence system. On the strength of the analysis of the Finnish im-
age of war and the factors affecting the development of the Finnish 
defence system performed here, at least the following six factors can 
be identified as challenges for the development of that system dur-
ing the post-Cold War era: 
1. Territorial defence has declined in significance both worldwide 
and especially in the western countries since the Cold War. This 
has meant a gradual undermining of the credibility of the Finn-
ish defence solution and system, which have been inherited 
from the Cold War period.
2. The western countries have made significant reductions in the 
strength of their armed forces and have at the same time shifted 
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the emphasis in the development of these forces towards expe-
ditionary operations to be conducted as a part of multinational 
troops.
3. International pressure on Finland to participate more exten-
sively in demanding military crisis management operations has 
been on the increase since the late 1990s.
4. The transformation of armed forces in the western countries 
has been based on the increased use of high technology and 
the reduction in service personnel. Compulsory conscription 
has been abandoned, or is to be abandoned in the near future, 
in many western countries.
5. Finland continues to have a military great power, Russia, as 
its next-door neighbour, and there are many uncertainties at-
tached to developments in that country.
6. The United States has exerted great pressure on the western 
countries since autumn 2001 to participate in its anti-terrorist 
military activity carried out in the name of the ‘war on terror-
ism’. Terrorism has indeed emerged as one of the most signifi-
cant security risks facing the western nations in the early years 
of the 21st century, and many western countries have been pre-
pared to mobilize their armed forces against this threat.
As a consequence of these challenges, the post-Cold War devel-
opment of the Finnish defence system has taken place for the most 
part under the influence of four discourses associated with changes 
in the image of war. The discourse of a war of territorial defence is the 
most significant factor inherited from the Cold War period that has 
tended to introduce an element of continuity into the development 
of the defence system. It represents a certain inertia in the country’s 
military defence, a shadow of history which became ossified in the 
course of the Cold War as a taken-for-granted perception of how 
Finland could defend itself against an armed offensive, indeed the 
‘only conceivable’ way in which this could be done. The fact that 
this remains the most significant factor guiding the development of 
the Finnish defence system even today renders the country some-
what exceptional relative to its security and defence policy reference 
group, the western security community. The paradoxical point about 
the notable role that a war of territorial defence continues to play in 
the maintenance and development of the Finnish defence system is 
that, at the same time as the country has been making a serious at-
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tempt to build up a western identity for itself in terms of security and 
defence policy, as in other ways, and has very largely succeeded in 
doing so, it has distinguished itself sharply from the western nations 
precisely on account of its continued adherence to the strong tradi-
tion of territorial defence. Even so, the discourse has proved suscep-
tible to change in some ways, at least when the changes take place 
gradually and with due respect to certain fundamental principles of 
this tradition, such as total defence of the national territory, universal 
male conscription and a strong public will to defend the homeland. 
The focus of the discourse of a crisis management war has em-
phasized the change in the security environment, Finland’s connec-
tions with the West and the creation of new military capabilities. It 
is closely associated with the change which has come about in interpre-
tations and understandings of the international indicators of military 
power and of what constitutes a credible military defence capacity. In 
addition, Finland’s more active participation in international crisis 
management has represented on the one hand a positive response 
to the international pressure for the western nations to recognise 
their ‘responsibilities’ for intervening in humanitarian crises on a 
more or less global scale and on the other hand a conscious effort 
to construct and foster a western identity. After all, the pressure to 
participate in these operations is precisely a question of a western 
identity. It is essential for Finland to take part in more operations of 
this kind, and in more demanding ones, in order to be at the core of 
the western security community. In this sense participation in cri-
sis management operations can also be regarded as an opportunity 
to defuse the ‘identity crisis’ with respect to the western community 
caused by Finland’s continued adherence to a strong territorial defence 
tradition.
The discourse of an SFVS war has altered the emphasis within 
Finnish territorial defence – and at the same time the discourse of a 
war of territorial defence – from the country’s boundaries to the sites 
and functions that are vital to its society. In addition, it has followed 
the international trend in bringing the activities of the defence forces 
closer to those of the other authorities responsible for internal se-
curity – naturally mainly from the perspective of the administrative 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence. This closer link between in-
ternal and external security, to the extent that it has become more 
difficult than ever to make a clear distinction between them, has 
nevertheless been perceived to be problematic, as it implies that 
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any strengthening and expansion in the discourse of an SFVS war 
will require a re-appraisal of the principles of action that the various 
authorities have inherited from the Cold War era and the division 
of labour between them. If we look on politics in the constructivist 
sense as a struggle over meanings, then the potential strengthening 
of the discourse of an SFVS war can be regarded as leading sooner or 
later to a struggle between various branches of the administration over 
a ‘new’ Finnish definition of security and the associated redistribution 
of resources and hierarchical command relations. He who exercises 
control over the dividing line between internal and external secu-
rity and defines their mutual importance will also be able to control 
the allocation of resources between the branches of the administra-
tion responsible for security. It is important to realise, however, that 
the potential strengthening of the discourse of an SFVS war will not 
necessarily lead to competition for resources between the various 
ministries involved, as Finnish security policy is very largely shaped 
nowadays as a part of that of the western security community within 
a globalizing international system, and a more general definition of 
security and dividing line between internal and external security can 
be expected to be laid down in the future by a consensus achieved 
by state-level actors in the international system, so that national se-
curity policy decisions will take place on this basis.
The discourse of a techno-war has provided legitimacy for a re-
vision of the Finnish territorial defence over the last decade, imply-
ing at the same time a relaxing of the historical grip of the Cold War 
over the Finnish defence solution of the information age. Techno-
warfare represents the modern trend in the development of armed 
forces in the West, so that it is quite natural that it should have been 
introduced into the Finnish defence policy discussion and have be-
come one of the guiding principles for the development of the de-
fence system, in spite of the fact that Finland is something of a ‘black 
sheep’ within its western reference group on account of its retention 
of universal male conscription, its territorial defence system and the 
strong will of its population to defend their country. Thus the creation 
of a wartime techno-warfare capability within the defence forces can 
be looked on not only as a means of developing military efficiency 
but also as one possibility for normalizing Finland’s somewhat excep-
tion defence solution in the eyes of its western reference group. In this 
way Finland is in a sense ‘buying itself into’ the West as it sets out 
both to develop the appropriate capabilities for international crisis 
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management operations and to invest in techno-warfare capabilities 
for its own national defence.
The challenges posed by the international security environ-
ment for the development of the Finnish defence system and the 
discourses directing that development that have arisen on the basis 
of these challenges have meant as far as the Finnish defence sys-
tem is concerned a maintenance of the territorial defence system 
throughout the post-Cold War era, although in a constantly chang-
ing form as its content has been gradually adjusted in response to 
the slow decline in the military credibility of this territorial defence 
system inherited from the Cold War period. These adjustments are 
manifested in the following factors, for example:
1. The relative importance of defending the national territory has 
declined at the same time as the protection of sites and func-
tions that are vital to society has increased in importance in the 
development of the Finnish defence system.
2. The numbers of troops deployable at times of war have been 
reduced considerably, while standards for the training of the re-
maining troops have been raised and at least the units with the 
highest military capabilities have become more professional.
3. International crisis management collaboration has been com-
bined with development of the territorial defence system as part 
of the drive to improve military credibility, and the possibility of 
receiving outside assistance in the event of Finland being in-
volved in a crisis situation has been brought to the fore as one 
of the goals of collaboration in crisis management and indirect-
ly as a factor contributing to the credibility of the defence sys-
tem. In addition to the aspirations for increasing the credibility 
of the national defence, international military cooperation in 
crisis management also served as an operational logic existing 
alongside territorial defence – although admittedly subordinate 
to it – in the uncertain and somewhat unpredictable interna-
tional political situation that followed the termination of the 
Cold War.
4. Greater emphasis has been placed on the role of the Defence 
Forces in providing support for the authorities responsible for 
internal security as new threats have increased in significance 
as security policy factors. The increase in the importance of 
these SFVS tasks may be seen as an operational logic existing 
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alongside territorial defence – although admittedly subordinate 
to it – in the situation in which the threat of a large-scale mili-
tary offensive against this country is – at least for the present 
– far less conspicuous.
5. Advanced technology has become the main factor governing 
the development of the defence forces within the present de-
cade. Network-enabled defence has become a central concept 
denoting the renewal of the territorial defence system and the 
seeking of international legitimacy for it.
As the concept of a war of territorial defence has declined in 
importance globally during the post-Cold War era, so the emerging 
discourses of a crisis management war, an SFVS war and a techno-
war that have contributed to the Finnish image of war have proved 
to be those which bind the development of this country’s defence 
forces most closely with the western security community. Likewise, 
the tradition of territorial defence, which continues to be strong in 
Finland, has altered over this same period under the influence of the 
crisis management war, SFVS war and techno-war discourses. Main-
tenance of the credibility of the Finnish defence system – as part of 
the western security community – has called for the gradual phasing 
down of the significance of territorial defence and the adjustment 
of its content. Thus we are in a situation where a crisis management 
war, an SFVS war and a techno-war, as discourses constructing the 
Finnish image of war – and thus forming the foundation of the Finn-
ish defence system – have made it possible to develop the defence 
forces in accordance with the general principles applying to armed 
forces in the West at the same time as the Finns’ interpretations of 
their country’s geostrategic position and the lessons learned from 
their historical experiences have underlined the significance of the 
tradition of territorial defence and the necessity for ensuring its con-
tinued existence.
The alteration in the image of war that has occurred in the glo-
balizing world of the post-Cold War era and the western trend for 
attaching greater significance to expeditionary military operations 
have gradually emerged as factors casting doubts on the Finnish de-
fence system as inherited from the Cold War period. One response 
to this pressure for change exerted on the logic of Finnish military 
activity by the external operational environment has been the deci-
sion to develop the troop interoperability required for internation-
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al military crisis management, following which the requirements 
placed on these troops and their capabilities have gradually been 
raised in accordance with the global trend. By following this line of 
development towards international crisis management and expedi-
tionary operations, Finland has begun to boost the credibility of its 
defence forces in a situation in which the global credibility of an ex-
tensive army based of the mobilization of reservists for the repulsion 
of a mass military incursion has been gradually declining. Participa-
tion in multinational crisis management operations has thus made it 
possible to develop military cooperation with the West (including the 
western identity aspect) and to maintain the credibility of the coun-
try’s own territorial defence system by integrating the experiences 
acquired and lessons learned from crisis management operations 
into the development of troops for territorial defence purposes. It 
should also be noted that as the discourse of a war of crisis manage-
ment has gradually gained in strength these operations have taken 
on a ‘natural’ or ‘self-evident’ character. It is now taken for granted in 
the first decade of the new millennium that Finland will participate 
in crisis management operations. These are an everyday part of the 
work of the Defence Forces and an element in building up Finland’s 
western identity in the military sector. Also connected with this trend 
are the many opinions put forward on how essential it is for Finland 
to take part in more demanding crisis management operations ever 
further away from home in order to relieve human suffering.
As discourses involved in the construction of the Finnish im-
age of war, and thereby in the development of the Finnish defence 
system, both the discourse of a crisis management war and that of 
a techno-war have served to alter and to reduce the significance of 
the tradition of a war of territorial defence during the post-Cold War 
era. These two discourses are indeed the main ones affecting the 
Finnish discourse of war that have done most to re-shape the tradi-
tion of a war of territorial defence, by placing emphasis on troops 
capable of operating out-of-area and reforms in terms of weapons 
systems, command and control systems and a new operational cul-
ture. Furthermore, the crisis management war and techno-war dis-
courses have served to integrate the international trends of reducing 
troop sizes and favouring greater professionalism among personnel 
and more advanced technology in military equipment into the re-
vised territorial defence system. The discourse of an SFVS war has 
altered the Finnish tradition of a war of territorial defence mainly 
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from an internal perspective, by shifting the focus of defence to sites 
and functions of vital importance to society and emphasizing col-
laboration between all the relevant authorities in order to prevent 
and eliminate the new threats that have emerged.
The claim that Finland’s defence system has remained stable and 
unchanged during the post-Cold War era still raises its head, however, 
from beneath a surface composed of innumerable small changes and 
emergent trends, but a more detailed examination reveals that the ter-
ritorial defence system inherited from the Cold War period persists un-
altered only at a general conceptual level – and that even the concept of 
territorial defence is subject to considerable pressure for change.
The aim of this work has been to explain the formation of the 
principles governing the development of the Finnish defence system 
in the post-Cold War era in terms of the international security en-
vironment, the western image of war, the Finnish image of war and 
the Finnish security policy discourse centred on Russia. This exami-
nation from the perspective of change conducted within a construc-
tivist theoretical framework has demonstrated that there have been 
a number of factors connected with the development of the Finnish 
defence system during the post-Cold War era, the emergence and 
development of which as forces for practical changes in the defence 
system has been restrained by the general temporal inertia associ-
ated with the maintaining of a military defence. The construction of 
a new military capability can often take decades to complete, so that 
the abandoning of existing capabilities requires a thorough long-
term analysis of the security environment and the ability to predict 
military threat scenarios. In the case of Finland, it is the difficulty of 
evaluating and predicting developments in Russia that has meant 
that the changes in the defence system have been relatively moder-
ate by comparison with the average situation in the western coun-
tries. It would be justifiable to speak of minor changes and the con-
tinued existence of the relatively strong tradition of military-based 
territorial defence established during the Cold war period.
Military alliances – the construction of a western identity as re-
flected in the development of the defence system 
Certain factors began to appear in the formulation of Finnish security 
and defence policy around the mid-1990s that could be interpreted 
from a constructivist perspective as implying either reconstruction of 
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the Finnish identity or transformation of the identity inherited from 
the Cold War period. This reconstruction was manifested especially 
clearly in an emphasis on western connections in the development 
of Finnish security policy and an effort to make a break with the 
implicit sphere of influence of the Soviet Union/Russia soon after 
the Cold War had come to an end. A fairly clear desire for a change 
in Finnish identity, and indeed some actual change from the point 
of view of Finland’s security policy and the development of the De-
fence Forces, can be perceived in the 1995 security policy report:
“Following the end of the East-West dichotomy, the policy of 
neutrality that Finland pursued during the Cold War is no lon-
ger viable. … Under these new conditions Finland’s approach 
should be one of active participation in international politi-
cal and security policy cooperation in order to resolve security 
problems and prevent new ones from arising. …”
“With the change in the operational environment, Finland has 
been able to relieve itself of the position that it occupied inter-
nationally during the Cold War, the principal element in which 
was the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual As-
sistance concluded with the Soviet Union, and has set about es-
tablishing a new, equal relation with Russia in accordance with 
OSCE principles. …”
“With the end of the political division of Europe, Finland is 
no longer situated between East and West in terms of security 
policy. …”
“A substantial change has taken place in Finland’s international 
status now that it has become a member of an influential alli-
ance of nations, the European Union. …”
“The Finns’ world-view in the new Europe includes a great deal 
more international responsibility and solidarity. …”
“Membership of the European Union has clarified and strength-
ened Finland’s position by linking the country to the core of the 
European democracies.”258
The aim in the construction of Finland’s identity from the early 
258 Security in a changing world – guidelines for Finland’s security policy. Govern-
ment report to Parliament 6.6.1995 (1995), pp. 39-44 (in Finnish).
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1990s onwards was to convert this ‘borderland’ overshadowed by the 
Soviet Union or ‘buffer state’ between East and West into an insepa-
rable part of the core of the western world. This implied a symbolic 
rejection of the Cold War identity – which as far as security policy 
was concerned meant the policy of neutrality and the Agreement of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in particular. It also 
meant the creation and promotion of new symbols, customs and 
narratives indicative of a western identity, of which membership of 
the EU, cooperation with NATO and the emphasis placed on a more 
active role in international security initiatives and European solidar-
ity and responsibility were conspicuous indicators. 
The discussion concerning military alliance, i.e. possible mem-
bership of NATO, has been going on practically throughout the post-
Cold War era, although it should be noted that during the 1990s it 
characteristically started out from the assumption that there was no 
great need for any such alliance. The 1995 government report had 
this to say about NATO membership:
“Unlike the countries of Central Europe, Finland is not applying 
for membership of NATO. Finland has a smoothly functioning 
defence solution and does not experience any security deficit. If 
any essential change should take place in the security situation 
in Europe, Finland will evaluate its own security situation and 
related solutions in the light of such a development.”259 
A fairly cautious attitude towards NATO membership was also 
evident from the observation in the 1997 report that “Finland will 
evaluate the relative benefits and drawbacks of non-alliance and 
military cooperation in the event of an alteration in the security 
set-up in Europe and as a part of the development of the Europe-
an Union.” Mention was made here, however, of a credible defence 
capability as an essential part of the development of this country’s 
security policy. Application for NATO membership as such made its 
appearance as an implicitly acknowledged option towards the end 
of that decade, and it was noted in the first government security 
and defence policy report of the new millennium that military non-
alliance was regarded as the most suitable policy for Finland “under 
the prevailing conditions”. By 2004, however, the idea had matured 
a little further, and it was stated that “Finland is continuously moni-
259 Ibid., p. 34 (in Finnish).
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toring the changes occurring in NATO, the development of its ca-
pability and the organization’s international significance. Applying 
for membership of the alliance will remain a possibility in Finland’s 
security and defence policy also in the future.”260
It can also be seen from this gradual maturing of opinion re-
garding NATO membership over something like a decade that the 
military alliance question was mainly invoked within Finnish security 
and defence policy discussions in support of the discourse of a war of ter-
ritorial defence – or at least the discussion was entered into from the 
perspective of a war of territorial defence, with the accent placed on 
the need to maintain a credible national defence even when acting 
as part of a military alliance.261 Thus the discussions over NATO mem-
bership have not challenged the tradition of a war of territorial defence 
within Finnish security and defence policy to any significant extent. 
On the other hand, both the discourse of a crisis management war 
and that of a techno-war have played a part in raising the question 
of NATO membership. The connection between NATO and a crisis 
management war is concealed in the transformation of the former 
that took place after the termination of the Cold War, when crisis 
management became the most visible task undertaken by the al-
liance, leading to the present situation in which it is also the most 
important task. In addition, Finland’s increased stake in the devel-
opment of international crisis management cooperation has been 
achieved to an ever more prominent extent as a part of NATO op-
erations. The techno-war discourse, for its part, has been connected 
with the NATO discussion particularly on account of the problems 
arising from the exceptionally high costs of acquiring modern mili-
tary equipment and the question of international interoperability.262 
The replacement of Finland’s policy of neutrality with one of 
military non-alliance as part of the project of constructing a western 
identity has been one of the stumbling blocks as far as the defini-
260 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001. Government report to parliament, 
13.6.2001 (2001), section II; Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Govern-
ment report 6/2004 (2004), p. 82.
261 See Kaskeala (2002b); Kääriäinen (2006b) (in Finnish): “Even in the event of 
NATO membership the main task of the Defence Forces would be to defend 
Finland itself. The saving of money must not be a criterion for applying for 
membership, and NATO Finland should still be prepared to increase its defence 
budget. The defence of Finland will in any case still be primarily the responsibil-
ity of Finnish forces, whether we are part of an alliance or not.”
262 See Kääriäinen (2006b).
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tion of the country’s security and defence policy in the post-Cold 
War era is concerned. On the one hand, the transition from neu-
trality to non-alliance marks one step towards a western identity, 
especially since abandonment of the neutrality policy has stood as 
a metaphor for escape from the difficult position that Finland oc-
cupied in international politics during the Cold War. On the other 
hand, many countries that previously belonged quite explicitly to the 
eastern block (the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Po-
land, Hungary etc.) have taken considerable steps towards the West 
and many have joined the European Union and particularly NATO. 
As the above quotations from the 1995 government report indicate, 
as far as its alliance policy was concerned Finland did not belong to 
the group of Central European countries which initiated a power-
ful drive for rapid integration with the West in all aspects of society 
once the dissolution of the Soviet Union became a reality. In fact, 
from the identity perspective, the achieving of NATO membership 
immediately after the end of the Cold War would have had the effect 
of associating Finland with that group of ‘westernizing’ eastern block 
countries, which, having spent the whole of the Cold War period 
on the brink between East and West, Finland was not prepared to 
countenance. On the other hand, Finland’s ‘late awakening’ to the 
possibility of NATO membership, has raised the question of what 
reference group the country in fact belongs to at the present time, as 
many of the current Partnership for Peace countries are located on 
the borders of Europe or beyond, and the only ones among them 
that meet the criteria for western status are Sweden, Austria, Ireland, 
Switzerland and Finland. It should also be noted that even joining 
NATO after the former eastern block countries may pose a problem 
for Finland’s identity, as in spite of having regarded itself for decades 
as in part a western state, it may well end up in the same reference 
group as these former East European countries as far as security and 
defence policy is concerned.
“The Partnership for Peace cooperation is facing major new 
challenges. Originally it was mainly intended for the coun-
tries seeking NATO membership but which the alliance was 
not prepared to adopt immediately. For those countries and the 
countries that were not applying for membership it provided an 
opportunity to cooperate with NATO and to carry out reforms 
in their defence and security sectors. Most of the states that 
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were seeking to join NATO are now members of the alliance, 
while the remaining partnership countries have become an in-
creasingly heterogeneous association. It comprises the five mil-
itarily non-allied countries of Western Europe (Austria, Finland, 
Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland) and countries in the Western 
Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. New partnership can-
didates are Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, which have already submitted PfP applications.”263
The question of NATO membership is a relevant one in Finland 
nowadays in connection with problems arising from both the de-
velopment of the defence system and the construction of a western 
identity. Membership might well have the effect of making it pos-
sible to develop the defence system in a more cost-effective manner, 
but at the same time it could in part link Finland in terms of identity 
with the group of East European countries that had been within the 
sphere of influence of the Soviet Union and, in fear of Russia, rushed 
at full speed to NATO in search of security guarantees under Article 
V. Finland is not desirous of adopting that kind of identity at the 
present moment, nor does it wish to do anything that would pre-
cipitate such a situation.
The highly controversial security and defence policy question of 
NATO membership thus certainly cannot be decided exclusively on 
the result of a cost-benefit analysis based on instrumental rational-
ity, but rather it will inevitably include elements of both normative 
rationality and communicative-expressive rationality. The factors in 
NATO membership that carry an element of normative rationality 
will be focused especially on how Finland, as a member of an alli-
ance regarded in the West as legitimate, would be able to facilitate 
the shaping of the international security environment in accordance 
with normative international pressures by playing an active part in 
the ever more demanding military crisis management operations. 
As a member, Finland would, in accordance with western expecta-
tions, be redeeming its place among the western nations, as it were, 
by taking part in military action defined in a legitimate manner by 
western standards (cf. the shift in NATO activity from the defence 
of its own area towards a global crisis management role). The com-
municative-expressive factors linked to NATO membership are con-
263 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), p. 62.
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nected in particular with the opportunity for Finland, as a member 
of the most important military organization as far as building up 
a western identity is concerned, to demonstrate that it belongs to 
the West in defence policy terms as well as in other ways. For the 
present – while not a member of NATO – Finland has attempted to 
fill the ‘communicative gap’ left in its western identity by participat-
ing in progressively closer cooperation with NATO (from the early 
1990s onwards) and developing its own national defence system 
to be NATO-compatible, or as the 2004 government report puts it, 
“In order to ensure international military cooperation, the Defence 
Forces’ operational and material interoperability will be developed 
according to NATO standards and norms.”264
One problematic question from the perspective of normative 
rationality concerns the global legitimacy of NATO: Are its military 
interventions sufficiently widely accepted, even by non-members? It 
they are not, membership may prove awkward for Finland in spite of 
the fact that it may entail certain practical advantages as far as ter-
ritorial defence is concerned. The strident Russian criticism of NATO 
will certainly be one important factor to be taken into account when 
evaluating the alliance’s global legitimacy, and NATO’s growing role 
in anti-terrorist military operations and the connections between 
these and the US war on terrorism and that country’s military hege-
mony in general could well mean considerable normative disadvan-
tages in terms of the global legitimacy of NATO and the repercus-
sions of Finnish membership.265
264 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004. Government report 6/2004 (2004), p. 
101; it should be noted that the decision to develop the equipment possessed by 
the Finnish Defence Forces to be compatible with NATO standards and norms 
means that many existing systems will have to be replaced entirely with NATO-
compatible ones at the latest at the stage when the current equipment reaches 
an age at which it would need modernization to increase its service life any 
further. The existing wartime organization and peacetime equipment mainte-
nance and training organizations will have to be revised in connection with 
the acquisition of new western missile equipment, which will naturally involve 
substantial costs. 
265 Cf. Laitinen (2005), p. 75 (in Finnish): “The war on terrorism in particular has led 
to the globalization of US security policy, as did the Cold War in its time, and 
this has meant a change in the role of NATO and a need for other US allies in 
Europe and elsewhere to consider their positions and roles. The possibility of 
Finnish membership of NATO and the related discussion on the formation of 
professional rapid deployment troops or an increase in their numbers are also 
connected with this overall situation.  
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5. Conclusions
The broad issue that this work set out to examine, as formulated in 
Chapter 1, may be summarized in the following manner: How has 
the Finnish image of war changed since the end of the Cold War, and 
how has that change affected the principles for the development of the 
Finnish defence system? In order to proceed towards an examination 
of these matters, three more precise questions were put forward in 
that chapter, the first of which was How has the Western image of war 
changed since the end of the Cold War? An answer to this question was 
sought in Chapter 2, in which the conclusions were reached in the 
form of six discourses of war that can together be estimated to ac-
count for a significant proportion of the change that has taken place 
in the western countries. These discourses were concerned with:
1. The termination of the Cold War and the rise of globalization as 
a representation of the significant change in the security envi-
ronment that led to the need for a reinterpretation of the use of 
the force of arms.
2. The revolution in military affairs – a proposed change in the 
nature of armed forces and the reality of war brought about 
by the adoption of advanced technology – implemented under 
United States leadership, which has led to a transformation of 
the armed forces of the Cold War era towards those required in 
the new security environment. Crucial elements in this change 
have been a high degree of utilization of modern technology, 
network-centric systems, high technical quality, strategic mo-
bility, long-distance operations, precision impact and informa-
tion warfare.
3. The privatization of warfare – a process connected with the rev-
olution in military affairs    among western military forces which 
has had the consequence of reducing the manpower employed 
in those forces. Correspondingly, doubts have gradually come 
to be cast upon the military credibility of a force that relies on 
the mobilization of extensive reserves.
4. New wars – a trend associated with the changing security en-
vironment which has altered the reality of warfare and calls for 
new methods and doctrines regarding the deployment of mili-
tary forces on the part of the western countries.
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5. Military crisis management and humanitarian interventions – 
the post-Cold War western response, particularly to the emer-
gence of new wars. Crisis management has also become one of 
the new yardsticks for assessing military power. The capabil-
ity for taking part in demanding crisis management operations 
out-of-area as part of a multinational force constitutes a dem-
onstration of military power in the post-Cold War world.
6. The war on terrorism – a political choice made by the United 
States in connection with the militarization of the threat posed 
by terrorism, which has influenced the judgements and/or 
practical actions regarding the use of military force of all the 
state-level actors in the international system.
Under the influence of these discourses, the following have been 
among the issues touched upon by the themes of change that have 
dominated the western image of war in the post-Cold War era:
1. The scale of war has been reduced – encounters between large 
armed forces have become a rarity and the threat of a large-
scale nuclear war has gradually receded. One consequence of 
the latter, however, has been that various new threats in the 
form of terrorist groups, ‘rogue states’, etc. have increased in 
importance as factors to be considered with respect to nuclear 
weapons and the related technology.
2. The gradual transfer of warfare to the ‘sub-state’ level that was 
already visible during the Cold War has continued. Non-state 
actors are becoming more frequently involved in the wars that 
ravage the international system.
3. The development of armed forces has been largely directed by 
investments in advanced technology and the need for profes-
sionalization. This has meant reductions in the size of armed 
forces and an increase in the significance of international mili-
tary cooperation.
4. Multinational military interventions have become more com-
mon and the use of force has emerged during the post-Cold 
War period as much more of an instrument of foreign policy. 
Answers were sought in Chapter 3 to the second question, How 
has the Finnish image of war changed since the end of the Cold War? It 
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was observed that the Finnish image of war tended to follow that in 
the western countries as a whole in a “reticent”266 manner, chiefly on 
account of Finland’s historical experiences and geostrategic position. 
The trends observed in the western image of war for a reduction in 
the scale of wars, the increased importance of military crisis man-
agement, the transformation of armed forces (defence forces) with 
a greater accent on technology, and the need for increased coopera-
tion with other authorities could also be identified in the post-Cold 
War change in the Finnish image of war.
The fate of the Finnish image of war during the post-Cold War 
era can be described in terms of its fragmentation and attenuation. 
Fragmentation of the image of war may be seen in the transition from 
a war of territorial defence towards a more diverse and complex 
overall concept. Finnish interpretations of war have undergone a 
change in scale, so that the principal threat scenario in today’s world 
is no longer that of a major offensive by massed mechanized troops. 
Attenuation of the image of war, for its part, implies specifically a pro-
gressive reduction in the threat of a military offensive directed at 
Finland since the Cold War. The danger of a military incursion into 
Finnish territory, and likewise that of an attack upon sites and func-
tions of vital importance to society, an aspect which has gained in 
emphasis in recent times, is perceived to have diminished, and cor-
respondingly, the country’s defensive capabilities – naturally seen in 
relation to the dangers presenting themselves at any particular time 
– are felt to be at an unprecedentedly high level.
The post-Cold War fragmentation and attenuation of the Finn-
ish image of war has implied a certain pressure for change in the 
country’s defence system and development of its defence forces. The 
principal of a territorial defence system based on universal conscrip-
tion and a strong will among the people to defend their homeland 
has gradually been challenged as the majority of the western nations 
have transformed their armed forces, which has meant significant 
changes in their duties, composition and operating principles. There 
is nevertheless one clear element of continuity in the Finnish im-
age of war that has served to reproduce the military threat scenario 
inherited from the Cold War period throughout the post-Cold War 
266 The word ‘reticent’ should not be understood here as carrying any negative con-
notations. It largely reflects just a change that is taking place slowly. The slow 
reform of the defence system is not looked on in this connection as either an 
especially negative or especially positive thing. 
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era even though new threats have otherwise risen to occupy a cen-
tral position in the country’s security policy, and this is Russia – on 
account of its vast military potential and the unpredictability of its 
future development. Russia has played a significant role in bringing 
about the situation in which Finland has followed a more static line 
in its military development than has been common in the West as a 
whole.
Answers to the third and last question, How has the change in 
the Finnish image of war affected the development of the country’s de-
fence system in the post-Cold War era, were sought in Chapter 4. The 
discussion in Chapter 4 led to the identification from among the 
factors contributing to changes in the Finnish image of war of four 
discourses which were of significance from the point of view of the 
development of the defence system, namely:
1. The discourse of a war of territorial defence – a powerful com-
mon understanding inherited from the Cold War period of what 
types of military threat could be directed at Finland now and in 
the future and what kind of war Finland should be prepared for 
and how it should prepare itself.
2. The discourse of a crisis management war. When the promi-
nent position of a war of territorial defence was challenged in 
the course of the 1990s as a result of developments in the global 
security environment and changes in armed forces, military cri-
sis management began to grow in importance within the Finn-
ish defence system.
3. The discourse of an SFVS war – a description of a model of pre-
paredness for facing the new military threats that grew up out 
of the discourse of a war of territorial defence and represented 
an adaptation to the post-Cold War international security envi-
ronment.
4. The discourse of a techno-war, which has come to the fore as 
one major tool for implementing changes in the Finnish de-
fence system. It is this discourse that has enabled the gradual 
advance of changes in the principle of territorial defence that 
remained so powerful throughout the Cold War period and has 
allowed new focuses of emphasis to be introduced into it.
One of these four discourses that have influenced the develop-
ment of the Finnish defence system – that of a war of territorial de-
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fence – is a legacy from the days of the Cold War and is unquestion-
ably the leading discourse even today. It is indeed significant that 
throughout the post-Cold War era all discussions of the development 
of the Finnish defence system and implementations of decisions in this 
respect have taken place within a ‘permitted’ forum defined by the dis-
course of a war of territorial defence. The tradition of a war of territo-
rial defence has continued to dictate the agenda for developing the 
defence system even under post-Cold War conditions – although 
this discourse has admittedly been subject to gradual changes in the 
course of time. The other three discourses affecting the development 
of the Finnish defence forces, which have emerged since the Cold 
War, have thus had to take their place within the forum defined by 
that of a war of territorial defence. These discourses of change – those 
of a crisis management war, an SFVS war and a techno-war – have 
nevertheless effected changes in the tradition of a war of territorial 
defence as time has passed.
Russia is the principal reason why the reform of the Finnish 
defence system has proceeded in a rather “reticent” manner, at least 
relative to the situation in other western countries. Russia has not 
been felt to have constituted a threat to Finland during the post-
Cold War era, but the potential military threat that it represents – a 
danger that could possibly be realized at some time in the future – 
has guided the reform of the Finnish defence system on a fairly mod-
erate path. Without the influence of Russia’s military potential, the 
changes implemented by the Finns in accordance with their western 
reference group might easily have taken place more quickly.
One could very well say that Finland has been ‘trapped’ since 
the end of the Cold War between two competing logics for directing 
the development of its defence system. The military might of Rus-
sia has served to maintain a logic of territorial defence – albeit in a 
gradually altering form, and one which has been moving to some 
extent towards the western logic of techno-warfare as the modern-
ization of the Russian armed forces has proceeded. On the other 
hand, the construction of an identity for Finland as a part of Europe 
and the West has meant that efforts have been made to ‘implant’ a 
western defence philosophy. This has been manifested above all in 
the growing military crisis management and technological develop-
ment trends as parts of the reconstructed territorial defence system. 
Correspondingly, both international crisis management operations 
and network-centric systems based on advanced technology have 
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increased in importance in the development of the Finnish Defence 
Forces during the post-Cold War era.
In spite of the notable influence of Russia, the findings of the 
present work suggest that the western image of war has been ‘trans-
ferred’ to Finland in the form of small changes accomplished with 
only minor time-lags. This alteration in the image of war and the 
resulting changes in the Finnish defence system have not been re-
stricted to the instrumental logic governing that system – in the 
form of an objectively detectable improvement in the efficiency of 
the country’s defence – as the aims of the defence system and the 
goals directing the development of the Defence Forces are now very 
largely constructed on social criteria. The pressure of international 
norms regarding the development and deployment of armed forces 
is reflected in a change in the Finnish identity and in the influence 
of the reconstruction of this identity on the duties, material readi-
ness and modes of operation of the Defence Forces. The operational 
capabilities of the Defence Forces are not to be constructed on the 
strength of present and future threat scenarios alone, but will also 
be developed as a part of the broader, more long-term process of 
change in advanced western societies. Perhaps the most striking ex-
amples of this at present are the increased importance attached to 
international military crisis management cooperation and the grad-
ual steering of defence forces towards an internal security frame of 
reference. Naturally, both of these processes have been influenced 
by the reconstructed threat scenarios, but the western nations, 
which have been important as a reference group for the fostering 
of a Finnish identity, have also had an influence of their own both 
on security and defence policy and in the field of domestic policy in 
other respects.
Given that the discourses of a war of territorial defence, a crisis 
management war and an SFVS war that direct the development of 
the Finnish defence system are those that determine the principal 
tasks of the Defence Forces, it is the discourse of a techno-war that 
determines the means by which those tasks are to be successfully 
carried out. Thus the discourse of a techno-war can be regarded in a 
sense as a comprehensive concept of how the capabilities of the Defence 
Forces should be developed with a view to their future tasks. This dis-
course is indeed becoming established as a new developmental impera-
tive for the Defence Forces – an instrument in the transition from the 
tradition of a war of attrition to that of manoeuvre warfare. An influ-
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ential background factor in the development of the core of Finland’s 
techno-warfare capacity, its network-enabled defence, has been the 
discourse of the revolution in military affairs that has spread among 
the western countries. Networking of sensors with weapons systems 
and command and control systems will give rise to the information 
warfare systems by means of which the Defence Forces will be ca-
pable of discharging their tasks in a wide variety of future scenarios: 
a war of territorial defence, a crisis management war or an SFVS war. 
Thus techno-war as such, lying at the core of the Defence Forces’ 
new operational logic, is able to provide support for territorial de-
fence, crisis management operations and SFVS defence.
As well as being a new imperative constructing and maintain-
ing the credibility of the Defence Forces in the 21st century, the 
discourse of a techno-war is an instrument capable of influencing 
the reconstruction of Finland’s defence system. The Defence Forces 
should be developed – at least in part – in accordance with this west-
ern discourse, so that Finland, with its ‘exceptional’ defence system, 
and the Defence Forces, as the military actors in that system, should 
be capable of maintaining a military credibility in the eyes of the 
world at large. The gradually increasing emphasis laid on military cri-
sis management during the post-Cold War period is connected with 
this process of constructing the credibility of the Defence Forces, and 
it is clear that a strengthening of the discourses of a techno-war and 
a crisis management war and the effects of these on the post-Cold 
War development of the Defence Forces, will enable Finland in the 
future to demonstrate a capacity for expeditionary warfare – if it is 
deemed politically desirable to do so – and in that way to lay claim to 
a command of the internationally respected ‘new’ military capabili-
ties. The decision to take part in the European Union battlegroups 
and the powerful political pressure to contribute to the NATO NRF 
force are good examples of this construction of a military credibility 
at the point where the discourses of a techno-war and a crisis man-
agement war coincide.
The Finnish defence system, Quo vadis?
Significant changes have taken place in the international security 
environment since the days of the Cold War, and their repercussions 
are to be seen in the Finnish image of war that can be understood 
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as directing the development of the defence system and the Defence 
Forces. If the image of war is in the grip of change, then it is inevitable 
that the basic logic guiding the development of the defence system 
and the Defence Forces will also be subject to change. It is in this that 
the great challenge for the development of the defence system and 
the construction and maintenance of the capabilities of the Defence 
Forces is concealed. The question of what new or adjusted basic logic 
will suit the long-term development of the Finnish defence system 
best and how this new logic will affect the military capabilities that 
the Defence Forces has been building up over a number of decades 
will undeniably be high on the agenda in Finnish defence policy 
discussions and decision-making. The maturation of the basic logic 
behind the development of Finland’s post-Cold War defence system 
up to now had been incremental in character, advancing step by step 
along the path of change. The cornerstones of the Cold War defence 
system are still for the most part in existence today, or are at least 
visible in the revised territorial defence system as it is constructed. 
If trends in the international security environment and in the de-
velopment of the western armed forces continue as they have so 
far since the end of the Cold War, it is likely that the need will arise 
for a detailed analysis of the more long-term challenges facing the 
Finnish defence system. This analysis will no doubt be carried out in 
a continuous manner in both the Ministry of Defence and the De-
fence Forces. In addition, the defence policy decision-making elite 
will have an opportunity to compile a comprehensive synthesis of 
the basic logic of the defence system every four years in the form of 
a security and defence policy report to be submitted to parliament. 
It should be noted, however, that the government security 
and defence reports to parliament represent the prevailing politi-
cal will rather than an objective analysis of Finland’s security envi-
ronment, and that one cannot use them to derive decisions for the 
optimization of the country’s security policy situation by processes 
of instrumental rationality. The analysis of the security environment 
contained in such a report and the decisions taken with respect to 
the development of Finland’s defence system are based on socially 
constructed ‘facts’. The analytical tool employed in this work for the 
interpretative task involved is the concept of the image of war, which 
is a socially construed composite entity constructed in Finland under 
the influence of the international security environment.
As it would be impossible to attain an objective analysis of the 
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security environment, and as the development of a country’s defence 
forces must inevitably depend on ‘sub-optimal’ political decisions, 
the public discussion of defence policy that has taken place in Fin-
land will be of major significance for the future of both the defence 
system and the Defence Forces. It is for this reason that academic 
debate and public discussion regarding the analysis of the interna-
tional security environment and the principles for the development 
of the Defence Forces are of the utmost importance. A chorus of 
mixed voices on this question, which is so central to Finnish security 
and defence policy would appear to be more of a virtue than a vice. 
The present work should be viewed as one part of that discussion.
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